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Abstract
This study and numerous prior works have argued that remittances increase the likelihood
that states will implement external voting. However, quantitative studies have generally failed to
find a relationship between reliance on remittances and the adoption and implementation of
external voting. In this study it is argued that the pooling of observations from developed and
developing countries as well as autocracies and highly consolidated democracies has altered
previous results. Most studies have also not investigated possible non-linearities in the
relationship between remittances and external voting. The results of this study illustrate the nonlinear influence remittances have on non-autocratic developing countries in their decision to
implement external voting. The impact of remittances is positive at low to moderate levels, but
the effect weakens when remittances reach higher levels. Furthermore, the influence of
remittances at the subnational level in Mexico are also non-linear but different. Low to medium
levels of remittances make Mexican states less likely to implement external voting, but once
remittances per capita reach higher levels, subnational units become more likely to enfranchise
those abroad.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The 47th Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, Tip O’Neill, famously
stated that “…all politics is local” (Weitz-Shapiro 2008). Although O’Neill’s observation might
be accurate, it is also the case that domestic politics have become increasingly global (Koslowski
2005). It is now commonplace for politicians to cross international borders to ask for support
from emigrants.1 During these trips, politicians ask citizens abroad to vote for them, help finance
their campaigns, and ask their family and friends in the homeland2 to support their political
causes. However, emigrants also influence the politics of their home country in other ways than
just being involved in matters of electoral politics (Levitt, 1997; Guarnizo et al. 2003). For
example, by sending part of the money they earn in the host country back to their country of
origin, expatriates might influence elections and other facets of policy in their country of origin.
Remittances are commonly seen as a form of political investment (Ahmed 2017, 24), and
there are several reasons to expect that remittances deliver political power for emigrants who
transfer money back to their home country (Collyer 2006; Lyons and Mandaville 2010). First of
all, emigrants who send remittances can influence the political behavior of their family and
friends in the home country (Kapur 2010; Vari-Lavoisier 2016). Second, sending remittances
illustrates the continued engagement of emigrants in the politics of their country of origin
(Fitzgerald 2000; Hoffmann 2010; Burgess 2012a). Third, the inflow of remittances can have a
direct impact on the home country government’s macroeconomic performance and policy (Abdih

1
Similar to numerous authors (for example Turcu and Urbatsch 2015 , 429) I use the terms “emigrant” “expatriate”
“overseas voter” “diaspora” interchangeably to refer to a citizen or a group of citizens of a country who are abroad.
2
“Homeland”, “home country”, “country of origin”, “sending country/state” refers to the country a migrant has left
while “host country”, “destination country/state”, “receiving country/state” refers to the place they are currently
living.
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et al. 2012; Ahmed 2012; Easton and Montinola 2017). This is particularly the case in countries
where remittances represent a significant share of the country’s gross national product (GDP).
Fourth, political parties may view the financial contribution of their emigrant community as a
justification to enfranchise their citizens living abroad (Jimenez-Cuen 2008, 167-168). Fifth,
countries that rely on remittances may be motivated to put in place policies to encourage the
continued flow of money from their emigrant community (Itzigsohn 2000).
The central argument of this dissertation is that remittances do have political
consequences. Specifically, I focus on the argument that countries who are more reliant on
remittances are more likely to implement external voting.3 Many previous studies have argued
that remittances increase the likelihood that states will adopt or implement expatriate voting.
Nonetheless, quantitative studies, for the most part, have failed to find a relationship between
reliance of remittances and the adoption and implementation of external voting (Collyer and
Vathi 2007; Turcu and Urbatsch 2015). The lack of findings has led scholars to doubt this
relationship. I argue that it is important to distinguish between developed and developing
countries. The level of economic development might impact the motivations for enfranchising
those abroad. Many high-income countries4 have implemented external voting. However,
developed countries are less likely to be dependent on remittances. In this dissertation I test
separate models in which high-income countries are dropped from the sample. I assume that
developing countries are likelier to be swayed to adopt favorable policies for their emigrant
community such as external voting due to the remittances they receive.

3

External voting refers to where citizens are allowed to vote when they are not located in their home country. The
term “external voting” is used interchangeably with “voting from abroad” and “expatriate voting.”
4
The term “high-income country” is used interchangeably with “developed country” and “lower-and-middle-income
country” with “developing.”
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Furthermore, I contend that there are distinctions between countries which have some
components of democratic governance and autocracies. Generally speaking, the decision to
implement external voting has a greater potential political impact in democracies. Particularly,
in democratic countries that have a considerable percentage of their citizens living abroad.
Politicians in countries that are not democratic do not face the same potential political
consequences as those in countries in which there are some components of democratic
governance. Subsequently, models are tested in which countries with a negative Polity score are
dropped. I also expect the relationship between remittances and the likelihood of a government
implementing external voting to be non-linear following the findings of Erlingsson and Tuman
(2017). This hypothesis is tested at the country level, but also by examining Mexico’s 32
subnational units.
The inflow of remittances has drastically increased in the past decades. In 2017, lowerand-middle-income countries (LMICs) received a record-breaking $466 billion current dollars
(World Bank 2017). In 2018, this number is expected to reach $528 current billion, more than a
10 percent annual increase (Ratha 2018). Remittances represent a substantial source of foreign
income for many developing countries. For example, in 2015 remittances as a of GDP exceeded
25 percent in Haiti, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Nepal, Tajikistan, and Tonga (see table 3.2). In this
dissertation, I add to the nascent literature researching the political consequences of remittances
by examining the influences remittances have on the likelihood of states implementing external
voting laws.
A majority of the countries in the world that hold elections have now enfranchised their
citizens abroad (Braun and Gratschew 2007). External voting has been implemented by both left
and right leaning governments, wealthy and poor countries, as well as by consolidated
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democracies and autocracies. Furthermore, voting rights for citizens living abroad are currently
being debated in numerous high-income and LMICs and set to be implemented for the first time
in the upcoming years. Subnational governments have also begun to allow for external voting.
For example, six Mexican states and the federal district (Mexico City) allowed those living
abroad to vote for gubernatorial candidates in elections that took place in July 2018. Overseas
voters have also been permitted to weigh in on recent controversial plebiscites such as the
independence referendums that took place in 2017 in Catalonia and Kurdistan.
The prevalence of external voting and other policies geared towards the emigrant
community has shown that migrating away from the home country is no longer synonymous with
the loss of voice (Hoffmann 2010). This message has been illustrated directly by states
becoming more willing to tolerate dual citizenship. Furthermore, as Gamlen, Cummings, and
Vaaler (2017) note, in 2012 a total of 27 countries had put into place specific government
ministries for their diaspora population. However, out of all these different programs, external
voting is the most controversial (Collyer and Vathi 2007; Collyer 2014a).5 Expatriate voting is
unique in the sense that it can reshape the political balance within a country (Escobar 2007, 69).
Recent political controversies have also illustrated that policymakers are still assessing
how to react to the internationalization of domestic politics. For example, the implementation of
external voting in Turkey has been a very delicate issue for foreign governments. Turkish
politicians have made frequent trips abroad to Western Europe where approximately 4.6 million
Turkish citizens reside (Capone and de Guttry 2017). Several European governments made it
clear that they do not want inflammatory Turkish political issues to spread into their territory.

5

There are also notable controversies on the allowance of dual citizenship. At the time of this writing, Australia has
just gone through a dual citizenship controversy which resulted in more than a dozen members of parliament having
to resign including a former deputy prime minister (Baidawi 2018). Furthermore, politicians in several countries are
debating whether to allow or ban dual citizenship.
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These controversies were particularly evident during the 2017 referendum which shifted political
power away from the Turkish parliament to President Erdoğan. During the referendum
campaign, bilateral relations between the Netherlands, Germany, and Turkey soured and
eventually turned into a diplomatic incident when the Dutch government barred Turkish
ministers from speaking at a pro-Erdoğan rally in Rotterdam (Gumrukcu and Escritt 2017).
Turkey allowed its substantial emigrant community to vote at 120 diplomatic missions in
57 countries (BBC News 2017a), and external Turkish voters ended up being more supportive of
the referendum compared to their compatriots living in Turkey.6 The pro-Erdoğan vote among
Turkish voters abroad compelled German politicians to consider changing the country’s dual
citizenship rules (Huggler 2017). President Erdoğan retaliated by suggesting that German voters
of Turkish descent should not vote for certain German parties including Chancellor Angela
Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union and the Social Democratic Party (Allen-Ebrahimian
2017).
Emigrants also have a long history of being active participants in the politics of their
homeland. They have helped facilitate peaceful regime transitions (Wucker 2004), but also
caused instability and contributed to civil conflicts (Miller and Ritter 2014). Money transfers
sent from the emigrant community to a conflict zone can be used to finance warfare (Collier and
Hoeffler 2004). The diaspora community can also at times be less willing to compromise which
can make it more difficult to achieve a peaceful settlement (Lyons 2007).
Additionally, some countries have been able to mobilize their emigrant community to
lobby host governments to adopt policies favorable to the emigrants’ home government. For

6

The pro-reform yes vote won a narrow victory of 51.41% to 48.59%. However, in Germany the yes vote received
63%, in the Netherlands 70%, in France 64%, and in Austria 73% (BBC News 2017b)
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example, the Mexican government saw Mexican-Americans as a strategic ally in pushing for the
ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement (Levitt and De la Dehesa 2003; Lafleur
2008; Délano 2009). Other states, such as the Dominican Republic, have wanted their emigrant
community to become more politically active in their host countries to push for a similar deal
(Itzigsohn 2000; Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008).
There are many theoretical explanations why countries implement external voting. One
such explanation argues that external voting is emerging into a democratic norm similarly to the
enfranchisements of women and minority groups in the past. The surge in countries
democratizing certainly provided the opening for countries to open up the electoral process for
citizens living abroad. Many emigrants have also stayed engaged in their country of origin while
policymakers started to portray their emigrant community in a more positive manner. Another
strand of the literature has focused more on economic issues. States see their emigrant
community as a resource not only to help increase exports, but also as a way to attract foreign
direct investment. Furthermore, authors have argued that the reliance of remittances has
motivated countries to implement external voting.
According to a recent report from the United Nations (2017), more than 250 million
people are situated in another country than they were born. Numerous LMICs have seen a large
portion of their populations emigrate. In 2015 nine countries had 20 percent or more of their
population living abroad (Connor 2016), eight of the nine were LMICs.7 The potential political
impact will increase significantly if voting rights are also extended to those with a more distant
heritage. External voters have already impacted several elections. For example, in 2006, voters

7

Portugal, a country with a long history of emigration, was the only high-income country. The other countries
included Albania, Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Republic of Macedonia, Syria, and Trinidad
and Tobago.

6

abroad were perceived to have shaped electoral results in Cape Verde (Hartmann 2015, 918),
Italy (Lafleur 2013a), and Peru (Escrivá, Santa Cruz and Bermúde 2010). Furthermore, voters
from abroad are likely to sway elections in the future as more countries continue to allow their
emigrant community to partake in elections.
The organization of the remainder of the dissertation is as follows. The second chapter
reviews some of the most prominent explanations of why states implement external voting and
other policies for their emigrant community. The third chapter discusses the theoretical
explanation as to why reliance on remittances might lead countries to implementing external
voting. The fourth chapter tests the political influences of remittances in the implementation of
external voting at the country level. The fifth chapter reviews the literature on external voting at
the subnational level in Mexico. The sixth chapter examines the implementation of external
voting at the subnational level by focusing on subnational units in Mexico. The seventh chapter
reviews the finding of the dissertation, its limitations, and avenues for future studies.
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Chapter 2
Explanations for the Implementation of External Voting: Literature Review
It has been more than a decade since Collyer and Vathi (2007) found that 115 countries
had allowed their citizens living abroad to vote in their country of origin. Up until that point,
there was little academic interest in external voting, with most studies tending to severely
underestimate the number of countries that had implemented voting from abroad (Collyer and
Vathi 2007). The illustration of the prevalence of expatriate voting around the world, along with
a report published by the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) (Ellis et al.
2007), has helped spark an impressive amount of research examining expatriate voting, and other
rights and policies states have granted to their citizens abroad.
In the past few years, there have been numerous in-depth case studies demonstrating the
political process that takes place before external voting is accepted (Lisi et al. 2015; Wellman
2015; Jaulin 2016) and some comparative political examinations focusing on a few countries
(Lafleur 2011; Lapp 2019). Some of the literature has examined a number of countries in one
region, such as Latin America (Escobar 2015; Hartman 2015; Erlingsson and Tuman 2017),
while others employ a mixed methods approach (Lieber 2010; Rhodes and Harutyunyan 2010).
There are also large-N studies that include observations from more than 100 countries (Turcu
and Urbatsch 2015). Furthermore, recent research has shown the noteworthy differences in the
implementation of external voting (Collyer 2014a; Hutcheson and Arrighi 2015; Turcu 2017;
Waterbury 2018). This latter literature seeks to understand why states delay implementing
external voting (Palop-García and Pedroza 2018) or it focuses on the approaches and issues
governments and political parties are using to engage with their emigrant community (Gudelis
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and Klimavičiūtė 2016; Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2017; Paarlberg 2017a and 2017b;
Koinova 2018).
It is difficult to explain why states engage with their population abroad, as this
relationship is dependent on numerous influences which change over time (Délano and Gamlen
2014). In this chapter, I focus on three general explanations which are frequently discussed in
the literature on external voting. First, external voting has occurred as migrants have been
integrated into “imagined communities” (Anderson 2006). A transformation occurred among
political leaders who stopped portraying their emigrant community as no longer being engaged
in their country of origin. Furthermore, those living abroad were willing participants in their
homeland by sending back remittances, but also by speaking to their friends and family back
home about political matters. I also argue that politicians have been willing to enfranchise those
abroad partly because they know external voter turnout will be low following the rationality of
voting.
Second, expatriate voting has increased rapidly in the last few decades as the third-wave
of democratization (Huntington 1991) has created a window-of-opportunity for emigrants to be
enfranchised. External voting has arguably become a democratic norm where allowing for those
living abroad to vote is seen as a step towards democratic consolidation. This opening of
democratic governance has created an opportunity for political negotiation among politicians
who must weigh the cost and benefits of adopting and implementing external voting.
Third, states have wanted to implement external voting due to financial considerations. States
see their emigrant community as a resource to be more competitive in a globalized world.
Governments are aware of the consequential role migrants can have in both attracting investment
and helping their economy adjust to the world economy (Leblang 2010, 587-588). Likewise,
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many states have become reliant on the remittances their emigrant community sends back.
Therefore, governments try to maximize the engagement of their emigrant community by
creating incentives, such as external voting, for them to be engaged in their home countries
(Gudelis and Klimavičiūtė 2016). In return, states hope that those abroad will continue to keep
sending money back home.

Changes in Attitudes toward Emigrants
Emigrants do not automatically cut ties when they leave. Many migrants maintain
connections within their country of origin (Glick Schiller, Basch, and Blanc‐Szanton 1992;
Graham 1997; Guarnizo, Portes and Haller, 2003; Fagen and Bump 2006; Levitt and Jaworsky
2007; Soehl and Waldinger 2010). They stay connected not only to family and friends but also
to the state of affairs in the home country. Emigrants may discuss politics, organize to improve
the communities they left, and shape various institutions back home (Haller and Landolt 2005).
These connections are not a new phenomenon. Migrants in the past often stayed connected
(Itzigsohn 2000; Waldinger 2013; Pogonyi 2015), and some states sought to engage with them
(Shain 2010; Collyer 2013). Nonetheless, home country governments were often wary of
diaspora involvement in their internal affairs.
For many years, governments in host and sending states tended to oppose the idea of
migrants being politically active in both countries. Receiving states who favored assimilation
expected migrants to eventually give up their transnational connections (Wimmer and Glick
Schiller 2002). They were fearful of political divisions in the country of origin starting to
manifest themselves with higher levels of immigration (Sheffer 2003; La 2004; Bauböck 2007;
Mencütek 2015). This view was buttressed by policymakers in many sending states who were
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also not interested in expatriates interfering in their politics. Leaders in home governments were
suspicious of emigrants and often portrayed them in a negative manner (Joppke 2003; Bauböck
2005; Fox and Bada 2008; Burgess 2018). Furthermore, the emigrant community has often been
seen as being out of touch with their homeland (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a; Turner and Kleist
2013). In what follows, I elaborate on several themes that were often employed to oppose
emigrant enfranchisement.
In some cases, the diaspora community was seen as being detrimental to the stability of
their country of origin. The question of whether a country’s diaspora promotes or impedes peace
is debated among scholars.8 Studies have shown the convoluted relationship among those living
abroad and stability in their country of origin. There are numerous examples of diaspora groups
acting both to improve and diminish the likelihood of peace (Horst 2008; Brinkerhoff 2011;
Délano and Gamlen 2014; Miller and Ritter 2014; Beyene 2015; Mariani, Mercier, and Verdier
2018). Some studies, such as Preotu (2016), find that the likelihood of civil conflict is decreased
by emigration to developed countries. Similarly, Regan and Frank (2014) find that an increase in
remittances during crises minimizes the likelihood of a civil war. The diaspora can also have a
moderating effect (Koinova 2011a; 2013) and help alleviate suffering after the conflict (Fagen
and Bump 2006; Brinkerhoff 2011; Hoehne, Feyissa, Abdile 2011; Duval and Wolff 2016).9
However, other studies, such as an influential work by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find
that having a large emigrant community in the United States increased the likelihood of a civil
war reemerging.10 Furthermore, Miller and Ritter (2014) show that an increase in financial
8

See special issue in the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies (2018) 44(8): Diaspora Mobilizations for Conflict
and Postconflict Reconstruction: Contextual and Comparative Dimensions. Also Smith and Stares (2007).
9
The World Bank estimates that in 2015 remittances represented 4.15% of GDP in current USD in fragile and
conflict affected situations. Information gathered from Personal remittances, received (% of GDP) World Bank
(n.d) dataset (Last accessed November 29, 2018).
10
Collier and Hoeffler have been criticized for measuring the size of the emigrant community in the United States as
a proxy for financial contributions they send to rebels (see Nathan 2005, 8). Collier and Hoeffler also recognize that
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resources migrants send to their homeland raises the likelihood of civil war. Diaspora groups are
also known to help develop and fund resistance groups (Gunaratna 2002; La 2004; Salehyan and
Gleditsch 2006; Koinova 2018), as well as for being divisive and less willing to compromise
than those back home (Lyons 2007; Horst 2008; Lampert 2009; Koinova 2011b; Heindl 2013).
Many states have also opposed their emigrant community getting involved in their
domestic affairs due to their contentious relationship with each other. This opposition is
particularly true for autocratic or semi-democratic regimes, which have often been mistrustful of
their emigrant population. Migrants who move away from countries with autocratic leadership
are less likely to have left due to economic reasons compared to those that leave democracies
(Mirilovic 2015). Numerous authoritarian governments closely monitor those living abroad
(Brand 2014; Michaelsen 2018) in order to see if they are helping opposition forces in their home
country. In some cases, leaders in authoritarian regimes have resorted to murdering dissidents or
prominent opposition figures living abroad (Shain 1989; Stern 2010; Mirilovic 2015). The
recent, alleged, assassinations of Saudi Arabian journalist Jamal Khashoggi as well as the halfbrother of North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-Un, Kim Jong-nam, illustrates this point. Some
authoritarian countries such as North Korea are also known to force people to move abroad while
the North Korean state takes a majority cut of their wages (McLaughlin 2018). The relationship
between the state and its emigrant community can also be based on the ethnic and religious
characteristics of those who lives abroad.

their findings might not necessarily indicate that a large emigrant community in the United States is causing conflict.
The authors write, “[w]hile this result may indicate that diasporas increase the risk of conflict through their finance
of rebel organizations, it is also open to a more anodyne interpretation. Diasporas are endogenous to the intensity of
conflict: when civil war occurs, people emigrate to the USA. Hence, the size of the diaspora might be proxying the
intensity of conflict” (2004, 575).
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Many diaspora groups are comprised of different communities with diverse interests
(Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b; Berg and Tamagno 2006; Baser and Swain 2008; Dufoix 2008;
Hoehne, Feyissa, Abdile 2011; Turner 2013; Singh and Singh 2014; Yefet 2017). States may
view some group of citizens living abroad more favorably than others. This distinction can be
based on various characteristics, such as social class, level of education, ethnicity, or religion.
For example, the Turkish government has regularly reached out to Turks abroad while being
apprehensive of the Kurdish population (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a, 772). This can also be
dependent on numerous other factors, such as professional success, i.e., the case of India
(Dickinson and Bailey 2007) or, more recently, Turkey.11 States also opposed continued political
engagement from their emigrant community as it was seen as going against the long-held notion
of sovereignty.
Over time, the negative view of emigrants has started to dissipate in many sending states.
Policymakers now often celebrate their diasporic community (Adamson and Demetriou 2007;
Gamlen 2008b Ragazzi 2009; Kapur 2010; Gamlen 2013; Turner and Kleist 2013; Ragazzi 2014;
Boccagni, Lafleur, and Levitt 2016). Instead of politicians from home countries speaking in
undesirable terms about their emigrant community, many now use inclusionary terms, such as
those abroad being a part of the “global nation” (R Smith 2003). This is exemplified by the fact
that the African Union has designated its diasporic community the “sixth region” of Africa
(Crush and Chikanda 2017), the Peruvian state calling those abroad as part of the “fifth region”
(Berg and Tamagno 2006 as cited in Chaudhary 2018), and the conception of the “tenth
department” in Haiti (Itzigsohn 2000). This transformation is illustrated by Wucker when the

11

It should be noted that after the post-coup crackdown by President Erdoğan in 2016, Turkey has seen many
educated citizens leave the country as they fear for their freedom and security (Zambrana and Türkeri 2018). Since
the attempted coup, the Turkish state emphasized its perception of viewing some in the diaspora community as
friends and others as enemies (Yanasmayan and Kaşlı 2019, 28).

13

author states “…the mantra is no longer ‘Go away and Stay away’, but ‘Go and don't forget us’”
(2004, 37).
There has also been a change in the notion of nationhood and who is eligible for suffrage.
In the Westphalian system, a central assumption for suffrage was based on residency (Caramani
and Grotz 2015). However, states have been moving away from this rational by implementing
external voting, and, more profoundly, by also creating electoral districts representing migrants
in their legislature. In effect, these districts include other sovereign countries. Collyer (2014b,
64) found that, as of October 2013, 13 countries had set up such special districts. This
transformation towards the idea of transnational citizenship is also seen in the Ecuadorian
constitution, which was approved in 2008. The constitution advocates for transnational ties and
calls for universal citizenship (Margheritis 2011; Ramírez 2016).
States can channel their change in attitudes towards citizenship and their citizens living
abroad by implementing external voting. Therefore, some argue that expatriate voting laws are
put in place for symbolic reasons designed to reinforce the feeling of membership between
migrants and their country of origin (Collyer and Vathi 2007; Levitt and De la Dehesa 2003).
Scholars, such as Bauböck (2007), have highlighted how states can incorporate their migrant
community by emphasizing political communities which are not based on geographical
boundaries. Moreover, the implementation of external voting can also be a symbolic illustration
of a state’s democratic governance (Levitt 2001a).
The transformation in attitudes has opened up policy space for emigrants. Interestingly,
sending states who used to be apprehensive of those abroad have not shifted their position to one
of indifference as we might expect their default position to be (Bauböck 2003). Instead, many
have adopted a policy of active engagement (Délano 2009; Bada and Gleeson 2015) where their
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relationship with the migrant community is formalized by implementing policies, such as
external voting. These policies go against the longstanding principle that states should not
promote actions that might interfere with the domestic politics of other states (Gamlen 2008a;
Délano 2009). The fact that more than 150 countries currently allow for external voting certainly
illustrates that states want to maintain a political relationship with those abroad (Frizzo and
Mascitelli 2018). This message has been furthered directly by states becoming more willing to
tolerate dual citizenship. Dual citizenship facilitates the process for emigrants to stay connected
to their home country after they leave (Bauböck 2003; Ratha et al. 2011; Mirilovic 2015). Also,
the expansion of rights towards those living abroad has occurred due to the transnational
behavior of those that have left.
As levels of emigrant engagement increased with selected home countries, governments
in the sending states were encouraged to implement policies aimed at building higher levels of
attachment with those abroad. In most cases, states are not going to implement policies for those
abroad unless there is some mutual interest. Unless it is done for purely symbolic reasons, such
as when authoritarian governments implement external voting as a façade of holding meaningful
elections. In some cases, those abroad are skeptical of the motivations of the outreach from their
homeland. Emigrants are unlikely to favor the right to vote or participate in elections if the home
country government is not trusted to hold free and fair elections (Hartmann 2015; Boccagni,
Lafleur, and Levitt 2016), or if the emigrant community is skeptical of the outreach from their
homeland. Østergaard-Nielsen illustrates this dilemma by stating “…it is not easy to convince
an overseas community of the sincerity of official interest after years of neglect” (2003a, 767).
For example, Turner and Kleist (2013, 192) argue that mistrust is the customary position in the
relationship between African countries and their diaspora. Technological advancements have
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also made it easier for states to be more involved with their emigrant community, whether it be
to strengthen ties with them or to track them for nefarious purposes (Michaelsen 2018).

Emigrant Engagement
Due to advancements in communication technologies, it is now easier for migrants to
maintain connections with their home country than before (Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt 1999;
Vertovec 2004a and 2004b; Barry 2006; Adamson and Demetriou 2007; Fargues 2011). When
migrants have access to the internet, they can readily access news from their country of origin in
their native language. Studies have shown the importance of media availability in the vernacular
to get migrants engaged in the politics of their homeland (Leal, Lee, and McCann 2012; Sui and
Paul 2017). Technological improvements has also drastically lowered the cost of
communicating with friends and family back home. For example, in the 1990s, the cost of
making international calls decreased greatly. In many cases, the cost of an international phone
call went from several dollars to a few cents per minute (Vertovec 2004a, 220). Moreover,
technology, whether it be the internet or satellite television, can help create a sense of
community for those abroad (Horst 2008; NurMuhammad et al. 2016).
In many developing countries, the spread of technology has occurred at a rapid pace.
The Economic Commissions for Latin America and the Caribbean found that the number of
households that were connected to the internet nearly doubled from 2010 to 2015 (CEPAL
2016). In Africa, the Afrobarometer (2016) found that cell phone service had rapidly increased
and was getting close to universal coverage (93%). Similarly, in Asia, there has been a robust
expansion in communication technologies (Zheng et al. 2014). A recent PEW survey in 11
developing countries found that 93 percent of adult mobile phone users use them to help stay in
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touch with those living far away (Anderson and Silver 2019). New technologies also have the
potential to facilitate and lower the costs of sending remittances (Rodima-Taylor and Grimes
2018). These improvements in communication technologies should help increase the
opportunities for transnational ties and transnational political activity in the future. Nonetheless,
a large body of research already exists illustrating how migrants have engaged in their homeland.
Given the improvement in attitudes towards emigrants, and changes in technology,
governments have started to implement external voting because of the continued commitment of
their population abroad. The main political impact of those abroad is usually not due to their
votes, although as mentioned previously there have been cases where votes from abroad have
swayed elections. Instead, the influence of emigrants is often expressed through dense networks
of friends and family in the homeland.
To understand emigrant influence through networks of family and friends, it is necessary
to distinguish among different types of transnational engagement among migrants. A large body
of literature12 has examined a diverse set of factors that help determine whether migrants will
engage in transnational political behavior.13 The research has illustrated the various ways
migrants have stayed involved in their country of origin. For example, emigrants might support
political candidates or political causes in their country of origin, or they might engage in
activities that have no obvious political motivations such as traveling to the homeland to visit

12

A secondary goal of this literature is to examine whether transnational engagement creates a barrier to
assimilation in the emigrants’ new host countries. For example, see Portes, Guarnizo, and Haller 2002; Guarnizo,
Portes, and Haller 2003; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004; Haller and Landolt 2005; Snel, Engbersen, and Leerkes
2006; Portes, Escobar, and Arana 2009; Ahmadov and Sasse 2016
13
Examples include Itzigsohn and Saucedo 2002; Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003; Portes, Escobar, and Arana
2009; Leal, Lee, and McCann 2012; Waldinger, Soehl, and Lim 2012; Hickerson 2013; Burgess 2014; Ahmadov
and Sasse 2016; Chaudhary 2018; Mirilovic and Pollock III 2018; Peltoniemi 2018; Umpierrez de Reguero et al.
2018; McCann, Escobar, and Arana 2019.
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family and friends. Scholars have emphasized the importance of making distinctions between
different types and regularity of transnational acts.
In a study of Dominicans, for example, Itzigsohn et al. (1999) categorize between the
types of transnational activity (political, economic, civil-societal, and cultural) and how
frequently they occur, and the scope of the engagement (narrow and broad). Narrow
transnationality refers to practices that have a higher level of institutionalization and occur more
frequently. An example of narrow political transnationalism would be a migrant’s membership
in a political party that has a branch in the host country. On the other hand, acts of broad
transnationality are less institutionalized and occur less frequently, such as when migrants
become interested in the politics of their homeland just before an election takes place (1999, 328329).
Moreover, Østergaard‐Nielsen notes that emigrants are often interested in a diverse set of
issues (2003a, 762-764). While residing in their new host countries, migrants battle to improve
their living conditions (e.g., immigrant politics). They also engage with their country of origin to
protect their legal status back home (emigrant politics). Migrants also get involved in the
domestic and foreign affairs of their native land (homeland politics). Additionally, diaspora
politics refers to the political action of migrants who are stateless or are not allowed to
participate in the politics in their homeland. Furthermore, migrants get involved in improving
their local communities while they are abroad (translocal politics).
More generally, political activities by migrants can be classified into electoral
participation and non-electoral participation (Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008). Østergaard‐Nielsen
(2003b, 22) classifies transnational activity between direct and indirect participation. Direct
participation refers to actions such as voting or contributing to political causes in their country of
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origin. Indirect participation is when those abroad pressure governments in their host country to
carry out policies involving their home country. Additionally, Ahmadov and Sasse (2016, 82)
classify transnational political activities into two categories: electoral engagement and
community engagement. Electoral engagement includes unequivocal political actions such as
voting while community engagement includes actions such as raising money for projects in the
homeland. These studies have tended to measure the level of transnational activity by counting
the number of transnational political activities those abroad engage in (Guarnizo, Portes, and
Haller 2003; Ahmadov and Sasse 2016).
As discussed, the literature on transnationalism has shown that there is a wide array of
activities migrants partake in that keep them connected to their homeland. Economically,
migrants remain connected by sending remittances. One type of remittance, “individual”
economic remittances, involves sending money back to family members. A number of
econometric studies have found that individual remittance flows can be important in reducing the
incidence of poverty among family members of emigrants in the home country (Adams and Page
2005; Adams et al. 2008; Gupta, Pattillo, and Wagh 2009). A second type of remittance, which
is sometimes referred to as “collective” economic remittances, involves pooling funds through
transnational immigrant organizations in order to raise money for various projects in their home
communities (Goldring 2002; Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003; Burgess 2012a; Meseguer and
Aparicio 2012; Danielson 2017), and financing humanitarian work (Brinkerhoff 2008; Horst
2008; Beauchemin and Schoumaker 2009; Yefet 2017). For example, Mexican and Guatemalan
immigrant associations in the U.S. have raised funds and provided collective remittances to
support free eyeglasses for children in Guatemala, or to build libraries, pave roads, or increase
access to potable water in small municipalities in Michoacán and Chihuahua (Tuman 2009;
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Tuman and Gearhart 2010). Migrants remained on the political agenda in many communities
due to their financial help.14
Furthermore, emigrants can also influence politics in their homeland by spreading ideas,
norms, and political beliefs to their friends and relatives, or what Levitt (1998) coined social
remittances.15 For example, migrants who settle in established democracies may acquire
democratic practices in their host countries and share it with family and friends back home
(Córdova and Hiskey 2015; Crow and Pérez-Armendáriz 2017). There is some debate in the
literature regarding how much of these adaptations of attitudes is caused by migrants’
experiences in their homeland before migrating (Merelo 2017). Nonetheless, it is clear that those
living abroad can influence political attitudes and behaviors of their social network in their home
country.
It is common for migrants to discuss politics and political engagement with friends and
relatives in the homeland. In a survey of Senegalese migrants living in the United States and
France, Vari-Lavoisier (2016, 22-24) reports that two-thirds had encouraged family members to
vote in the 2012 presidential elections and a majority of the respondents believed that family
back home had considered their recommendation. Escrivá, Santa Cruz, and Bermúde (2010.
114) found that 60 percent of the Peruvians living in Spain they surveyed had discussed the 2006
presidential elections with their family and friends in Peru. Additionally, a study by PérezArmendáriz (2014, 75) found that 85 percent of the Mexican emigrants living in the United
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However, there can also be negative unintended consequences of these community development projects in the
home country. For example, if migrants raise money to build a community pool, the question still remains who
should pay for the upkeep and hiring of staff et cetera.
15
“Social remittances are the ideas, behaviors, identities, and social capital that flow from receiving-to sendingcountry communities.” (Levitt 1998, 926).
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States surveyed had conversations with family members in regards to their political and public
experiences while abroad.
Numerous studies have illustrated that communications with migrants can influence
political behavior and attitudes. For example, in a study of six Latin American countries,
Córdova and Hiskey (2015, 1456) find that respondents who have regular communications with
relatives in the United States are more likely to participate in local politics. Pérez-Armendáriz
and Crow (2010, 139) showed that Mexicans who know someone abroad are less satisfied with
democracy in Mexico and are more likely to be politically engaged than those who do not have
contacts abroad.
Similarly, a follow-up study by Crow and Pérez-Armendáriz (2017) shows that
respondents in 20 Latin American countries who had discussions with migrants reported lower
levels of satisfaction with democracy in their country.16 In addition, in a study of 18 Latin
American countries, Meseguer, Lavezzolo, and Aparicio (2016) find that those who
communicate with relatives abroad are more inclined to approve of an enhanced role for the
state. Furthermore, Ivlevs and King (2017, 404) found that respondents in several Balkan
countries who had relatives abroad were less likely to bribe public officials. These effects are
also conditioned by whether those in the homeland receive remittances.17 The spread of ideas has
also occurred by migrants returning to their country of origin after studying abroad.
Beyond contact with family or friends, migrants can diffuse new norms or ideas through
their experience in higher education. International students who study at foreign universities
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Of course, it is possible that individuals who are dissatisfied with the status quo (in the home country) might be
more likely to engage in political discussions with the diaspora population. Nevertheless, the findings of this study
are suggestive of the possible effects of emigrant engagement on political attitudes.
17
The ensuing chapter will discuss in greater detail how receiving remittances can influence the political attitudes
and behavior of those living in the home country.
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may help to spread and transfer political values and economic ideas to their country of origin
(Kapur 2010). These students have often ascended to powerful positions in their homeland. A
2009 study by Spilimbergo showed that there were 46 leaders currently in office and 165 former
leaders who had been educated at universities in the United States. The author also found that
individuals who had studied in democracies promoted democratic values in their country of
origin (2009, 528). The spread of neoliberal economic ideas has also illustrated the influences of
the educational system in the United States.18 Some well-known examples of American educated
policymakers pushing for neoliberal policies include the “Chicago Boys” in Chile (Brender
2010). As well as a number of Mexican finance and public budgeting ministers (e.g., Pedro
Aspe, and prior to his election as President, Ernesto Zedillo) educated in the most prestigious
universities in the United States (Babb 2004).
Another way emigrants remain engaged in the affairs of their home country from funding
political activities. Those living abroad can influence their homeland by financing political
parties and campaigns. For several decades, politicians have gone abroad to cities with a large
expatriate population to elicit campaign funds. For instance, in the 19th century, it was common
for Irish nationalist politicians to go to New York City where they would speak in front of large
crowds and raise considerable amounts of money (Foner 1997, 361). Politicians from the
Dominican Republic have also frequently visited the United States, where a significant percent
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When discussing neoliberalism, I am referring to the numerous policies that are meant to make the economy more
hospitable to free market ideas. More specifically, following Barkdull and Tuman (1999) the term tends to refer to
the following policies: “(1) liberalization of rules regulating foreign direct investment; (2) reductions in tariffs and
quantitative restrictions on imports; (3) privatization of state-owned enterprises; (4) reduction and elimination of
subsidies for consumers, domestic manufacturers, and agricultural producers; (5) reductions in public spending and
the size of the public-sector workforce; (6) deregulation of financial and capital markets” (footnote 10, page 119).
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of Dominicans live to ask for financial and political support.19 Up to half of the funding for the
1994 presidential campaign in the Dominican Republic came from abroad (Levitt 2001b as cited
in Levitt 2001a) and campaign funds from the United States have represented approximately 15
percent of the yearly amount raised by political parties in the Dominican Republic (Guarnizo,
Portes, and Haller 2003). However, critics of external voting argue that despite these
contributions those living abroad should not get to vote. First of all, emigrants are often illinformed on the issues in their homeland. Moreover, critics argue that low voter participation
among emigrants indicates a lack of interests in the home country.
It must be emphasized that transnational voting is not a strong norm among emigrants.
For this reason, the frequency and intensity of such actions should not be exaggerated (Itzigsohn
and Saucedo 2002; Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003; Portes, Escobar, and Arana 2009).
Interviews with emigrants have shown that they are often not up-to-date on the issues in their
home country. For example, Lafleur and Sánchez-Domínguez (2015) found that external
Bolivian voters were not informed of the positions of the major Bolivian political parties. Also,
in a survey of Mexicans living in the United States, Suro and Escobar (2006) found that a
majority of Mexicans in their sample were not aware of the fact that there was a presidential
election scheduled in Mexico that year.20 Critics also argue that low levels of electoral behavior
are an indication that those abroad should not be given the right to vote.

Institutional Rules and Incentive Structures: Voting Patterns among Emigrants
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Approximately one million foreign-born Dominicans and close to two million people of Dominican descent live
in the United States (López 2015; Guadalupe 2018).
20
Interviews with Mexicans living in Los Angeles indicate that many emigrants decided not to vote in the 2006
presidential elections due to low trust in Mexican politics (Alarcón, Escala, and Odgers 2014, 309)
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Some scholarship has suggested that emigrant enfranchisement is more likely when elites
in the home country perceive that turnout in the diaspora population will remain low. Studies
have found that turnout among emigrants tends to be low (Navarro, Morales, and Gratschew
2007), and often below predicted values (e.g., the inaugural elections in Mexico in 2006 [see
Lafleur and Chelius 2011; Muñoz Pedraza 2016]). However, as scholars such as Knott (2017)
and Leal, Lee, and McCann (2012) have pointed out, from the standpoint of the political science
literature, no one should be surprised by the low turnout. Even when governments enfranchise
citizens living abroad, they may put into place systematic barriers that reduce turnout from
abroad. Politicians and governments understand that turnout among external voters is going to
be low as the costs associated with voting from abroad increase. Cumbersome institutional rules,
which increased financial, travel, and opportunity costs, were noted widely as a factor in
depressing emigrant voting in the Mexican presidential election in 2006 (see Bada and Fox 2010;
Lieber 2010). Therefore, the calculus of voting for those living abroad might help explain why
so many states have implemented external voting.
Although the “calculus of voting” (Downs 1957b; Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Aldrich
1993) was not designed to explain voter behavior among citizens living abroad, the underlying
logic of this approach may be applied to external voters.21 Several factors impact the decision of
external voters about whether to vote or not, which domestic voters do not face. We might
assume that the probability of being the winning vote stays the same (P term).22 The differential
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Riker and Ordeshook (1968, 25-28) present the equation R= PB-C+D in which R is the benefit in utilities a voter
gets from voting. P is the probability that the voter will bring about the benefits from their candidate winning. B is
the benefit the voter gets from their favored candidate winning over another. C are the costs associated with voting.
The D term represents the various satisfactions which are associated with voting.
22
The likelihood of casting the winning might be higher in cases where migrants elect their own representative.
However, this assumes that migrants will not vote at a same rate as their fellow citizens who vote domestically.
Collyer (2014b) has illustrated the malapportionment that exists for most legislative seats reserved for those abroad.
For example, in the Portuguese lower chamber (Assembly of the Republic) each legislative seat represents about
47,000 people while each of the four seats reserved for emigrants represents approximately 495,000 (2014b, 69)
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benefits (B term) from one candidate winning over another is likely to be lower for external
voters as they are not impacted by most laws passed to the same extent as domestic residents.
For example, if income or sales taxes are increased those living abroad are less likely to feel their
effects compared to domestic residents.23
The costs associated with voting (C term) are likely to be much higher for most external
voters compared to their domestic counterparts. There is great variation in the willingness and
flexibility of governments in the country of origin to set up polling places. In 2017, Icelandic
voters living in and visiting the popular tourist destination of Tenerife in Spain were able to vote
in the toilet of a bar which had been transformed into a polling booth (Erlendsdóttir 2017).
However, in many countries, potential expatriate voters have to jump through institutional hoops
which would not be seen as acceptable for voters in the homeland in most democracies. One of
the key points from the handbook on external voting published by IDEA (Ellis et al. 2007) are
the various restrictions which have been put in place. For instance, Navarro, Morales, and
Gratschew write “[e]ven for the approximately 80 countries and territories that do not
specifically restrict the entitlement to an external vote, there is no guarantee that all eligible
voters will be entitled to vote” (2007, 21). Part of this is certainly due to legitimate concerns
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Not much is known about the voting behavior of those living abroad. For example, it is uncertain whether
external voters will reward or punish incumbents for their economic performance in the way we would expect
domestic residents to do (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). The author is not aware of research examining the
economic voting tendencies of external voters. Preliminary findings in a study of the Dominican Republic show
economic voting might exist among external voters (Erlingsson and Oganesyan working paper). Recent studies
have started to examine the impact of receiving remittances on domestic voters. For example, a 2013 study of
Mexico, Germano found that those who receive remittances were less likely to punish the incumbent. In a study of
20 Latin American countries Bravo (2012) finds that receiving remittances increases support for the incumbent.
Morgan, Hartlyn, and Espinal 2011 found that that those that receive remittances were more likely to support the
two established parties in the Dominican Republic. Germano (2017) finds that El Salvadorians who received
remittances were more likely to vote for the right-wing candidate in the 2004 presidential election. Furthermore,
Tertytchnaya et al. (2018) find that fluctuations in remittances influences the support for the incumbent in
Kyrgyzstan. Additionally, in a study of Latin America, Ahmed (2017) finds various differences in voting choice
between those that receive remittances and those that do not. For example, someone who receives remittances with
the highest level of dissatisfaction of the incumbent is 16 percent more likely to vote for the incumbent compared to
someone who does not receive remittances (2017, 33).
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dealing with the enormous costs, logistical difficulties, and electoral integrity of holding
elections abroad.
Nonetheless, restrictions have also been put in place by politicians to guarantee that those
abroad will not be too powerful. For example, in the Bolivian electoral law passed in 2009, the
number of overseas Bolivian voters could not exceed 6 percent of the Bolivian population living
abroad (Hinojosa Gordonava, Domenech, and Lafleur 2016, 125). Likewise, as noted, the 2006
Mexican presidential elections which are often viewed as the embodiment of little interest and
low turnout among emigrants, external voters had to go through a complicated registration
process which included requirements such as the financial costs of using certified mail to request
a ballot which had to be completed six months before the election took place (Lieber 2010, 143).
The political influence of the emigrant community can also be minimized by limiting
their financial impact on the electoral system. Ohman (2014, 48) notes that the majority of
African countries have bans of foreign funding of political parties, although interestingly only 30
percent of African countries ban funding of candidates. Similarly, Londoño and Zovatto (2014,
130) show that a large majority of countries in Latin America have bans of funding to political
parties and campaigns from abroad.24 Nonetheless, these bans of foreign money into the political
system can be difficult to enforce (Ohman 2014). However, even though political parties are
often wary of how the financial contributions of those abroad might impact domestic politics,
they must also weigh their concerns against the wishes of the state to harness as many financial
resources as possible from their emigrant community.
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It should be noted that these regulations are not always explicitly put in place to diminish the political influence of
emigrants. They can also be put in place so that foreign interests do not become too influential. For example,
Londoño and Zovatto write “Latin America has a long history of foreign interventions, and these bans seek to avoid
undue interference by foreign interests in the countries’ democratic lives” (2014, 130).
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Even where in-person voting is allowed, emigrants are often required to travel to major
urban areas to cast their ballots. In the 2001 presidential elections in Honduras, external voters
could only vote in six cities in the United States (Cruz 2007). Consequently, even someone who
is very informed and interested in the politics back home is unlikely to be willing to incur the
costs of having to travel a long distance to vote. Governments may limit external participation to
expatriates living only in selected countries. For example, for the 2009 Bolivian presidential
elections, only Bolivians living in Argentina, Brazil, Spain, and the United States could be
registered to vote (Lafleur and Sánchez-Domínguez 2015, 3).
Emigrants may also face a higher information cost than domestic voters. Interactions
with politicians and the media are viewed as a key element of any electoral campaign (BoxSteffensmeier, Darmofal, and Farrell 2009, 309). Most citizens living abroad are unlikely to
have much interaction with partisan elites or the media in their country of origin. As noted
previously, many countries prohibit political parties from advertising their message with voters
abroad. Political parties are seen as a crucial part of getting people to engage in the political
process. They help educate potential voters on the issues, as well as acting as a heuristic to
simplify the voter’s choice (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000, 6), and their absence in emigrant
communities can create barriers to voter education.
Studies have started to illustrate how these mechanisms also apply to external voters.
For example, political parties and party identification influence a persons’ transnational activities
(Sandoval and Jennings 2012; Mirilovic and Pollock III 2018). More specifically, in a study of
the Dominican Republic, Lebanon, Mexico, and the Philippines, Burgess (2018, 379) found that
allowing party outreach did help electoral participation. However, the author also observed that
party outreach can also reinforce divisions.
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Despite the obstacles, there are examples of officials from political parties traveling and
even putting in place party offices abroad (Bada 2003). In recent years, some candidates even
arranged campaign stops with emigrant communities in Europe or the U.S. For example,
Guatemalan presidential candidates have travelled to Las Vegas (and other cities) to meet with
emigrants (Tuman and Gearhart 2010). In addition, Mexican hometown associations have often
helped with voter education or distribution of campaign material among Mexicans residing in the
U.S. (Tuman 2009; Bada and Fox 2010). Nonetheless, due to the cost of traveling abroad for
political parties, it is unclear whether most candidates can afford the cost of international
campaigning. Moreover, some countries have prohibited international campaigns. Going back
to the Mexican case, the law allowing for external voting in Mexico prohibited Mexican political
parties and candidates from campaigning abroad. If candidates were caught campaigning
abroad, they would have been removed from the voting ballot (Leal, Lee, and McCann 2012,
548). Generally, emigrants are also not exposed to the media as those living in the homeland.
Research has shown the important role the media plays in political environments where
there are weak political parties (Kuenzi and Lambright 2007). The absence of being exposed to
media coverage in their country of origin increases the costs and diminishes the likelihood that
emigrant will be informed. Downs states “…it is irrational for most citizens to acquire political
information for purposes of voting” (1957a, 147). Indeed, there is a body of literature that shows
that most citizens are not very informed on political issues (Luskin 1987). This problem is
compounded since those living abroad are less likely to come across relevant information
accidentally, although this gap might be lessened by the internet and social media (Valeriani and
Vaccari 2016).
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The internet increases the likelihood that migrants will be able to access traditional media
outlets in their country of origin. For example, by listening to internet radio stations in the home
country online, the information gap between those living abroad and voters in the home country
may diminish. Studies have started to examine the link between access to the media and the
likelihood of being engaged in the country of origin. One such study found that emigrants who
prefer listening to the radio were more likely to send remittances (Hickerson 2013).
Moreover, looking at the socioeconomic factors of many migrants we would expect them
to vote at lower levels. For example, the work of political scientist Philip Converse have argued
that becoming engaged in the political process involves learning and socialization (Converse
1969). In their influential work on the calculus of voting, Riker and Ordeshook make a similar
argument when they state “…we have simply made voting rational by saying that the decision to
vote by those who have been socialized to vote is a rational decision” (1968, 34). Many
migrants leave their country of origin before acquiring the experience of participating in politics.
Some leave their homeland when they are young or live in countries which do not hold
competitive elections (Waldinger and Duquette-Rury 2016, 45).
Subsequently, since potential emigrants voters are less likely to be impacted by the
winner of the elections and the laws they might pass (B term). But generally, have to incur a
greater cost for voting than voters in the home country (C term). Politicians are likely to know
that the voter turnout among migrants will not be very high. Furthermore, we should expect that
those who do end up voting do so mostly for symbolic reasons (D term).
Indeed, studies which have examined voter motivations have tended to emphasize the
symbolic factor. For example, a survey of Ecuadorian voters in Italy showed that a little over six
percent of respondents said they voted because they wanted a particular candidate to win, while
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most voted due to symbolic reasons (Boccagni 2011a, 83). Furthermore, studies of Brazilian
(Frizzo and Mascitelli 2018), Turkish (Mencütek 2015), and Romanian (Knott 2017) citizens
living abroad found that external voters tended to vote due to symbolic reasons. Hence, the low
turnout rates among emigrant voters should not only be viewed from the perspective that it
signals their lack of interest, but also that they are acting in correspondence of a rational actor. I
would argue that research has strengthened this point. A study by Alarian and Goodman (2017)
illustrated that migrants are more likely to go to states that allow for dual citizenship.
Additionally, remittances often fluctuate due to political events. For instance, remittances have
often spiked when President Donald Trump has threatened to tax these money transfers
(Gillespie 2018; McDonald 2019)
Despite not voting, many migrants argue that they are stakeholders in the countries they
left because of their engagement in other ways such as sending money back and since they might
plan on returning someday (Collyer and Vathi 2007). Another reason for why external voting
has been implemented is due to strategic actions by politicians who see a benefit in enfranchising
those abroad. Furthermore, the increase in the number of countries who have democratized has
opened up a window-of-opportunity for more states to enact these laws.

Role of Democratization and the Diffusion of International Norms
When examining the puzzle of why states have decided to enfranchise emigrants, it is
useful to examine other expansion of voting rights enfranchisements. For example, the 19th
Century saw numerous countries, mostly in Europe, increasing the number of eligible voters.
Several explanations have been posited as to why this expansion occurred. Most of these
accounts have argued that enfranchisement happened as a way to prevent revolutions, or because
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elites saw a benefit in expanding the voter rolls (Przeworski 2009, 294). For example, Acemoglu
and Robinson (2000) argue that Western elites acted strategically by expanding voting rights to
prevent social unrest related to demands for redistribution of income. While other authors have
focused more on the differences in preferences among elites, Lizzeri and Persico (2004, 755)
argue that enfranchisement took place because a majority of elites saw the expansion of public
goods and the weakening of special interest politics as beneficial. Furthermore, Llavador and
Oxoby (2005) focus on the economic divisions among groups of elites and the role of expanding
the voter roll to accomplish their preferred policies.
However, it is problematic to compare the rise in the number of countries allowing
external voting in the last few decades to the expansion of internal voting rights in the 19th and
20th centuries. First of all, much of the effort to expand the electoral franchise in the 19th century
occurred during times of great economic crises and food shortages in Europe (Berger and
Spoerer 2001). Expanding the electoral franchise in that context may have helped domestic
elites preempt further demands for social and political change from the working and lower
economic classes. However, in the present international context, it is unlikely that governments
that fail to enfranchise those citizens living abroad would lead to any revolutions or social unrest
in the home country.25 Second, the expansions which took place in the 19th century would not be
seen as being sufficient for democratic rule today. For example, allowing women to vote was
not on the political agenda for many countries at this time, with New Zealand becoming the first
country to do so in 1893 (Paxton, Hughes, and Green 2006).26 Finally, some explanations better
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Migrants and the remittances they send back do play a vital part in the stability of some communities (see Tuman
2009, 19; Germano 2013, 875; Erlingsson and Tuman 2017). However, organizing a “capital strike” among
emigrants would be difficult and would involve convincing them to sacrifice the livelihoods of family members (in
the home country) for the vote.
26
There were however some subnational governments that allowed women to vote earlier in the 18 th Century
(Przeworski 2009, footnote 26, pages 297-298)
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explain certain types of voting rights expansion than others (Przeworski 2009). For this reason,
it is useful to examine the hypothesis put forward by scholars such as Rhodes and Harutyunyan
(2010) who theorize that the expansion of external voting rights should be viewed as analogous
with the struggles of other previously disenfranchised groups enfranchised in the 20th century,
including women and minorities. For this latter group, their political struggles developed in a
context that involved more competitive regimes and changing international norms.
The literature on enfranchisement in the 20th century has focused more on how norms
impacted the decisions to expand the voting base.27 The enfranchisement of women illustrates
how international norms were influential. Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan (1997) note the
expansion of women suffrage occurred in numerous waves. At the beginning of the 20th century
only a small percentage of the countries that allowed men to vote also enfranchised women.
Subsequently, from 1900 to 1930, the diffusion of “neighborhood” effects led more European
states to implement voting rights for women. After 1930, the momentum towards enfranchising
women starting growing stronger, and after World War II it was becoming a democratic norm
(Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan 1997, 737-738). Concurring with the view that international
norms played an important role in the enfranchisement of women, Przeworski (2009) argues that
the diffusion effects “are overwhelming for extensions involving women” (305) and after World
War II the importance of international norms made female suffrage “…almost inevitable” (314).
A persuasive theoretical argument can be made for a similar diffusion effect and
international norms when looking at expatriate voting. Generally speaking, the implementation
of external voting appears to have followed a similar trajectory as the enfranchisement of
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There are also studies that examine the enfranchisement of women from an economic standpoint (see for example
Bertocchi 2011). Furthermore, influential political activists such as Susan B. Anthony and Martin Luther King Jr.
clearly played a key role in ensuring enfranchisement for women and minorities.
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women, although it clearly does not have the same universality to it as women and minority
enfranchisement. For example, Hartmann (2015, 906-907) recounts how before the mid-1990s
external voting was not really on the political agenda in Africa, but now a large majority of
countries have implemented it. The global picture of external voting bears this out as can be
seen in figure 2.1.28 The number of countries which have allowed for expatriate voting
drastically increased in the last few decades.

Figure 2.1: Number of Countries Implementing External Voting 1900-2010
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Data gathered from Ellis et al. (2007) and Lafleur (2013b)
Studies examining the relationship between the roles of democratic diffusion,
international norms, and external voting have tended to illustrate a positive relationship. For
instance, a study by Turcu and Urbatsch (2015) found a statistically significant relationship
between democratic diffusion and external voting. Additionally, in their quantitative analysis,
28

The graphs shows the number of countries which had allowed for external voting for each time period. For
example, Botswana implemented external voting in 1997 so it was included for the 2000s number.
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Rhodes and Harutyunyan (2010) also found that global norms are increasing the likelihood of
external voting to be put in place.29 However, results from case studies have been more nuanced
(Rhodes and Harutyunyan 2010; Lafleur 2013a). There is also the argument that the increase in
external voting has occurred as a way for states to signal democratic consolidation (Bauböck
2007; Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008) in a modernized view of democratic representation (Collyer
2014b). The argument for allowing emigrants to be included is particularly persuasive when the
migrants have had to leave because of political repression.
From a normative perspective, one can argue that distinctions should be made between
migrants who were forced to leave and those that left on their own accord (see Ottonelli and
Torresi 2013; Erdal and Oeppen 2018).30 The argument for external voting becoming an
international norm is strengthened by the fact that there have been numerous occasions where
foreign governments have helped to subsidize the cost for voters living abroad (Thompson 2007;
Frizzo and Mascitelli 2018). The process of democratizing can be seen as incomplete if those
living abroad are not allowed to vote in countries which have a history of political persecutions.
For example, external voting has been used as a political tool to assist in the process of
reconciliation in elections taking place in countries that have experienced civil wars (Grace
2007). However, even in countries with the history of political oppression the adoption and
implementation of expatriate voting can be a complicated political process.
External voting tends to occur after political negotiations among political parties (Lafleur
and Chelius 2011). For example, in November 2017, over forty years after Augusto Pinochet
killed and forced thousands of his political opponents to leave, Chileans living abroad had the
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In a quantitative study of Latin American and Caribbean states covering the period of 1980-2010, Erlingsson and
Tuman (2017) did not find a statistically significant relationship between external voting rights and political
globalization.
30
For a theoretical discussion on external citizenship see Bauböck (2009)
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opportunity to vote in the country’s presidential election for the first time. Achieving the right to
vote was the culmination of a long partisan political battle for migrant organizations with
numerous previous attempts to amend the constitution to allow for external voting having
failed.31 Some saw the enfranchisement of emigrants as a final step to end the political legacy of
Pinochet (Valenzuela 2014). It is hard to generalize on the political reasons for why political
actors decide to allow those abroad to vote as it has been advocated for by both ends on the
political spectrum.32
Politicians generally act in ways that maximize their preferences and the likelihood of
being reelected (Downs 1957). Consequently, the decision of whether to adopt and implement
external voting is going to be dependent on how it affects the political actors involved in the
decision (for an explanation of the underlying logic, see Geddes 1988). Therefore, the political
decision on whether to implement external voting is going to vary among country-specific
factors. For example, if the electorate of a country votes primarily based on ethnic
considerations, one would expect that the consideration of political parties within the country
would be in large part based on the ethnic makeup of those living abroad. Additionally, if a
country has a history of forced outmigration, any political forces aligned with those policies are
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The partisan nature of external voting in Chile can be seen on a vote that took place on the 16 th of April 2014,
when the Chilean House of Deputies passed a constitutional amendment by a vote of 84 to 25 to allow Chileans
living abroad the right to vote. For example, 24 out of 28 members of the right leaning Independent Democratic
Union (UDI) voted against the bill. The amendment which also was approved by the Chilean Senate allows for
voting in presidential elections and primaries. Voting records for the bill can be found at
https://www.camara.cl/pdf.aspx?prmID=10487%20&prmTIPO=TEXTOSESION (Last accessed November 16,
2018).
32
Examples include Austria’s Peoples' Party (Bauböck 2005) on the political-right and Bolivia’s Movement for
Socialism on the political-left. The head of Bolivia’s Movement for Socialism, Evo Morales, even started a hunger
strike in favor of electoral reforms which included external voting (Lafleur and Sánchez-Domínguez 2015, 164).
Erlingsson and Tuman (2017) found that countries with a left leaning executive were more likely to adopt external
voting in Latin America and the Caribbean.
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likely to be opposed to external voting. Given the assumption that politicians want to stay in
power, it is puzzling how many states adopted and implemented external voting.
Why would those in power take the chance of expanding the electorate without knowing
whether it will benefit them politically? For example, in a study of previous enfranchisements in
the 19th and 20th centuries, Przeworski (2009) asks “[w]hy would people who monopolize
political power ever decide to put their interests or values at risk by sharing it with others?
Specifically, why would those who hold political rights in the form of suffrage decide to extend
these rights to anyone else?” (291). Previous expansions of voting rights to a larger section of
white males, women, and minorities were perhaps riskier politically simply due to the number of
potential voters. Those enfranchisements had clear normative justifications since
disenfranchisement was occurring of citizens living inside the country’s territory. External
voting is particularly puzzling in countries with a large emigrant population.
Many states which have implemented external voting have a large part of their citizens
living abroad. For example, in Ireland, a high-income country with a long history of emigration,
one of the arguments against external voting is that if the Irish Diaspora is allowed to vote there
might be more voters living abroad than in Ireland (O'Halloran 2017). Other countries such as
Armenia and Israel have a claimed diaspora that is considerably more numerous than citizens
living in the country (Ragazzi 2009, 381). Furthermore, external voting laws enfranchise a new
group of voters whose political preferences remain mostly unknown (Whitaker and Inyanji 2015;
Østergaard-Nielsen and Ciornei 2017). Therefore, it should be expected for politicians to either
oppose external voting or to put in place restrictions to limit the political impact of citizens living
abroad.
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Emigrants as a Resource in the Globalized Economy
Some prominent scholars have argued that states shifted their policies toward their
emigrant population due to a change in the world economy and a transformation in the notion of
the state (e.g., see Ragazzi 2009; 2014, and Gamlen 2013). This theoretical idea on the state
stems partly from the work of Foucault (1991) and was expanded on by scholars such as
Ferguson and Gupta (2002). Ferguson and Gupta describe how the change from the Keynesian
welfare state towards more neoliberal economic orientated conception of states may have
influenced ideas about the diaspora as a revenue stream (2002, 989).
In the 1980s, many developing countries went through a process of economic
liberalization by implementing policy recommendations commonly known as the “Washington
Consensus” (Gore 2000). These reforms which were championed by the Reagan and Thatcher
administrations along with major international financial institutions such as the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) (Gereffi 2014). Some of the recommendations were for countries to
remove trade barriers, deregulate, cut social spending, and to seek more foreign investment
(Moreno-Brid et al. 2004). Furthermore, remittances are also seen a resource to aid development
and alleviate poverty in the post-Washington Consensus (Burgess 2009). This sort of remittance
led-development (see Helmke 2010) has been promoted by international agencies who suggested
that remittances were crucial for development (Delgado-Wise and Márquez 2007a, 675).
Subsequently, scholars see these reforms pushing states to see their emigrant community as a
more valuable resource in the globalized economy.
There are many ways in which migrants can aid governments to adjust to a globalized
economy. One way is by helping to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) into their country of
origin. Several large-N studies have shown that migrants help facilitate investment (Gould 1994;
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White 2007; Leblang 2010; Javorcik et al. 2011; Nijkamp, Gheasi, and Rietveld 2011; Gheasi,
Nijkamp, and Rietveld 2013; Cuadros, Martín-Montaner, and Paniagua 2016). Migrants are
often knowledgeable about their country of origin which can help reduce the information cost
that is associated with investing abroad (Gheasi, Nijkamp, and Rietveld 2013). Migrants can
also highlight the strengths of the migrant community to potential investors (Leblang 2010, 587).
Furthermore, migrants can also inform potential investors on products and consumer preferences
in their homeland (Gould 1994).
Moreover, migrants’ often have preferences for products from their home country, which
can help aid exports from their country of origin to the host (Gould 1994; Girma and Yu 2002).33
Research has illustrated how migrants help boost exports from their homeland. For example, in
a cross-sectional (singe year) study of 131 home countries and 110 host countries, Tadesse and
White (2011, 283) show that a one percent increase in the number of migrants raises imports
from the country of origin by 0.17 percent. Similarly, Wagner, Head, and Ries (2002, 523)
found that for each new migrant that arrives in Canada, imports from the migrants’ country of
origin increased by $944 on average. Furthermore, studies have shown that an increase in the
stock of migrants leads to an increase in bilateral trade (Gould 1994; Head and Ries 1998;
Dunlevy and Hutchinson 1999; Girma and Yu 2002; Wagner, Head, and Ries 2002; White 2007;
Tadesse and White 2011; Law, Genc, and Bryant 2013).
Dunlevy and Hutchinson (1999, 1045) explain the theoretical mechanisms for trade and
migration. First, migrants exhibit a preference for imports of products from their homeland.
Second, migrants recognize the prospects for trade between their country of origin and host
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Inversely, having a large migrant population abroad might also be detrimental for the exporting industry in the
home country. Migrants can start to engage in import-substitution behavior and decide to produce the products they
miss from the homeland themselves (Dunlevy and Hutchinson 1999; Girma and Yu 2002). Egger, Von Ehrlich, and
Nelson (2012) find that as the migrant stock increases to a certain level the level of trade stops increasing.
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country, and, in some cases, establish import/export firms. Third, migrants do not face the same
information costs that are associated with international trade. Subsequently, many emigrants
already have an established network and know how to work with those in their country of origin.
Additionally, these connections can also help lessen uncertainty and set up contacts between
relevant parties in both host and home country (Tadesse and White 2012).
White (2007) finds that the relationship between migrants and trade is more powerful
when the migrants come from low-income countries. Therefore, lower-income governments
have a stronger incentive in obtaining the trade benefits that result from the departure of their
citizens. However, this might depend on the characteristics of the emigrant population.
Numerous authors have shown that having a more educated emigrant community helps attract
investment from abroad (Javorcik et al. 2011; Nijkamp, Gheasi, and Rietveld 2011; Gheasi,
Nijkamp, and Rietveld 2013). Governments are also interested in using the knowledge of their
community abroad for their advantage (Lieber 2010; Dickinson and Bailey 2007).
Sending states understand the important knowledge and skill their migrant community
have in helping them be successful in a globalized economy. Numerous states encourage those
abroad to use their talents and skills gained abroad to benefit their homeland. For example, India
has reached out to their academic and business leaders living abroad, and they have become
active contributors in India’s state of affairs (Kapur 2010). Devesh Kapur references the former
Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee speaking at a celebration of Indians overseas as
stating “[w]e do not want your investments, we want your ideas. We do not want your riches; we
want the richness of your experience” (2010, 116). Moreover, when visiting New York City in
2001, former Peruvian President Alejandro Toledo called on migrants with specialized education
to return to Peru (Berg and Tamagno 2006, 261).
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Gamlen (2013), argues that New Zealand transformed their attitude towards those living abroad
as New Zealand wanted to facilitate them into their economy. Jimenez-Cuen (2008) also argues
that former Mexican president Carlos Salinas opened up relations towards Mexicans abroad
partly because Salinas saw them as a strategic ally in the liberalization of the Mexican economy.
Rwandan President Paul Kagame has furthermore emphasized acquiring knowledge transfer
from their emigrant community (Turner 2013). Likewise, Cohen (2013) asserts that Israel has
modified its migration policy to obtain a closer relationship with their highly skilled workforce
abroad. Besides, many states see remittances as an imperative part of their development strategy
(Hollifield and Sharpe 2017; Malone and Durden 2018).

Importance of Remittances
The inflow LMICs receive from remittances is a much-noted explanation as to why states
would want to implement favorable policies such as external voting for their emigrant
community. International organizations, such as the World Bank, have endorsed remittances as a
way for countries to receive foreign currency and promote development (Delgado Wise and
Márquez 2007b, 4). The flow of remittances can be especially important during difficult times,
such as when states have a balance of payment issues (Frankel 2011). Those that leave not only
help reduce the unemployment rate, but they also send back valuable foreign currency
(Hoffmann 2010). Several studies have found remittances to be countercyclical (Vargas-Silva
2008; Frankel 2011) meaning that remittances increase when countries are going through
difficult financial times. However, the evidence is somewhat mixed. During the great recession
of the late 2000s, remittances remained more stable than other forms of foreign capital.
Remittances to developing countries on average dropped just over 5 percent between 2008 and
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2009 while FDI dropped by almost 40 percent during the same time (Mohapatra, Ratha, Silwa
2010; Yang 2011). Furthermore, studies have shown that the inflow of remittances tends to
increase in developing countries when states face natural disasters (Yang 2008; Ebeke and
Combes 2013).
Additionally, as noted previously, research has illustrated how remittances can help
alleviate poverty. For example, a study of 71 developing countries by Adams and Page, found
that a 10 percent increase per capita remittances decreases the proportion of people living in
poverty by 3.5 percent (2005, 1660). Moreover, studies of Asia (Imai et al 2014), Eastern
Europe (Giannetti, Federici, Raitano 2009; Duval and Wolff 2016), Latin America (Lopez et al.
2008; Vacaflores 2018) and Sub-Saharan Africa (Gupta, Pattillo, and Wagh 2009; Akobeng
2016) have found that remittances help alleviate poverty. Remittances can also improve access
to health care (Airola 2007; Frank et al. 2009; Valero-Gil 2009) and education (Edwards and
Ureta 2003; Yang 2003; Zamora 2005a; Adams Jr and Cuecuecha 2010).
The inflow of remittances creates a multiplier effect as the money spent benefits
numerous sectors of the economy (Durand, Parrado, and Massey 1996; Glytsos 2002; Karpestam
2012). Studies have also shown how remittances can help develop a country’s financial sector
(Williams 2016; Fromentin 2018). Consequently, remittances can play an important role in
helping finance investments in countries where credit is difficult to come by (Woodruff and
Zenteno 2001; Chami et al. 2008; Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 2009; Bettin, Presbitero, and
Spatafora 2015). These money transfers can also mitigate the negative impact associated with
the brain drain (Ratha 2003; Brown 2006; Javorcik et al. 2011; Darkwa 2018).
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An important negative aspect of having a large inflow of remittances is that it can lead to
less accountable government and a less efficient economy (see Chami et al. 2018).34 Citizens
who receive income from abroad are less dependent on internal conditions and are therefore less
likely to hold their government accountable. For this reason, governments do not face the same
amount of pressure to make improvements within their country (Chami et al. 2008; Abdih et al.
2012).35 For example, receiving remittances can result in lessened pressure on the government to
provide social welfare services (Abdih et al. 2012; Ahmed 2012; Doyle 2015; Gautam 2015).
Also, instead of building up their economy, some states have encouraged and at times created
institutions that facilitate emigration (Rudnyckyj 2004; De Haas 2005; Lavenex and Jurje 2017;
Burgess 2018; Chami et al. 2018). It can be argued that some sending states are not interested in
stopping emigration (Wucker 2004; Lavenex and Jurje 2017) nor wanting a large influx of return
migration (Boccagni 2011b). Additionally, large inflows of foreign capital do not incentivize
governments to put in place long-term economic policies to make their economy more
competitive (Glytsos 2002).
Moreover, some scholarship indicates that remittances can lead to perverse incentive
structure among recipients. Individuals who receive remittances may have less incentive to
work, leading to lower labor force participation and diminished working hours (Airola 2008);36
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There is some preliminary evidence suggesting that sending states might be well served to endorse democratic
principles to attract a higher inflow of remittances. For example, Abbas, Masood, and Sakhawat (2017, 529) find
that migrants remit more to democracies. Additionally, Agbegha (2006) found that political instability lessened the
levels of remittances sent to Latin America and the Caribbean, although this finding did not apply to Africa.
However, remittances are certainly not a panacea for all of the problems developing countries face. Indeed,
numerous scholars have pointed to the various negative aspects associated with receiving a large inflow of
remittances.
35
Desierto (2018, 432) challenges the logic of the Stackelberg duopoly game that is used by Abdih et al (2012) and
Ahmed (2012). Using formal modeling, the author argues that as long there is a competitor who can challenge the
incumbent remittances should not lead to symptoms associated with the resource curse.
36
However, other studies such as Posso (2012) find that remittances increase the aggregate labor supply in
developing countries.
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at the subnational level, this effect may lead to local labor shortages and the need for employers
to raise wages in order to clear local labor markets (Chami et al. 2018). Furthermore, receiving
large sums of remittances can result in symptoms associated with the Dutch disease. Inflows of
these money transfers can lead to currency appreciation, which in turn hurts exporting sectors of
the economy (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2004). Moreover, remittances can also produce
higher inflation (Narayan, Narayan, and Mishra 2011) and they do not appear to significantly
increase economic growth (Clemens and McKenzie 2014; Nwaogu and Ryan 2015; Chami et al.
2018). Despite the possible negative effects of remittances, most governments view such flows
as having positive externalities and remain committed to encouraging flows from emigrants. 37
Although remittances are usually not sent for political purposes,38 in some cases –
including where emigrants are forced into irregular migration – remitters may explicitly link
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Several major destination countries have recently been considering taxing remittances (Ratha, De, and Schuettler
2017). As a candidate, President Trump floated the idea of taxing remittances as a way to pay for the border wall
(Germano 2017). There are numerous restrictions on the sending on remittances put in place by both home and host
countries. After the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001, the United States government started further regulating
the flow of remittances (Abbas, Masood, and Sakhawat 2017). There have also been regulations on the sending of
remittances by both the U.S and Cuban government which have widely been circumvented (Eckstein 2004). Home
countries such as Vietnam and Tajikistan have also put in place a tax on remittances they receive, but both were
eventually removed (Tertytchnaya et al. 2018, footnote 1, page 760)
38
There exist an impressive body of literature examining the motives for sending remittances. In accordance with
other studies examining remittances and its effects, there is no consensus among scholars with research supporting
several competing hypothesis. One of the most important question addressed in this literature is in regards to
whether remittances are pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical both in terms of the host and home country. If remittances
are pro-cyclical in nature in the home country that would suggest that migrants send money back to earn a profit by
investing (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 2009). Cooray and Mallick (2013) found evidence that remittances decrease
when there is volatility in the home country. A study looking at remittances from Turkey to Germany found that
remittances were pro-cyclical in relation to the Turkish economy, but did not correlate in terms of the German
economy (Sayan 2004, 71). Furthermore, migrants can send back money to insure themselves for the future.
Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006, 230) find support for the insurance hypothesis since Mexican migrants remit
more when they face superior risks of losing income. Brown (1997, 620) found that migrants who intended to return
back to their home country were more likely to remit. A counter-cyclical nature of remittances in the home country
would indicate that migrants send remittances for altruistic purposes. Studies finding support for counter-cyclical
remittance patterns include: Agarwal and Horowitz 2002; Agbegha 2006; Frankel 2011; Fonchamnyo 2012; Bettin,
Presbitero, and Spatafora 2015; Ajide and Alimi 2018. However, many authors tend to emphasize how the motive of
remitters can vary by country and period. The works of Ruis and Vargas-Silva (2014) support this as they find that
remittances are at times pro-cyclical, but at other times counter cyclical. Similarly, in their influential work in
Botswana, Lucas and Stark (1985, 913) do not find evidence that altruism is sufficient to explain why remittances
are sent, but nonetheless they do not discount it as playing a role. Authors such as Garip, Eskici, and Snyder 2015
have emphasized the social reason for why migrants remit. If migrants are sending back money for social reasons it
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remittance flows to political objectives. Moreover, remittances have been associated with certain
political outcomes, although the findings of studies have been contradictory. At the macro-level
level, some studies have shown how remittances can increase the likelihood of democratic
transition (Escribà-Folch, Meseguer, and Wright 2015, 583), promote stronger democratic
institutions (Pfutze 2012; Deonanan and Williams 2017), increase political protest in
nondemocracies (Escribà-Folch, Meseguer, and Wright 2018), and lessen corruption (Tyburski
2012; Ivlevs and King 2017). Remittances also influence the economic decision making of
governments (Singer 2010; Beine, Lodigiani, and Vermeulen 2012; Combes, Ebeke, and Maurel
2015; Easton and Montinola 2017).
Conversely, research has also illustrated that remittances can help autocrats stay in power
(Ahmed 2012), increase corruption (Abdih et al. 2012), and create conflict (Miller and Ritter
2014). Furthermore, there is evidence that remittances can also influence individual behavior.
Studies have shown those that receive remittances have fewer economic complaints (Germano
2013) thereby decreasing voter turnout (Goodman and Hiskey 2008; Dionne, Inman, and
Montinola 2014; López García 2018). Receiving remittances can also impact the support of the
incumbent (Bravo 2012; Germano 2013; Tertytchnaya et al. 2018), and help undermine
clientelism (Pfutze 2012).
Although there is ample evidence of the economic benefits associated with remittances,
many groups oppose enfranchising emigrants due to their perceived economic power. In
particular, critics argue that giving expatriates voting rights due to their financial importance is
is questionable whether that should be called altruistic. For example, when referring to West Africans who do not
remit money Lacroix writes “they are called ‘postcard migrants’ because they only send postcards to their family
back home. There is no altruism in the act of remitting; it is a duty that migrants are expected to fulfill” (2016, 248).
Other studies have examined determinates of remittances by looking at transaction costs (Freund and Spatafora
2008), level of violence (Meseguer, Ley, and Ibarra-Olivo 2017), and regime type (Agbegha 2006; Abbas, Masood,
and Sakhawat 2017). See Rapoport and Docquier (2006) for a more complete explanation of the theoretical reasons
and empirical findings of why migrants send remittances.
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comparable to buying political rights. For example, most would be opposed to large foreign
investors being able to vote in an election in countries where they invest. Authors such as
López‐Guerra (2005) have also pointed out that since not all migrants remit money back home,
their claim as a group of achieving voting rights based on their financial contribution is
weakened.
A counter argument made in favor of external voting is that migrants have more closeknit connections to the country they are sending remittances to in comparison to most foreign
investors. Foreign investors are likely to be motivated mostly by higher profit margins.
Migrants, on the other hand, must also consider their friends and family living in the home
country. Ratha et al. (2011) point out that migrants are often willing to accept conditions on
investments due to this attachment that foreign investors would be unlikely to accept.

Conclusion
This chapter has surveyed some of the most important explanations as to why states adopt
and implement external voting. A drastic change has occurred in a short period of time, by
which external voting went from being an anomaly to arguably a democratic norm. The increase
in the number of countries that have democratized in the last few decades is clearly a valid
explanation for this surge in external voting. However, not all democracies have implemented
external voting and some countries that are not democratic, but pay lip service to democratic
governance (Welzel and Inglehart 2008) have done so. In chapter four, I will test whether
democracies have different motivations compared to non-democracies when implementing these
laws. Expatriate voting also became more common as politicians began portraying their
emigrant community in a more positive manner. Furthermore, many emigrant communities
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remained involved not only with their families in their countries of origin, but also engaged in
the political system.
In the following chapter, I develop a theoretical argument that focuses on the effects of
remittances and external voting rights. Remittances have influenced all the aspects which have
been discussed in this chapter. Remittances are one of the key mechanisms that migrants have
employed to remain engaged with their country of origin (Burgess 2012a, 48). Their
engagement has helped transform the attitudes of leaders in the home country towards them.
Furthermore, the money received from migrants has also helped promote democratization
(O'Mahony 2013; Escribà-Folch, Meseguer, and Wright 2015), and helped developing countries
to tackle liquidity problems (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 2009).
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Chapter 3
The Link between Remittances and External Voting
Since the appearance of the pioneering study on external voting by Collyer and Vathi
(2007), numerous authors have highlighted the importance of remittances in allowing those
abroad to vote (e.g., Dominican Republic [Barry 2006, 57], Portugal [Lisi et al. 2015], Mexico
[Jimenez-Cuen 2008], and Morocco [Dalmasso 2018]). Nevertheless, large-N studies have
tended to reach no clear conclusion, although a limitation of the large-N literature is that they
pool observations from rich and poor countries, and they have neglected the possible non-linear
relationship between remittances and voting rights. Further, external voting and remittances in
each country may be conditioned on particular relationships among the state, political parties,
and those living abroad (Escobar 2007; Collyer 2014a; Caramani and Grotz 2015; Lafleur 2015;
Wellman 2015; Frizzo and Mascitelli 2018). As noted in the previous chapter, prior scholarship
has also noted the complementary roles of international norms (Rhodes and Harutyunyan 2010)
or the implementation by a neighbor leading to a diffusion effect (Turcu and Urbatsch 2015), and
it is importance to control for these influences.
In this dissertation, I argue that the adoption and implementation of external voting in
democracies is a political decision and, all things being equal, a strong reliance on remittances
makes external voting more likely. 39 However, I will argue that this relationship tends to be
stronger in groups of countries at the lower end of the income spectrum.

39

However, there are some cases where the judicial system has been influential in permitting external voting such as
in Costa Rica (Bravo 2013) and in Pakistan (Ghauri 2016). Courts in Austria and Germany have ruled against laws
that denied citizens abroad from voting (Arrighi and Bauböck 2017, 620). Courts in Kenya in Zimbabwe have ruled
against emigrant voting (Hartman 2015) and the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the United Kingdom
was not required to allow for external voting for a British citizen that had been living abroad for over 15 years
(Lappin 2016).
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The political and economic powers of migrant groups are often closely aligned with one
another (Jimenez-Cuen 2008). First, remittances influence the political calculus that take place
in order to adopt and implement external voting. Politicians in countries dependent on
remittances have a slightly different calculation of when the benefits of reforming the electoral
system outweigh the potential costs borne by politicians (Geddes 1991). When remittances as a
share of GDP reach high levels, the political risks associated with external voting rights might be
different than at lower to moderate levels. The influence of remittances is also conditioned on
the type of political regime as only in countries where elections count will politicians face real
consequences. Second, governments want to implement external voting to strengthen the
connection to their emigrant community to encourage them to send money to the home country.
When states grant rights such as external voting they can expect more in return from their
emigrant community (Collyer and Vathi 2007, 5).
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section discusses the
theoretical expectations of why remittances would influence politicians to enfranchise citizens
living abroad. Then a discussion follows as to why states who are reliant on remittances are
more likely to implement external voting. Next, I argue that the distinctions should be made
between developing and developed countries and autocracies and countries who have some
components of democratic governance.

Political Bargaining and the Role of Remittances
As has been discussed, enfranchising a new group of electorates is surprising as it
entails certain risks for political parties and elected officials. I assume politicians to be riskaverse actors who will set up institutions that help them stay in power (Downs 1957; Mayhew
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2004). If politicians are content with the status-quo, they should be hesitant to increase the
voting pool to those abroad, especially in countries with a large emigrant community in which
the potential political impact is greater. Cox and McCubbins (1986) for example argue that riskaverse politicians should focus on maintaining their electoral coalition, i.e. not attempting to
expand it to new constituencies abroad unless they know they will have support there. Cox and
McCubbins write, “[i]n particular risk-averse candidates should invest relatively more in their
support groups (thus increasing stability), while risk-acceptant candidates should invest
relatively more in swing groups (thus decreasing stability)” (1986, 378). There tends to be little
information available about the potential voting intentions of the emigrant community which
should scare risk-averse politicians whose main goal is to stay in office.40 Political parties will
subsequently back external voting when they see it improving their political fortunes and reject it
if they expect that the emigrant community might vote for other parties (Lafleur 2011).
Therefore, in general, I would expect that elected officials should only implement external voting
if they are confident that they will not fair worse electorally among external voters. This may be
a function of whether politicians are confident those abroad will not vote in large numbers due to
institutional barriers that accompany external voting laws.
However, political actors from countries dependent on remittances must also seek to
maximize remittance flows while also balancing the interests of expatriates (who send
remittances) against the political risks of enfranchising a new group of voters (Tager 2006, 37). I
begin by examining the potential interests of expatriates and their family members. Many

40
For example, Arrighi and Lafleur state “…in regard to the enfranchisement of a fraction of the electorate whose
partisan behaviour is essentially unknown prior to the reform, electoral (mis)perceptions and speculations do matter
a great deal” (2019, 533). While discussing the adoption of annulation of external voting in South Africa, Wellman
(2015) similarly illustrates how important the perception of the political parties are in regards whether they will be
in favor enfranchising those abroad or not.
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elected officials may have constituents who receive remittances and can be influenced by the
opinions of those living abroad. Politicians in sending states are well aware that emigrants
discuss politics with their friends and family and have the ability to influence voters. Prior
research has found that politicians often assume that expatriates influence family members and
others in their social network (Itzigsohn et al. 1999; Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008; Paarlberg
2017a). Paarlberg (2017b) conducted interviews with party officials from the Dominican
Republic, Mexico, and El Salvador. Forty-four out of the forty-five officials interviewed stated
that the main reason why they campaigned abroad was to receive the votes of the migrants’
relatives in the homeland (2017b, 544). Migrants who might be seen as part of the lower classes
in the destination country frequently hold the status of the elite in their country of origin
(Reichert and Massey 1980; Levitt and Jaworsky 2007). Therefore, officials and parties who
propose external voting rights might be motivated by the strategic thinking of attaining the votes
of those who are receiving the remittances. Likewise, if politicians believe that those abroad can
influence voters, they will seek to avoid being viewed negatively by the emigrant community or
blamed for being opposed to increasing emigrants’ political rights.
Further, there is a link between remittances and the spread of influence through
emigrants’ social networks involving family and friends. For example, Vari-Lavoisier (2016)
shows how economic remittances sent by Senegalese citizens living in New York and Paris
increased their social standing among those receiving the remittances living in Dakar. VariLavoisier notes that the “…economic transactions contribute to the renegotiations of the
respective positions of the stakeholders” (22) and “remittances affect the hierarchy between the
sender and the recipient” (25). Those that send remittances are in a stronger position to signal to
those in the homeland of how to act politically. Vari-Lavoisier (2016) argues that this
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connection is more complex than being simply a clientelistic interaction. A similar argument is
made by Lyons and Mandaville (2010) that “…those who send money home often become
patrons wielding significant authority and political influence” (127).
When emigrants are forced into irregular migration due to political instability or state
repression, their incentive to influence family members through remittances might be even
stronger (Williams 2017, 68). When discussing Dominicans – including some forced into
irregular migration -- Paarlberg writes “[m]any of them report trying to influence the voting
behavior of their relatives, and some even appear to consciously use remittances to buy
influence” (2017a, 192). Furthermore, if migrants feel that their friends and family members are
not supporting something that the remitter values, such as an anti-corruption program or broader
political reforms, they can signal that they will stop sending the money (Ivlevs and King 2017,
392). There is some empirical evidence showing that migrants do remit due to political reasons.
In a study of 81 developing countries from 1990-2005, O’Mahony (2013) shows how
remittances increase on average by 30 percent during election years. The author finds that these
effects are even larger whenever the elections are more competitive. Remittances are close to 60
percent higher in elections years where the incumbent or their selected replacement does not run
(2013, 808). Subsequent research by Nyblade and O’Mahony (2014) further advances the
argument of political remittance cycles. The authors examine monthly remittance data for nine
countries along with quarterly data for Mexican states and find that remittances increase prior to
elections. The magnitude of these cycles are stronger during competitive elections and when the
economy in the host country is robust (2014, 45).
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Although sending remittances is not a form of taxation, historically those who have
contributed financially to their homeland have demanded political rights (Fox and Bada 2008).41
Migrants and the organizations representing them use the huge sums of money they send to the
home country as an argument towards why they should be allowed to vote (Fitzgerald 2000;
Wucker 2004; López‐Guerra 2005; Lieber 2010; Newland 2010; Frizzo and Mascitelli 2018).
This argument is likely to be particularly persuasive in countries which allow for campaign
contributions from abroad. Since migrants who contribute to politicians are likely to increase
their political leverage (O’Mahony 2013, 805). Additionally, politicians who travel abroad are
more likely to feel pressured to approve of external voting legislation.
When politicians go abroad and interact with their country’s emigrant community, they
often espouse that they will work on increasing rights for those abroad (Whitaker 2011). It is
difficult for politicians to go abroad to ask for political and financial support, but at the same
being opposed to increasing their political rights. Therefore, politicians and political parties
must weigh the options of potentially being blamed for not allowing external voting against the
political uncertainty which comes with enfranchising those abroad. Moreover, government
officials are also faced with pressures to implement external voting when they are abroad.
It is common for government ministers of developing countries to travel abroad and organize
events with their expatriate community. Government officials encourage those abroad to send
back remittances as well as supporting numerous other development projects. In order to try to
boost remittances flows, states have put in place numerous financial incentive programs (Orozco
2003; Beine, Lodigiani, and Vermeulen 2012; Marcin 2013). Likewise, officials can pledge

41

As of April 2016, Eritrea and the United States were the only countries in the world in which tax their citizens
regardless of where they live (Ashman and Moss 2016). Groups representing Americans living abroad tried to
convince Congress to change this requirement for the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, but were unable to do so.
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more political rights such as allowing for external voting in an attempt to attract more
remittances. Many developing countries have become dependent on money transfers sent from
their emigrant community and want to encourage their continuance.

Reliance on Remittances
After an external voting law has been passed, it still has to be implemented by the
government. External voting legislations which get adopted in the legislature, but never
implemented are purely symbolic. It is common for it to take years before for those abroad
having the chance to vote after the electoral reforms have been adopted. For example, external
voting was approved in 2012 in Nicaragua, but it has yet to be implemented (Palop-García and
Pedroza 2018). States have legitimate reasons for not implementing these electoral reforms right
away. Holding elections abroad brings with it numerous technical challenges. Furthermore, the
decision must be made of who gets to vote where and how.
It is also expensive to hold elections abroad, and it can be challenging to guarantee the
electoral integrity of voting taking place outside of the home country. Governments must also
keep in mind the political impact of these decisions. I argue that states which are more reliant on
remittances are more likely to administer elections where those abroad can vote. For one,
migrants can use the remittances they send back as a counterargument to the state’s concern that
external voting is too expensive to implement. Furthermore, remittances are such an important
source of income for many developing countries that states will feel pressure to please those
living abroad.
From 1990 to 2015, remittances surpassed official developmental assistance (ODA) and
were a more stable source of income for developing countries than private capital flows (World
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Bank 2017, 1). In fact, according to the World Bank (2018a), remittances now account for three
times the amount LMICs receive from ODA. Furthermore, unlike ODA, remittances are not
subject to the domestic politics in donor countries (Kapur and McHale 2003) whose main
purpose is often based more on strategic purposes rather than development (Woods 2005).
Data from the World Bank shows that in 2014, 53 states had remittances representing
five percent of their GDP or more. Out of these 53 states, 49 were classified by the World Bank
as LMICs42 and three out of the four high-income states with remittances more than 5 percent of
their GDP were island microstates with a population under 70,000.43
Remittance flows to LMICs have greatly increased in the last 25 years. Figure 3.1
illustrates this growth of the mean remittances as a percent of GDP from 1990-2015 for lowincome, lower-middle income, and upper-middle income countries increased by 28.9, 37.3, and
47.5 percent respectively. On average during this time, remittances accounted for over 48
percent of Lesotho’s GDP and close to 30 percent of the GDP of Tajikistan and Tonga.44

42
To see an explanation of how the World Bank classifies countries visit https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/licslmics-umics-and-hics-classifying-economies-analytical-purposes (Last accessed November 16, 2018)
43
Bermuda population of 65139, Faroe Islands population of 48221, St. Kitts and Nevis population of 54944. Latvia
was the only country with remittances representing more than 5 percent of its GDP that is not a microstate
44
The World Bank does not have complete data coverage for Tajikistan and Tonga from 1990-2015
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Figure 3.1: Remittances as a percent of GDP 1990-2015
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The idea of linking remittances and states putting in place policies for those abroad is
frequently mentioned in the literature.45 First and foremost, states hope that putting in place
favorable policies will make the emigrant community feel as if they are still a part of the nation.
States want migrants to be stakeholders not only in the lives of their family in the homeland but
also in the well-being of the state. In other words, policymakers reason that if emigrants still feel
a sense of belonging to their country of origin they are more likely to continue their financial
support.

45

Some examples include González Gutiérrez 1999; Faist 2000; Itzigsohn 2000; Goldring 2002; Bauböck 2003;
Guarnizo 2003; Guarnizo, Portes and Haller 2003 Levitt and De la Dehesa 2003; The Economist 2003; López‐
Guerra 2005; Barry, 2006; Hazan 2006; Rubio-Marín 2006; Tager 2006; Collyer and Vathi 2007; Cruz 2007;
Gamlen 2008a; Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008; Jimenez-Cuen 2008; Sejersen 2008; Yrizar Barbosa 2008; Leblang
2010; Lieber 2010; Lafleur 2011; World Bank 2011; Burgess 2012a; Marcin 2013; Lafleur 2013a, 2015; Sanders
2013; Turcu and Urbatsch 2015; Caramani and Grotz 2015; Hartmann 2015; Leblang 2017; Schiavon 2017a;
Waterbury 2018; McCann, Escobar, and Arana 2019; Villegas Rivera 2019.

55

Numerous case studies have pointed out how governments have been swayed by
remittances to increase the political rights of their emigrant population. For example, Dalmasso
(2018, 199) notes that King Hassan II of Morocco decided to increase political rights for the
emigrant community in hopes that it would sustain the inflow of remittances. Brand (2014) also
states that “…the regime’s primary concern appears to be maintaining some economic and
cultural services that will help reinforce [Moroccans resident abroad] sense of attachment to
Morocco to keep remittances flowing” (60).
The same argument is made about Ben Ali in Tunisia; President Ali saw external voting
as a way not only to try to rebuild trust with those living abroad but also to encourage their
remittances (Brand 2010, 94). In Portugal, policies for the emigrant community were put in
place to keep the attachment of the Portuguese living abroad and because of their financial
importance (Lisi et al. 2015). Likewise, the Peruvian government has created policy initiatives
including voting from abroad as a way to entice remittances (Berg and Tamagno 2006, 261;
Chaudhary 2018).
Remittances have also played a part in getting governments to move from the default
position of indifference (Bauböck 2003) to a more active participant in their affairs. For
example, Frizzo and Mascitelli (2018, 30-31) contend that remittances help explain a shift in
policy by the Brazilian government towards more engagement with its emigrant community.
Interviews by the authors with key stakeholders in Brazil show the important connection
between remittances and external voting. Even though the authors did not directly discuss the
impact of remittances in their questioning, it was brought up by some of the Brazilian
representatives interviewed as a justification for why emigrants should be able to vote (2018,
113-114).
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There is little empirical evidence showing that states get rewarded by putting in place
policies for those abroad (Pogonyi 2014, 127). The key study which has illustrated more
remittances flowing to the home country because of policies enacted by the home country looked
at the tolerance of dual citizenship. Using both panel and survey data, Leblang (2017, 77) finds
that migrants are 10 percent more likely to send money to states which allow for dual citizenship.
Furthermore, states which permit dual citizenship received considerably more inflow of
remittances.
The work of Leblang (2017) also highlights an important question of what happens to the
inflow of remittances as migrants become more settled in their host country. Some authors have
found evidence of a “remittance decay” effect in which remittances decrease when migrants
become more established in their host country (Hunte 2004; Barrett and Durden 2018).
However, other studies have found a mixed effect of this phenomenon (Goza and Ryabov 2012)
or not found evidence supporting it (Brown 1997). Likewise, scholars such as Gould (1994)
have argued that preference for home country products is likely to dissipate with time, which is
another reason for why states want to do what they can to keep a connection with those abroad.46
It has been presumed by many that the creation of emigrant friendly policies leads to higher
remittances. As Pogonyi states, “politicians as well as scholars studying remittances do
intuitively assume that the symbolic inclusion of diasporas by the granting of political rights will
result in greater volumes of money sent home” (2014, 127). However, no empirical evidence

46

There is some evidence to back up this argument by looking at dietary studies of Mexican-Americans. Studies
have shown that diets become more “Americanized” the longer the Mexican-American stay in the United States
(Viruell-Fuentes 2007; Batis et al. 2011). A survey by Nielsen (2016) showed similar cultural influences in terms of
language use. Latino millennials who are Spanish dominant were more than twice as likely to shop at Hispanic
chains compared to their cohort who are English dominant (Nielsen 2016).
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shows that implementing external voting leads to higher remittances.47 Furthermore, despite the
commonness of the argument linking remittances to the implementation of external voting, few
quantitative studies have found a significant relationship between the two.

Previous Findings
Numerous studies have argued that countries which receive large sums of remittances are
more likely to expand rights to their citizens living abroad. Most prior studies have not found
evidence supporting this claim (Collyer and Vathi 2007; Sanders 2013; Turcu and Urbatsch
2015).48 However, as noted previously, most of the large-N work has tended to suffer from three
problems. First, these studies have often pooled observations from rich and poor countries.
Even with the inclusion of covariates to control for levels of development, the unit effects of rich
countries are so strong that the results for remittances are possibly distorted. The results
provided in my statistical analysis are suggestive of this point. Second, in some cases, there are
no controls for the political regime type among countries in the sample. Third, and perhaps more
important, most studies have not examined the possible non-linearities the relationship between
remittances and voting rights (see Table 3.1).
Erlingsson and Tuman (2017) found that remittances as a percent of GDP influences the
adoption of external voting in a study of 24 Latin American and Caribbean countries for the
period of 1980 to 2012. They also included the squared term to capture the possible non-linear
effect of remittances. Other quantitative studies that have come to the same conclusion have

47

The only study the author is aware of which has examined external voting and the inflow of remittances is an
earlier manuscript of Leblang’s (2017) work. It did not find a statically significant relationship between the two
(2013, appendix)
48
Furthermore, Rhodes and Harutyunyan (2010, 490) do not find any statistical for evidence for the role of reliance
of remittance and it is dropped from their model.
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done so using either descriptive statistics (Hartmann 2015) or using the total dollar amount of
remittances received (Lieber 2010).49 However, using the total inflow of remittances is prone to
bias and fails to capture the degree of dependence on remittances.

Table 3.1: Relationship between Remittances and External Voting
Study
Collyer and Vathi (2007) use analysis of variance (ANOVA) among
144 countries to study the impact of remittances on the likelihood
that external voting is implemented. Both Remittances as a percent
of GDP and per capita are tested.
Lieber (2010, 64-65) uses time series models to examine both the
adoption of external voting laws and the likelihood of having an open
implementation for 130 states from 1970-2004. Furthermore, a
Heckman selection model limited to 2000 and 2004 is used to avoid
selection bias in the time series models. Both Remittances as a
percent of GDP and inflow of remittances are tested.
Sanders (2013) uses the Cox Model to examine the adoption of
external voting in 73 countries in Europe and Latin America from
1962 to 2013. Remittances are operationalized as a percent of GDP.
Hartmann (2015) looks at general trends in Africa along with case
studies of Cape Verde, Ghana, Nigeria, and South Africa.
Descriptive statistics and the four case studies are used to examine
the importance of remittances as a percent of GDP.

Turcu and Urbatsch (2015) use the Cox model to study the
implementation of external voting in over 100 countries from 1960 to
2010. Remittances are tested as a percent of GDP.

Erlingsson and Tuman (2017) examine the adoption of external
voting laws in 24 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean from
1980-2012. The study uses the Cox model, and it tests both
remittances as a percent of GDP and its squared term.

Findings
“The proportion of emigrants and dependence on remittances still
provide important factors for the explanation of the introduction of
emigrant voting but there is obviously no clear relationship” (2007,
20)
Remittances as a percent of GDP are not significant a predictor in
any of the time series models. However, the author finds that
remittances as a percent of GDP is negatively correlated (p<0.019)
with states adopting external voting laws in the Heckman model for
2000 and 2004. The inflow of remittances has a positive coefficient
and is statistically significant throughout in all the models where it is
tested except for the Heckman model testing for the adoption of
external voting laws (2010, 289-291).
“[T]he insignificant effect of international remittances are surprising.
Such findings are contradictory to my expectations and the general
assumptions of the literature regarding overseas suffrage” (2013, 36).
“The African state with the highest remittance ratio per GDP,
Lesotho (25%), has external voting provisions only for state
employees. However, the four next-ranked states – Togo (10%),
Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal (each 9%) – allow for
comprehensive external voting. Thus, the argument that strong
dependency on remittances makes the introduction of external voting
more likely is generally confirmed” (2015, 912).
Remittances are not a statistically significant predictor of countries
implementing external voting (2015, 424). The authors' state “[l]ike
any research, this analysis opens some questions even as it answers
others. For instance, does the relatively weak performance of
economic variables in predicting franchise extensions suggest that
expatriates do not generally increase their remittances (or other
economic and political returns) in the wake of franchise extensions,
even if some previous case studies have suggested that franchiseextending governments expect them to?” (2015, 428).
“[T]he coefficient for remittances as a percent of GDP is positive and
achieves statistical significance, while the coefficient for the squared
term for remittances as a percent of GDP is negative and is also
statistically significant. Taken together, the results for these two
covariates suggest that remittances have a positive effect on the
likelihood on the adoption of external voting, but the effect is
nonlinear” (2017, 305-306).
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Contrarily, in a study examining the variations in emigrant engagement policies, Waterbury (2018) diminishes the
role of remittances using descriptive statistics to compare the inflow of remittances received in Bulgaria, Hungary,
Poland, and Romania. Ragazzi (2014) test the importance of remittances on 35 countries using multiple
correspondence analysis to create a typology of sending states policies. The author finds that the reliance of
remittances does not adequately explain variations among states (2014, 84).
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The Argument
In this study, I argue for a more nuanced relationship in which regime type and a
country’s level of development must also be considered. Politicians in nondemocratic regimes
are more likely not to be faced with the political electoral consequences of expanding the
electoral rolls. Previous quantitative studies examining the implementation of external voting
have not distinguished whether the state implementing the law is democratic or not. Holding
elections is certainly not a sufficient condition for democracy, especially during times where the
norm is for most leaders around the world to espouse that they hold democratic values (Welzel
and Inglehart 2008). Most nondemocratic states hold elections, but the rules have been
engineered in the favor of the ruling regime (Boas 2015).
The former Soviet Republics illustrate this. All 15 former Soviet Republics have allowed
those living abroad to vote at least once (Ellis et al. 2007; authors research). Including the 2017
elections in Turkmenistan in which President Berdymukhamedov was reelected with 98 percent
of the vote. Turkmenistan is one of many central Asian countries that have implemented
external voting and claim to be democratic, although the elections are symbolic with the outcome
having been decided before any vote has been cast (Matveeva 2009). Rwandans living abroad
were also able to vote in the 2017 presidential elections in which President Paul Kagame
received nearly 99 percent of the vote (Human Rights Watch 2017).
Even though remittance flows do not directly go to a country’s treasury, they can still
influence governments’ decision makings. Numerous recent studies have started to illustrate the
differences among regime types. For example, a study of 105 developing countries found that
remittances influenced more democratic governments to increase their welfare spending while
autocratic governments used more resources for spending on their militaries (Easton and
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Montinola 2017). Mirilovic (2015) shows the different calculation when it comes to the
allowance of dual citizenship. Mirilovic argues that allowing for dual citizenship increases the
likelihood that those living abroad will get involved in the domestic politics of their home
country. Democracies see that as being positive while autocracies see it as being negative (2015,
515). Studies have also illustrated that autocracies act strategically when it comes to their
emigration policy and allowing their citizens to travel abroad to try to bolster their chances of
staying in power (Alemán and Woods 2014; Miller and Peters 2018; Tsourapas 2018).
Additionally, I contend that the level of development of a country matters. Previous
studies have tended to include both the wealthiest and poorest countries together in the same
sample. Developing countries tend to be more reliant on remittances. It is important to keep in
mind when discussing remittances that few hundred dollars sent back home to a low-income
family can determine whether it can meet its basic necessities or not (Kapur and McHale 2003).
Similarly, a few thousand dollars collected by a migrant organization for their community of
origin can make a real difference (Fitzgerald 2000). Politicians in countries where remittances
play an important role in alleviating poverty are more likely to be willing to overlook any
potential adverse political consequences of expanding the voter base to those that live abroad.
Subsequently, poorer countries that are dependent on remittances are likely to feel more
pressure to enact policies that are favored by those living abroad such as external voting. As
O’Mahony writes “[t]he extent to which remittances influence political outcomes may depend
upon how wealthy the country is. For poorer countries, because there is less money available
domestically for political purposes, politically-motivated remittances may provide more ‘bang
for the buck” (2013, 808).
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Conclusion
The argument linking remittances and the likelihood of countries adopting and
implementing external voting is commonly mentioned in the scholarly literature. However,
except for Erlingsson and Tuman (2017) whose study focused on the adoption of external voting
in Latin America and the Caribbean, studies have tended not to find a statistically significant
demonstration of this relationship. In this chapter, I have argued that in order to test for this
relationship, the distinctions should be not only between developing and developed countries, but
also countries that share some affinity of democratic governance and non-democracies. In the
upcoming chapter, the impact of remittances along with other previously discussed theoretical
explanations (in chapter two) will be modeled to estimate their impact on the likelihood that
countries implement external voting.
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Chapter 4
External Voting Rights and Remittances:
A Quantitative Analysis
In this chapter, I present the data and methods section used to test the determinants of
countries implementing external voting. The focus of the chapter is to analyze whether reliance
of remittances, net-migration rate, level of democracy, globalization, and policy diffusion
influence the likelihood that countries will implement external voting. The results of the four
estimation models using the Cox Proportional Hazard Model are also introduced. The last
section of the chapter provides an interpretation of the results from the models.

Data and Methods
The dataset for the study includes data for 193 states from the period of 1970-2012. This
time series allows me to capture observations from when the vast majority of external voting
laws were implemented. However, all countries which implemented external voting before 1970
were dropped from the sample.50 There is also missing data for many countries, and they were
not included in the models.
The motive of this study is to examine what influences states to implement external
voting laws. Consistent with the set-up of panels for a Cox model, once a country has
implemented external voting, its time series for the panel ends in the year the law was
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1970 is the first year World Bank remittance data is available, which is why the study cannot go further back.
Countries not included in the dataset because they implemented external voting before 1970 are: Australia, Canada,
Colombia, Finland, Iceland, Indonesia, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, and United States of America. Countries that were excluded because they had no observations on
the main independent variable, remittance as a percent of GDP include: Andorra, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Brunei,
Cuba, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Nauru, North Korea, San Marino, Somalia, South Sudan, and the United Arab
Emirates.
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implemented. For example, Senegal implemented external voting in 1993, and therefore the time
series for the Senegal panel is only from 1970-1993. However, Nigeria has yet to implement
expatriate voting and remains in the dataset from 1970-2012. As a result, the dataset has
unbalanced panels.
I expect that there is a different rationale between poorer and wealthier countries when it
comes to implementing external voting. In order to test this assumption, I classify countries by
their level of development using the classification provided by the World Bank. The World
Bank classifies countries into four categories: low-income, lower-middle, upper-middle, and
higher-income. I used this information to code each country for all the years available from “1”
(low-income) to “4” (high-income). Using this approach, I was able to capture differences in
development between years. For example, in 2001, Bahrain moved from being classified as
upper-middle income (coded as 3) to high-income. In models 2 and 4 of the estimation models
(see below) the high-income countries were removed from the sample. Therefore, in those
models, Bahrain was included in the sample in 2000, but not in 2001.
Using the World Bank classification of developing countries is often utilized in the
scholarly literature (see for example Adams and Page 2005; McMahon and Thorsteinsdóttir
2013). However, a problematic aspect of the World Bank classification is that it does not begin
until 1987.51 Therefore, models 2 and 4 go from 1987-2012. Dropping observations before 1987
did not change the results in models 1 and 3. As a robustness check, I also ran the same four
models in which countries were coded based on whether they were located in developing
regions, based on information from the United Nations Statistical Division.52 Countries were
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The historical classification by the World Bank by income from 1987 can be downloaded by going to
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-groups and
clicking on “historical classification by income in XLS format.”
52
Information available at https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/
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coded as either being developing (coded as “1”) or developed (coded as “0”). Using this
classification, all the country years were included in the models. However, this method does not
distinguish between changes in the level of development during the time span of the study.
Since the results remained the same using both the World Bank and United Nations geographical
classifications, I used the more precise World Bank designation.
The Cox Proportional Hazard Model (Cox 1972) with robust standard errors was used to
test for determinants of implementing external voting laws. The Cox model is widely used in the
health sciences, but also in the social sciences to study rare events such as the passing or
implementation of a specific law or regulation (see for example Knittel 2006; Murillo and
Martínez‐Gallardo 2007; Berliner and Erlich 2015). Furthermore, several studies examining
external voting have employed the Cox model (Sanders 2013; Turcu and Urbatsch 2015;
Erlingsson and Tuman 2017) along with studies on closely related subjects such as the
implementation of diaspora institutions (Gamlen, Cummings, and Vaaler 2017). For all models
presented in this chapter (and in the Appendix), diagnostic tests indicate that the equations, and
each covariate in the model, satisfy the assumption that the data are proportional hazards (see
Appendix B, Tables 3-4; and Appendix C, Tables 3-4).53

Dependent Variable
The dependent variable for this study is whether a country has implemented external
voting (coded “1” in the year that the country implements an external voting law, and “0”
otherwise; as noted, the time-series for any panel ends in the year of implementation of external
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The ph test in STATA was performed. The p values for the global tests and each covariates are well above 0.05,
which implies that one cannot reject the assumption that the data are proportional. The tests suggest that the data
meet the assumptions of Cox regression estimation.
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voting). The data were taken from the widely used IDEA report on external voting (Ellis et al.
2007). Supplemental information from Lafleur (2013b) was used to extend the period of the
study.54 In an attempt to have consistency in the coding of the dependent variable, I used a broad
definition of what can be considered external voting. The data used does not discriminate
between how restrictive or open the voting procedure is for the inaugural allowance of external
voting. Nonetheless, since this study is interested in the implementation rather than the political
consequences of external voting, the characteristics of the data should not pose a problem.

Covariates: Reliance on Remittances
To capture the importance of inflow of remittances to a country, I operationalized the
remittance variables as a percent of GDP in constant 2010 U.S. dollars. The data for remittances
and GDP (constant 2010 U.S. dollars) were gathered from the World Bank (various years).
Remittances as a percent of GDP is an appropriate normalization of the data, and it provides a
more accurate measurement to degree of possible dependence on remittances within a country.
For these reasons, I used the normalized remittance data as opposed to an unadjusted total dollar
flow.
Singer (2010) discusses how some of the countries that receive the highest inflow of
remittances are not very dependent on them. Remittance information for different types of
government entities from the World Bank illustrates this gap. For example, in 2015, the U.S.
ranked 23rd in terms of inflow of remittances (6.56 billion dollars), but number 171 out of 175
concerning remittances as a percent of GDP (0.03%). On the contrary, the Marshall Islands rank
13th regarding remittances as a percent of GDP (15.21%) but 165th in terms of inflow (27
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Information for Armenia comes from the Los Angeles Times (Hong and Haldane 1996)
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million) (for more information see Appendix G). Moreover, in 2015, France, Germany, Spain,
Belgium, and Italy were among the top 15 countries in terms of remittances received. However,
none of these countries are very reliant on remittances.55 It is also important to keep in mind that
there is a great variance in how important remittances are to developing countries. Not all
LMICs are reliant on remittances. For example, in 2015 remittances represented just 0.01
percent of the economy of Mauritius, while comprising a much higher share in Tonga, Liberia,
Haiti, and El Salvador (see Table 4.1)

Table 4.1: Ranking of Countries by Inflow of Remittances and Percent of GDP
Ranking by the
The inflow of
Ranking by
Remittances percent
inflow of remittances remittances (billions) percentage of GDP in of GDP/Inflow of
in 2015 current U.S
/Remittances Percent 2015
remittances
dollars
of GDP
India
68.9/3.27%
Tonga
34.41%/138.28
million
China
63.9/0.4%
Liberia
32.17%/640.78
million
Philippines
29.79/10.17%
Nepal
31.43%/6.72 billion
Mexico
26,23/2.24%
Tajikistan
28.75%/2.25 billion
France
23.76/0.98%
Kyrgyz Republic
25.27%/1.68 billion
Nigeria
21.06/4.39%
Haiti
25.16%/2.19 billion
Pakistan
19.30/7.13%
Moldova
23.64%/1.54 billion
Egypt
18.32/5.50%
Comoros
22.76%/128.79
million
Germany
16.13/0.46%
El Salvador
18.53%/4.28 billion
Bangladesh
15.29/7.84%
Samoa
17.88%/143.79
million
Vietnam
13.20/6.83%
Honduras
17.48%/3.66 billion
Spain
10.28/0.22%
Jamaica
16.64%/2.36 billion
Belgium
9.87/2.16%
Marshall Islands
15.21%/27.34 million
Indonesia
9./1.12%
Lebanon
15.12%/7.48 billion
Italy
9.51bn/0.52%
Kosovo
15.07%/971.06
million
Information gathered from the World Bank (n.d)
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In terms of remittances as a percent of GDP France ranks 116 th, Germany 132nd, Spain 146th, Belgium 88th, and
Italy 130th
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There are numerous well-documented problems with the remittance data. The World
Bank can only estimate the amount from official figures, and as a recent report stated, “…the
true size of remittances, including flows through informal channels, is significantly larger”
(World Bank. 2018a, 3). Scholars tend to agree that the inflow of remittances are substantially
underestimated (Gammeltoft 2002; Adams and Page 2005; Freund and Spatafora 2005; Ratha et
al. 2011; Dionne, Inman, Montinola 2014). Another problem with the data has been addressed
by authors such as Gibson and McKenzie (2017). They argue that the reason for why the inflow
of remittances has increased so greatly in the last few decades is due to changes in the
documentation of these money transfers.56 Despite these problems, the World Bank data is
widely used.
However, the World Bank takes measures to try to minimize these problems (Singer
2010). I assume that the biases in the data are more or less distributed equally among the
countries in the sample. Moreover, I agree with the sentiments of Skeldon (2008) who argues
“[w]hile doubts exist about the precise amounts of money migrants send as remittances, there is
no question about their importance for countries of origin” (2008, 8). I expect that countries
which are more reliant on remittances are more likely to implement external voting.
Hypothesis 1: Countries who are more reliant on remittances are more likely to
implement external voting.
I also included a squared variable of remittances as a percent of 2010 GDP to test for a
possible nonlinearity on the effects of remittances. Following the findings of Erlingsson and
Tuman (2017), I expect that the likelihood of states implementing external voting starts to
dissipate after reliance on remittances reaches moderate to high levels of recipient GDP.
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Authors such as Clemens and McKenzie (2018) have pondered why such high levels of remittances have not
resulted in greater economic growth.
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Politicians are likely to feel pressure to enfranchise those abroad due to their financial
contributions to their home country. However, if citizens in the home country perceive
expatriates as having disproportionately high levels of influence due to remittances, the risks
associated with enfranchisement increase and outweigh the potential benefits for politicians.
Under these conditions, politicians are less likely to be willing to allow for emigrant
enfranchisement.
Hypothesis 2: The impact of remittances on the likelihood of states implementing
external voting is non-linear, and begins to dissipate at moderate to high levels of GDP.

Covariates: Potential Political or Economic Impact
The net migration rate of a country is used a proxy to measure the potential political or
economic impact of those living abroad. Even after adjusting for the effects of remittances,
studies have tended to show that a large emigrant community might be viewed positively or
negatively. For example, Hartmann (2015, 912) discusses how among the top 15 states in
Africa, one-half have no or very restrictive external voting laws. Sanders (2013) finds that
higher emigration lessens the likelihood of the adoption of external voting. Similarly, Hutcheson
and Arrighi (2015) argue that European states with a large population abroad are more likely to
put in place restrictions to guard against those abroad against having too much power. Belton
(2019) argues that external voting is particularly controversial in many Commonwealth
Caribbean countries due to their small population and the high percentage of citizens living
abroad. The findings of Lieber (2010, 260) are a little more nuanced, but the author finds that
states with a large emigrant population are likely to try to minimize their political power.
On the other hand, as noted in the review of literature, scholars have hypothesized that
states now view their population living abroad as a resource in the globalized economy (e.g.,
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Gould 1994; Head and Ries 1998; Dunlevy and Hutchinson 1999; Girma and Yu 2002; Wagner,
Head, and Ries 2002; White 2007; Tadesse and White 2011; Law, Genc, and Bryant 2013). In
particular, larger emigrant populations might facilitate increased trade or investment with the
home market, while also contributing to the transfer of technology or human capital. For this
reason, governments might be tempted to grant expatriates voting rights in order to deepen
economic ties with the emigrant population.
Given the conflicting hypotheses in the literature, I expect that, all things being equal, a
large emigrant population may have a positive or negative effect on the likelihood of
implementing external voting laws. Testing for net migration is advantageous as the impact of a
large emigrant community will be especially felt in countries which do not have immigrants
coming in to replace those that left. I employed data on the net migration data per 1,000
habitants; the data is gathered from the United Nations Population Division.57
Hypothesis 3: The effects of high levels of net migration may be positively or negatively
associated with the likelihood of implementing external voting.

Control Variables
Following the arguments that external voting is influenced by global democratic norms
and a step towards the consolidation of democracy, I control for the level of democracy. I used
the revised combined polity scores from the Polity IV dataset, which range from -10 (most
autocratic) to 10 (most democratic). A benefit of using the Polity dataset is that it covers all the
years for the study. I expect that countries with higher Polity scores are more likely to
implement external voting.
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The data is available at http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?d=PopDiv&f=variableID%3A85 (Last accessed December 9,
2018).
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Hypothesis 4: Democratic regimes are more likely to implement external voting
A lot of the literature has also focused on the role of globalization in order to explain the
growth in external voting and, more broadly, policies that are favorable to emigrants. As noted,
scholars have hypothesized that states now see their population living abroad as a resource in the
globalized economy. The spread of communication technologies has also facilitated contact with
expatriates and their family and friends abroad, which has helped social norms to spread.
Furthermore, states have also been more open to implement external voting as it becomes more
of an international norm pushed on by the international community. In order to control for this
effect, I employed the KOF index of globalization variable (Dreher 2006), as it aggregates the
level of economic globalization, social globalization, and political globalization into a score
measuring low to high levels of globalization (0-100). I expect that states with higher levels of
globalization will be more likely to implement external voting.
Hypothesis 5: States that experience higher levels of aggregate globalization are more
likely to implement external voting laws.
Finally, I control for the effects of policy diffusion. The work of Turcu and Urbatsch
(2015) has illustrated how policy diffusion has impacted the likelihood of states implementing
external voting. Their work also helps explain why so many non-democratic states have
enfranchised their citizens abroad. Similar to the works of Shipan and Volden (2008) on policy
diffusion in the United States, I calculated the percent of the population in each sub-region which
had implemented external voting for each year. The information for sub-regions was gathered
from the United Nations58 and is available in the Appendix. The population data was gathered
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Information available at https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/ (Accessed November 20, 2018). There are
some sub-regions which have only two countries such as Northern America (Canada and the United States) and the
region of Australia and New Zealand. However, all of those countries implemented external voting before the start
of the study and are therefore not included.
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from the World Bank. I expect that countries that are in subregions where a large part of the
population of the sub-region has implemented external voting are more likely to follow along
and implement these laws.
Hypothesis 6: Diffusion has a positive effect on the likelihood of implementing external
voting
Table 4.2: Operationalization of Variables
Operationalization
Source
If the country implemented
Ellis et al. (2007); Lafleur
external voting that year, the
(2013b).
observation is coded as 1, and
0 otherwise.
Importance of remittances
Remittances as a percent of
World Bank Migration and
and squared value.
GDP in 2010 constant dollars. Remittance Data; World
Bank GDP data.
Potential political impact of
Net migration rate per 1,000
The United Nations
emigrant community.
habitants.
Population Division.
Level of democracy.
Polity IV index.
Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers
(2017).
Globalization.
KOF index of globalization
Dreher (2006).
Policy diffusion.
Percent of population in a
Ellis et al. (2007); Lafleur
sub-region which has
(2013b); United Nations
implemented external voting. Statistical Commission;
World Bank Population data.
Variable
Implementation of external
voting law (dependent
variable).

Results
Four separate models are presented below to test whether different country characteristics
lead to varying results (see Table 4.3). In Model 1, I present a global sample which includes 123
countries that pools observations across countries with varying levels of economic development
and democracy. However, the sample is highly skewed towards developing countries as around
75 percent of the observations are from LMICs. One explanation for this skewness is that a
majority of the countries in the world are LMICs. Additionally, many of the high-income
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countries were among the first ones to implement external voting, and therefore, they are not in
the sample for the entire duration of the study.
In Model 2 (all LMICs) I present the results for 102 LMIC countries (all observations
which the World Bank categorizes a country as being high-income are dropped).59 However, the
sample is not refined on the basis of regime type, and 40 percent of the observations in Model 2
are from LMICs with a negative polity score. In Model 3 (Non-Autocracies), I drop all
observations where a country has a negative polity score in any country/year observation (94
countries.) This classification is similar to Epstein et al. (2006, 555) who use a Polity score of
one to start classifying countries as partial democracies. Similarly, Polity IV starts classifying
countries as being an open instead of closed anocracy when they have a score of one.60 This
sample is slightly skewed towards high-income countries compared to the entire population of
observations in the dataset. Nonetheless, LMICs still make up close to 70 percent of the
potential observations. Finally, Model 4 (LMICs non-autocracies) has observations for 75
countries. In Model 4, all observations are dropped in which a country has either a negative
polity2 score or are classified as being high income. Descriptive statistics for each model,
correlation matrixes, and test for hazard model applicability are included in the appendix.61

Remittances
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As a robustness check, the second and fourth models were also estimated in which a country was coded as being
developing if it is included on the United Nation’s list of developing regions. The list of countries is available by
going to https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/ and clicking on developing region. The results of the model
were not impacted.
60
Information available at https://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm (Last accessed December 9, 2018).
61
Other trials included the log of GDP in constant 2010 dollars to test for the relationship on economic development
on the likelihood of states implementing external voting. The variable was consistently statistically significant with
a positive coefficient. However, the variable had a positive p-value in some of the Grambsch and Therneau’s test
for non-proportionally and was therefore dropped.
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The results from Table 4.3 show there are differences in results across the models.
Similar to previous studies, the coefficients for the remittance variables were not significant in
the model that pool observations across all countries without any sample refinement by level of
democracy (Model 1).62 This result is not surprising as the sample includes many wealthy states
that are not dependent on remittances, and states that exhibit autocracy. The results of Model 1
are in line the pioneering study of Collyer and Vathi (2007), who did not find a statistical
relationship between remittances and external voting. Once adjustments are made for nonautocracies, the coefficient for remittances to GDP is positive and significant, and the
relationship appears to be linear (Model 3). However, one should interpret Model 3 with caution
because the LMIC countries in the sample may be driving much of the result.
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In a separate trial, following the findings of Lieber (2010) the inflow of remittances in current and 2010 constant
dollars was significant. However, the log of inflow of remittances in current or 2010 constant dollars was not
significant. Neither was the log of remittances as a percent of GDP.
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Table 4.3 Determinates of the Implementation of External Voting
Variable
(1) All Countries
(2) All LMICS
(3) Non(4) LMICs Non
Autocracies
Autocracies
Remittance/
11.00
7.14
19.20**
22.51**
GDP
(9.66)
(8.68)
(9.12)
(8.94)
Remittance/
-.58
-.37
-.58
-.62**
GDP
(.56)
(.40)
(.37)
(.28)
squared
Net
.01
.03
.08**
.17***
migration
(.03)
(.04)
(.04)
(.06)
Polity2
.03
.02
.22**
.23**
(.03)
(.03)
(.11)
(.11)
Globalizati
-.01
.00
-.03
-.00
on
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
(.02)
Diffusion
1.54***
1.92****
1.51**
2.34***
(.54)
(.60)
(.66)
(.78)
N= 2,700
N= 1,611
N=1,771
N=1,057
Log
Log
Log
Log
pseudolikelihood=156. pseudolikelihoo pseudolikelihoo pseudolikelihoo
73
d= -110.08
d= -101.88
d= 61.01
Chi Square 13.68**
Chi Square
Chi Square
Chi Square
13.64**
14.85**
19.33***
**** p < .001; *** p < .01; ** p < .05 *p <0.10

In Model 2, which includes all LMICs, the coefficients for the remittance variables fail
to achieve significance. This result suggests that economic dependence on remittances alone is
not sufficient to induce governments to implement external voting laws. Rather, the effect of
remittances in the LMIC group might be conditioned on levels of democracy. Further analysis of
the regime type characteristics in the sample are suggestive of this point. The mean Polity score
in the Model 2 is 2.5 (with a standard deviation of 6.16), indicating that a large part of
observations are probably from non-democratic regimes. Given that politicians in democracies
are at times obliged to consider adopting and implementing external voting due to the importance
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of these money transfers for their constituents and the national economy, we might expect the
effect to be stronger in non-autocracies.
In Model 4, which examines non-autocratic LMICs, the results for the remittances
variables are in the expected directions. The coefficient for remittances to GDP is positive and
significant, while the coefficient for the squared variable is negative and significant. This
indicates a non-linear relationship. In other words, in non-autocratic LMICs, the influence of
remittances is positive at low to moderate levels of remittances to GDP ratios. After reaching the
tipping point, the effect diminishes (as suggested by the squared term of the remittances to GDP
covariates).63 In interpreting this finding, one should recall that in numerous states that are highly
reliant on remittances, politicians might be hesitant to enfranchise their population abroad due to
a perceived backlash among home country voters. States such as Jamaica -- which is one of the
most reliant on remittances in the world – exemplify this point: The government of Jamaica has
yet to implement external voting. Furthermore, countries who are reliant on remittances are
likely to put in restrictions such as limiting their financial contributions to political candidates to
diminish their potential power on the political system.64
Finally, it is important to note some regional differences in the results for remittances.
For example, consistent with the findings of Erlingsson and Tuman (2017), in a model limited to
Americas,65 the coefficient for remittances as a percent of GDP is statistically significant at the
five percent level. Likewise, the coefficient for remittances percent of GDP squared has a
negative coefficient and is also significant at the five percent level (See Appendix F). However,
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Trials using lagged remittances variables yielded the same results
It would be useful to graph the effects of the hazard ratio to better demonstrate this non-linear relationship and to
illustrate when this shift occurs. However, due to the peculiarities of the Cox model regular marginal effects cannot
be estimated (for example see online discussion by Maarten L. Buis at https://www.stata.com/statalist/archive/201203/msg01214.html).
65
The models in Appendix F, however, include more observations because they go from 1970 to 2012
64
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it should be noted that close to eighty percent of all observations in the inclusive sample for the
Americas are from LMICs.

Net Migration
Next, I discuss the results for net migration. It should be recalled here that I employ net
migration as a proxy for the potential electoral impact of the emigrant community. As one can
see from the data in Table 4.3, the results for net migration also vary across the trials. In the
trials with all countries or LMICs (Models 1 and 2), the coefficient for net migration is positive
but fails to achieve statistical significance. Quite possibly, the inclusion of autocracies in these
models influences the results. In Models 3 and 4, the coefficient for net migration is positive and
significant. This suggests that among all non-autocracies, higher rates of in-migration increase
the likelihood that governments will grant external voting rights. This result is compatible with
the argument developed by Sanders (2013) and others. However, as noted, this finding does not
potentially fit with the hypothesis concerning emigrants as a positive economic resource. Of
course, this is not to deny that governments may view emigrants positively because of their
potential to contribute to increased trade and investment flows (e.g., Gould 1994; Girma and Yu
2002; Law, Genc, and Bryant 2013), but only that the potential trade and investment benefits are
not sufficient to generate emigrant voting rights.66
Given the limitation of the net migration measure, in a separate trial, I estimated the
equations with a measure of the estimated percentage of a country’s population living abroad
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It might be expected that net migration rate and reliance of remittances would be highly correlated to each other,
but that was not the case. A variance-covariance matrix of the parameters indicated that the highest level of
multicollinearity was for model three (non-autocracies) at 0.2445. Correlation matrices for the models presented in
this chapter can be found in in Appendices B to F.
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(Pew Research Center, various years).67 The substantive results were not altered: The
coefficient was negative, which suggests that states with higher percentage of their population
living abroad were less likely to implement external voting. Furthermore, in a separate trial in
which all the observation that had a positive net migration were dropped, the results remained the
same. The coefficient was significant and positive in Models 3 and 4. This indicates that states
who have an emigrant community which have the potential to have a large electoral impact are
more hesitant to enfranchise those abroad.

Controls
Corresponding to the findings of Turcu and Urbatsch (2015), the coefficient for policy
diffusion is consistently positive and significant in all trials. On the other hand, the coefficient
for globalization was insignificant in all the models. Globalization is a concept which is hard to
operationalize, and therefore, it is possible that the index is not adequately measuring the types
of social, economic, and political globalization which would result in states to be more likely to
enfranchise their emigrant community. Trials testing the index of social and economic
globalization yielded the same results.
Interestingly, when autocracies are included in the trials (Models 1 and 2), the coefficient
for Polity scores is an insignificant predictor of external voting rights. The fact that so many
non-democratic states have implemented external voting partly for emblematic reasons conceals
the real impact of the level of democracy in the decision to implement external voting. However,
among non-autocracies (i.e., in the models where countries with negative Polity scores are
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The information is available at http://www.pewglobal.org/interactives/migration-tables/ (Last accessed November
15th, 2018). The estimates are only given for 1990, 2000, 2010, and 2015. I employed multiple imputation to fill in
missing observations for some years. For example, I used the data for 1990s to fill in observation for 1990-1999.
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omitted, Models 3 and 4), those states who are more democratic are more likely to implement
external voting. These results suggest that democratic consolidation might be an important
precursor to external voting.68

Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that politicians and governments are likely to be swayed by
remittances to enfranchise their citizens living abroad. The argument made in this chapter that
there is a relationship between the reliance of remittances and the likelihood that a state will
implement external voting is neither original nor innovative. However, previous quantitative
studies have tended not to find a relationship between them. I argue that the distinction should
be made between developing and developed countries and autocracies and countries which have
some democratic characteristics.
It is not inconceivable to assume that states with different characteristics implement
external voting for different reasons. I argued that the distinctions should be made between
lower-and-middle-income and high-income countries since on average LMICs are more likely to
be reliant on remittances. I expected that the fact that high-income countries such as Canada,
Japan, and the United States which remittances represent less than 0.10 percent of their GDP
have implemented external voting was skewing the overall sample. Furthermore, I assumed that
the implementation of expatriate voting by non-democratic countries was also skewing the
results. I argue that on average non-democracies are more likely than democracies to implement
external voting for purely symbolic reasons. Politicians in many autocracies do not face the
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Separate trials in which a higher threshold for Polity scores was used showed the same results. The more
democratic the regime is the more likely it is to implement external voting. Similarly, the same was found by using
Freedom House, if observation were dropped which had an average civil and political rights score over four (out of
seven).
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same political calculus on the costs and benefits of implementing external voting as politicians
do in more democratic regimes. In fact, remittances might threaten the power of politicians in
autocratic states by minimizing their clientelistic power (see Pfutze 2014).
The results from table 3.4 indicate that the biggest difference is whether countries with a
negative Polity score are included in the sample or not. This is logical, numerous nondemocratic do allow for external voting, if they are putting in place these policies for mostly
symbolic reasons it can taint the results of studies which are looking for general trends. These
findings also highlights the importance of case studies which have examined why nondemocratic regimes implement political rights for their citizens abroad (Brand 2010 and 2014;
Dalmasso 2018). Policy diffusion was the only variable which was statistically significant in all
the models tested. Turcu and Urbatsch (2015) explain how non-democratic regimes use external
voting as a way to illustrate their democratic procedures, since allowing those abroad to vote
“flaunts elections in a particularly visible way” (2015, 428).
The findings of statistical models point to a nuanced relationship remittances have on the
likelihood of whether external voting is implemented based on country characteristics.
Remittances were not significant in the global sample of 123 countries. Furthermore, going
against my expectations, neither were the variables significant in the model in which highincome countries were dropped. This intricate relationship is also noticeable by comparing the
models in which autocracies are dropped from the sample. The reliance of remittance variable is
significant among all democracies.
However, model 4, which includes non-autocratic developing countries the importance
of remittances is significant with a positive coefficient while the coefficient for the squared
variable is negative and significant. This indicates that the effects of remittances start to
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diminish in developing countries. This fits the model of strategic politicians who want to reward
their emigrant population for contributing to their homeland, but at the same time, they are
hesitant to enfranchise a group of people who can be seen as yielding too much political power.
The results showing that states who have a negative net migration rate are less likely to
enfranchise those living abroad gives further credence to this interpretation.
Finally, I would like to clarify further that the argument in this chapter is that states and
politicians are influenced by remittances to implement external voting. However, there are
certainly other factors which are crucial in determining whether these laws are implemented or
not. It is unlikely that any state will implement external voting simply due to the money
transfers it receives from abroad.69 If that were the case, then states would be likely to sell voting
rights to foreigners who were willing to pay for them. Furthermore, there are cases where the
financial muscle of the emigrant community does not lead to power (e.g., Kenya (Bekoe and
Burchard 2016, 128)). The argument is that ceteris paribus, reliance on remittances increases the
likelihood that states will implement external voting.
One of the contributions of this chapter is that it has added to the literature on how
remittances can impact the aggregate political decision-making of countries.70 Furthermore,
following the study on Latin America and the Caribbean by Erlingsson and Tuman (2017), this
chapter has contributed to the debate on what impact remittances have on the likelihood that
states will put in place favorable policies for their emigration community. The use of
instrumental theories to explain why states put in place diaspora policies seem to have fallen out
of vogue recently, and hopefully, this chapter can help contribute to future scholarly research on
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Lieber 2010 however argues that “the existence of cash remittances signifies a diaspora population linked to the
nation, without which there is no basis for overseas voting” (258).
70
The limitations of this chapter and recommendations for future studies are discussed in chapter 7 (conclusion)
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similar subjects. A survey of the scholarly literature on remittance illustrate how the impacts of
money transfers from abroad vary greatly based on countries and circumstances. This chapter
has further illustrated this by presenting four models of different country characteristics. The
next chapter examines what influenced the Mexican federal and subnational governments to
implement external voting.
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Chapter 5
External Voting at the Subnational Level. The Case of Mexico
Up to this point, I have contended that it is puzzling to understand why and how many
countries have implemented expatriate voting in the last 30 years. First, external voting violates
long held norms against domestic politics crossing international borders (Caramani and Grotz
2015). Second, providing expatriates with the vote required a transformation in which
policymakers started portraying their emigrant population in a more favorable manner and
incorporated them into the “global nation” (R Smith 2003). Third, politicians are often wary of
implementing such laws unless they know those living abroad will not hurt their chances of
being reelected (Lafleur 2011).
I argued that the surge in external voting around the world has partly occurred due to the
increase in democratic governance, associated with the third-wave of democratization
(Huntington 1991), which created a window-of-opportunity for an expansion in who is eligible to
vote. Additionally, allowing those abroad to vote has been viewed as a step towards the
consolidation of democracy. Likewise, I maintained that lower-and-middle-income countries put
in place policies such as external voting because they want to strengthen the ties with their
emigrant communities in the hopes of maximizing the flow of remittances and international
trade. Moreover, the rise of external voting is unlikely to have occurred without the continued
engagement by migrants in their country of origin.
So far, this dissertation has only focused on the differences in policies put in place by
central governments. However, oftentimes, much of the interactions emigrants have with
policymakers in their country of origin is not only with the national government, but also with
local or subnational governments (SNGs) (Lyons and Mandaville 2010; Nyblade and O’Mahony
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2014).71 Subnational governments in several countries have responded and put in place
institutions and policies designed to work with residents living abroad. One such example is the
Indian state of Kerala, which has set up an agency for residents living abroad not only to
facilitate migration and protect their rights, but also to attract remittances (Yrizar Barbosa and
Alarcón 2010, 172). Subnational governments in several countries have also opened up the
voting process to their residents living abroad. Nonetheless, little scholarship has focused on the
implementation of external voting by SNGs.
This chapter, along with the subsequent chapter, will focus on Mexico and the decision of
its federal government and Mexico’s subnational entities to implement external voting. Mexico
offers a unique perspective to study external voting, as both levels of government have taken an
active interest in their emigrant community (Pedroza 2015). Mexico is also an example of a
country in which the shift towards democratization resulted in a change of attitudes by
policymakers towards their diaspora. Subnational politicians such as governors and members of
state legislatures who are often most aware of the challenges but also opportunities brought on
by emigration, did not have much leeway from the federal government to implement policies for
those living abroad.
The remainder of the chapter will be organized as follows. The first section will review
the literature that has examined external voting at the subnational level. The second section will
discuss why Mexico is a pertinent case study to investigate external voting. The third section
reviews the historical context of migration from Mexico to the United States, which helps
explain the complicated relationship between the Mexican federal government and its emigrant
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The terms “subnational” and “provincial” will be used interchangeably to refer to a second level of government
such as the Mexican state of Jalisco or the German lander of Bavaria. When referring to specific city, town, or
village government the terms “local” or “municipal “ will be used.

84

community. The fourth section demonstrates how democratization and the subsequent decline in
power of the long ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party resulted in more favorable policies
being put in place for those living abroad. The fifth section discusses how Mexico’s system of
federalism has resulted in some subnational governments being at the forefront of pushing for
external voting rights and other policy programs for their emigrant community. The sixth
section will discuss how the importance of remittances has influenced both levels of government
to respond to the wishes of Mexicans abroad. Finally, the seventh section includes concluding
remarks.

External Voting at the Subnational Level
Since few studies examine external voting at the subnational level, there are not many
explanations as to why some regional governments implement such policies. Do these
motivations differ from explanations at the national level? It is certainly conceivable that
subnational governments might have different motivations compared to national governments.
For example, the democratic norm of enfranchising those abroad does not seem to apply to
subnational governments in the same way it does to national governments. Indeed, Arrighi and
Bauböck (2017) discuss how the Galician nationalist party (BNG) “…managed to convince an
overwhelming majority of Spanish MPs that the external local suffrage constituted a ‘democratic
anomaly which did not exist anywhere else in Europe’ and unduly diluted the preferences of the
resident population” (2017, 630).
Besides, subnational governments do not have the same infrastructure, such as
embassies and consulates, as national governments do to hold elections abroad. Registering
voters abroad and setting up the electoral process tends to be expensive. Moreover, all things
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being equal, it can be expected that turnout and interests are lower in regional and local elections
compared to national elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980; Lijphart 1997). In the first allowance of
external voting in 2007, in the state of Michoacán, only 349 citizens voted from abroad (Instituto
Electoral de Michoacán 2007, 91). Therefore, it is not surprising that generally non-citizens are
more likely to be allowed to vote in local elections compared to citizens living abroad (Arrighi
and Bauböck 2017).
In order to implement external voting, subnational governments need the authority to
modify their own electoral laws to include those living abroad (Arrighi and Lafleur 2019). Of
course, if the central government mandates or encourages such laws, the dynamic at the
subnational level can change. For example, in the United States, all 50 states, along with Guam,
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, allow their residents abroad to vote. In the United States, it
was the federal government that forced subnational governments to allow for external voting
(Arrighi and Lafleur 2019). Furthermore, subnational governments within democracies are also
more likely to have the authority to implement external voting. For example, Duchacek (1990,
3) argues that only in pluralistic democracies is there a true level of separation of powers
between central and subnational governments. Some sort of separations of power also allows
subnational governments more leeway to enter policy areas that are typically reserved for the
central government. This was the case in Mexico. As the country started to become more
democratic, subnational governments gained more political autonomy (Rodriguez 1998;
Schiavon 2017a).
Although elections are regularly organized and conducted at the subnational level, it is
debatable whether holding elections abroad is purely a domestic matter. Officials from the
subnational government must initiate contact with those expatriates living abroad, register them
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to vote, and promote the election if they are serious about getting their residents abroad to vote.
At the federal level, it is common for governments to enlist their Ministry of Foreign Affairs to
assist with registering potential voters abroad and collecting their votes (Nohlen and Grotz 2000;
Brand 2014). However, at the subnational level this process can be more complicated. For
example, when Michoacán allowed for external voting in 2007, state officials made several trips
abroad to promote the elections. Furthermore, officials had to cooperate with numerous Mexican
and international institutions, such as the Mexican Foreign Ministry and the postal services of
Mexico and the United States to conduct the elections abroad (Instituto Electoral de Michoacán
2007, 12). Nonetheless, as stated before, few explanations have been put forward exploring what
motivates subnational governments to open up the electoral process to those living abroad.
The work of Jimenez-Cuen (2008) suggests that Mexican subnational governments have
similar motivations as central governments in developing countries. Jimenez-Cuen examines the
approval of the 2003 law in Zacatecas that permitted residents abroad to run for elections and
included representation in the state assembly along with the approval of the first external voting
law passed in 2007 in Michoacán. The author focuses on three main factors that increase the
likelihood of subnational governments reforming their electoral laws to give emigrants greater
power. First, Jimenez-Cuen argues that Mexican states which have a high level of outmigration
and send large sums of remittances back are more likely to do so. Second, if the migrant
community is organized and contributes to public projects in their home community, the
subnational governments might have stronger incentives to provide voting rights. Third, a left
leaning Democratic Revolution Party (PRD) in power in the state is associated with expatriate
voting.
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Arrighi and Bauböck (2017) were the first to do a comparative analysis of the rights of
non-resident citizens to vote in local elections in 53 countries in Europe and the Americas. The
authors find that although external voting has become very common at the national level, it is an
anomaly at the local level. Subsequently, citizenship tends to outweigh residency requirements
to vote at the national level while the opposite is true at the local level. There are also political
motivations involved, such that of the BNG in Spain, which was motivated to end the
enfranchisement of residents living abroad at the local level due to electoral concerns (Arrighi
and Bauböck 2017, 630).
Ensuing research by Arrighi and Lafleur (2019) was the first systematic study to examine
more specifically which regions within countries allow for external voting, and how restrictive
the laws are. In their study of 20 countries, the authors show a nuanced picture of where
residents abroad can vote. Of the 20 countries, eight allowed expatriates to vote in regional
elections, which were not limited to only those serving the state’s interest or having to come
back to vote (see table 5.1). Moreover, requirements tend to be more restrictive for regional
elections compared to national elections. Only in Greece are the requirements for voting less
restrictive at the regional level.72
Arrighi and Lafleur (2019) emphasize how political factors influence the implementation
of external voting at the regional level. For example, the left leaning Scottish National Party has
been skeptical about letting residents abroad vote since they are viewed as having a contrary
view on Scottish independence (Arrighi and Lafleur 2019). Moreover, along with selfdetermination powers, i.e. having the power to make changes to electoral laws, the authors
highlight the importance of self-determination aims. In their two case studies examining all of
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In a recent interview on Greek television, the Prime Minister of Greece at the time, Alexis Tsipras, floated the
idea of allowing the Greek emigrant community to elect their own representative (Neos Kosmos 2019).
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Scotland, and Flanders in Belgium, the authors illustrate that strategic thinking tends to drive the
openness towards emigrants living abroad.
Table 5.1 below illustrates that there are noteworthy differences within countries. This
begs the question why certain subnational governments allow their residents living abroad to
vote while other do not. In addition, why are some regional governments more restrictive in
their requirements for overseas voters? Arrighi and Lafleur (2019) distinguish between six
categories of expatriate voting. Their coding ranges from zero, representing no external voting,
up to one, representing elections in which all citizens along with citizens born abroad are able to
vote. As can be seen in table 5.1, Mexican subnational entities have been among the pioneers in
putting in place external voting legislation for their population living abroad.
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Table 5.1: Arrighi and Lafleur (2019) Expatriate Voting in Regional Elections73
Country
Score of
Subnational Coded Coded Coded Coded Coded Coded
national
governments as 0:
as 0.2: as 0.4 as 0.6 as 0.8 as 1
election
examined
Austria
1
9
6
0
0
3
0
0
Belgium
1
3
3
0
0
0
0
0
Croatia
1
21
21
0
0
0
0
0
Czech
1
14
14
0
0
0
0
0
Republic
Canada
0.6
13
2
8
0
3
0
0
Denmark
0.6
10
0
10
0
0
0
0
Finland
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
France
1
33
0
0
33
0
0
0
Germany
0.8
16
16
0
0
0
0
0
Greece
0.2
16
0
0
16
0
0
0
Italy
1
20
0
0
19
0
1
0
Mexico
1
32
19
0
0
0
13
0
Portugal
1
2
2
0
0
0
0
0
Sweden
0.8
21
21
0
0
0
0
0
USA
1
55
0
0
0
0
28
27
United
0.6
4
3
1
0
0
0
0
Kingdom
Slovakia
1
8
8
0
0
0
0
0
Netherlands 1
12
12
0
0
0
0
0
Spain
1
19
2
0
0
0
0
17
Switzerland 1
26
0
16
0
0
0
10
Total
Average
335
129
35
68
7
42
44
0.88

Mexican Case Study
Mexico offers a unique perspective to study why some SNGs allow their residents abroad
to vote. Mexico is one of few lower-and-middle-income countries in which there exists a
disparity among its 32 subnational units on whether they have implemented external voting
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The authors coding goes as follows: No external voting (0), limited to those serving the states interest abroad
(0.2), only in country voting (0.4), voters are only eligible if they have spent 15 or less abroad (0.6), limited to first
generation of emigrants (0.8), and every citizen living abroad including those born abroad can vote (1) Arrighi and
Lafleur (2019, 523).

90

rights for their residents abroad.74 As of 2019, the majority of Mexican subnational governments
have yet to put in place voting rights for their residents residing abroad. However, the country is
currently in a transitioning phase in which the number of Mexican regional governments
allowing for external voting is increasing. For example, in 2018, eight out of the nine
subnational units that held elections for governor allowed their citizens abroad to vote. Of these
eight states, five implemented external voting for the first time. For the gubernatorial elections
that took place in June 2019, Puebla allowed their residents abroad to vote for the second time in
two years. Conversely, the other state that held gubernatorial elections in 2019, Baja California
(North), has yet to allow their residents abroad to vote. The states of Chiapas, Michoacán, and
Zacatecas have also been pioneers in extending political rights for their emigrant community by
creating special representation for those living abroad (Jimenez-Cuen 2008; Burgess 2009).
Mexico also provides variations on many of the independent variables used in chapter
four to study what influences countries to implement external voting laws. For example, in
2016, the Mexican government estimated that over 12 million Mexicans lived abroad with close
to 97 percent of them residing in the United States (Institute of Mexicans Abroad 2016).
However, historically, the majority of emigrants from Mexico have come from a handful of
states (see Durand, Massey, and Zenteno 2001, 110). It was estimated that from 2000-2008, 60
percent of migrants who left Mexico for the United States were from eight states (Botello 2012,
51).75 Similarly, divergences exist when it comes to the level of remittances states receive. In
2018, remittances sent to Mexico reached record highs of more than 33 billion dollars (Bank of
Mexico). Two-thirds of the remittances Mexico receives have tended to go towards high
intensity migrant sending subnational units located mostly in northwestern Mexico (Zarate‐
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Mexico is divided into 31 Mexican states and Mexico City (formerly known as the Federal District).
There state are Guanajuato, Michoacán, Sonora, Jalisco, Chiapas, Oaxaca, Veracruz and Sinaloa (Botello 2012)
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Hoyos 2004, 556). Furthermore, in 2018, the Bank of Mexico estimates that Zacatecas, a high
intensity migration state, with a population approximately twice that of Baja California Sur, a
low intensity migration state, receives more than 12 times the amount of remittances (Bank of
Mexico n.d.). The pressure to increase the levels of remittances has arguably been amplified as
Mexico went through a process of economic liberalization in the 1980s. Subnational entities
became more active in trying to compete in the global market and attain remittances (Schiavon
2017b).
As will be discussed, Mexico also illustrates the long and complicated political process of
getting external voting implemented both at the subnational and national level. It was not until
Mexico’s long ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) lost its power (2000) that allowed
for external voting to be implemented for presidential elections in 2006. At the subnational
level, PRI has also seen its previous dominance vanish. Nevertheless, the party remains a
considerable political force. For instance, numerous substantial entities have continued to vote
for PRI governors after the country started democratizing.
Mexico is also a prime example of a country in which the discourse of those living
abroad has become more favorable. The Mexican consular network in the United States is the
most extensive in the world with 49 consulates in 25 states as well as representation in
Washington D.C (Mexican Secretary of Foreign Affairs n.d.).76 Nonetheless, numerous SNGs
have set up their own representation offices in the United States to aid their residents living
abroad (Schiavon 2017a). Also, in 2010, all but three of Mexico’s SNGs had set up an agency
focused on migration (Ortega Ramírez 2013, 102).
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Information available at https://embamex.sre.gob.mx /eua/images/pdf/ factsheets/001mexican
consularnetwork.pdf (last accessed August 28, 2019).
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It is also important to study the political decision of SNG because many of the Mexican
hometown associations (HTAs) have built up connections with the SNGs of origin (Yrizar
Barbosa and Alarcón 2010). In some cases, Mexicans construct a regional identity while living
abroad that they did not have while living in Mexico (Fox 2007, 296). It is also at the local level
where migrants’ collective remittances gives them significant political power (Burgess 2012b).
Therefore, it is not surprising that many migrants feel that their remittance contributions are most
impactful at the hometown level (Lopez 2015, 25). The next section discusses how both the
federal and SNGs have struggled with attempting to control migration to the United States.

Historical context
In the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, which ended the Mexican-American War,
Mexico lost a substantial part of its territory to the United States. Henceforth, citizens of Mexico
became immigrants in the United States overnight (Delgado Wise and Márquez 2006). Roughly,
75,000 of the 100,000 Mexicans in the territory that now was a part of the United States chose to
stay instead of relocating to Mexico in order to keep their property and become U.S citizens
(Cano and Délano 2007, 698). The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was supposed to end hostilities
between the two countries, however; in actuality this was not fully achieved (Carrigan and Webb
2003).
The Mexican-American population now living in the territory of the United States were
supposed to be protected by the U.S government as American citizens (Cano and Délano 2007).
However, they were frequently discriminated against in terms of property and political rights
(Cano and Délano 2007), education (Miguel and Valencia 1998), and became victims of violence
that often went unpunished (Carrigan and Webb 2003). It has been estimated that from 1848 to
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1928, at least 597 Mexicans were lynched in the United States (Carrigan and Webb 2003, 413).77
The violence against Mexicans in the United States resulted in Mexican government officials
having to get involved in the affairs of their emigrant population living in the United States as a
way to protect their human rights.
The adoption of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 in the United States, along with a
recession in Mexico in 1907, increased the pace of outmigration from Mexico to the U.S (Cano
and Délano 2007; Joseph 2012). In 1910, the year the Mexican Revolution started, another wave
of mass emigration to the United States started. The violence and dire economic conditions
brought on by the Revolution resulted in up to 10 percent of the Mexican population fleeing to
the United States (Cardoso 1980, 38). During the reign of Porfirio Díaz, preceding the
Revolution, there was discontent among many Mexicans living in the United States that the
Mexican government was not doing enough to protect their rights (Cano and Délano 2007).
Furthermore, under the Díaz administration many political opponents of the regime had been
forced into exile (Monroy 1983). Subsequently, there were segments of the Mexican population
in the United States that advocated for and supported the Revolution (Monroy 1983).
Once the Mexican Revolution started winding down, several changes occurred in terms
of the relationship between the Mexican state and its population abroad. Starting with President
Carranza in 1917, a new national strategy on migration was put in place, which one of the main
goals was to curtail migration abroad (Cano and Délano 2007). Subsequent administrations in
the 1920s followed this policy of dissuading its citizens from emigrating while also increasing
consular services to better safeguard the interest of Mexicans in the United States (Sherman
1999, 841-842). Additionally, Mexicans abroad gained appreciation for the support they had
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Carrigan and Webb define lynching as a “retributive act of murder for which those responsible claim to be serving
the interests of justice, tradition, or community good” (2003, 413).
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provided during the Revolutionary War (Lafleur 2013a). For example, in the 1920s the idea of
external voting was discussed as Jose Vasconcelos, an influential Mexican thinker and politician,
developed a strong relationship with Mexicans in the United States who set up committees
supporting his candidacy for the presidency in 1929 (Lafleur 2013a, 51).
In 1917, the “draft scare” occurred with the adoption of the Selective Service Act of
1917, which illustrated the vulnerability Mexico faced in trying to regulate both in-and-outmigration. Migration patterns are dependent on events occurring in the United States. The
Selective Service Act mandated that all males aged 21 to 31 had to register for the draft (Cardoso
1980, 49). However, foreigners living in the United States who could prove they were foreign
nationals and had not attempted to change their citizenship status did not have to serve (Cardoso
1980, 49). Rumors spread that Mexicans citizens in the U.S would have to fight in World War I,
resulting in many Mexicans deciding to leave the United States and return to Mexico (Cardoso
1980).
Correspondingly, after the war, a wave of migrants went to the United States in the 1920s
once the United States put in place a quota to restrict migration from the rebuilding Europe
(Betten and Mohl 1973). A few years later, the Great Depression in the United States resulted in
in massive repatriation. The large drop in employment along with nativist sentiments resulted in
hundreds of thousands of Mexicans being forced to leave the United States (Cardoso 1980; De
Genova 2004). During this time, the Mexican government did try to put in place policies to aid
its populations abroad as well as help those who came back (Sherman 1999).78 The Mexican
government did also negotiate with the United States on a bilateral migration treaty in the
Bracero Program (Cano and Délano 2007). However, as these negotiations occurred, the
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Sherman (1999, 852-854) argues that the period from 1917-1932, as well as the years after 1988, was the period
where the Mexican state paid most attention to its emigrant community.
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Mexican government had transformed its policy towards Mexicans abroad as disinterest became
the standard policy for several decades (Sherman 1999, 843).
The Bracero Program functioned as a further incentive for Mexicans to emigrate. The
Program was a major reversal on behalf of the United States which had favored deportations just
a few years earlier during the Great Depression (De Genova 2004). During the span of the
Program, several million79 Mexicans migrated north with many more going to the United States
looking for work without authorization (Cardoso 1980).80 After the initial bilateral negotiations,
during which Mexico did have leverage to negotiate due to United States’ need for workers
during World War II, the United States started to act more unilaterally (Sherman 1999).81
The Mexican government was aggrieved with how the level of wages and quality of
working conditions kept on deteriorating for Mexican workers as the Program went on
(Fitzgerald 2009). However, the Mexican government did not have a consistent policy of how to
deal with migration. As a case in point, Fitzgerald writes “[t]hrough the mid-1950s, the Mexican
government continued a cycle of promoting bracero emigration one week and then suddenly
trying to stop all emigration, depending on the vicissitudes of the guest-worker negotiations”
(2009, 49). Some local and subnational governments were more effective in managing
emigration (Fitzgerald 2009). Nonetheless, other municipal governments defied federal policies
by encouraging emigration as a way to alleviate their economic problems (Fitzgerald 2006, 260;
2009, 66).
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Cardoso (1980, xiv) mentions a number of approximately 4.5 million Braceros. Cohen (2006) states that the
actual number of migrant workers who went to the United States was approximately 2 million workers while 4.5
million is the number of contracts that were available (see footnote 2, page 100)
80
It has been estimated that up to four undocumented migrants went to the United States for every Bracero worker
that had documentations (De Genova 2004, 165)
81
For some specifics rights negotiated in the original Bracero Program see Garcia y Griego (1983, 60); Sherman
(1999, 843); Cohen (2006, 83). It should also be stated that many employers did not uphold to the rules of the
originally agreed Program (Cano and Délano 2007).
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Under pressure from organized labor and Congress, the Johnson administration ended the
Bracero Program in 1964. One year later, the U.S. government enacted the 1965 Immigration
Act. One of the purposes of the 1965 Immigration Act was to restrict immigration particularly,
from Mexico and other countries in the Western Hemisphere (Reimers 1983, 10). Theoretically,
the United States might have assumed that migrants would eventually go back to Mexico.
However, many of the documented temporary Bracero workers had become accustomed to
circular migration between the two countries or had decided to permanently move to the U.S
(Grove 1996). Moreover, as the United States tried to limit legal ways for Mexican migrants to
enter the country, emigration kept on increasing (De Genova 2004).
The assumption had been made by numerous Mexican administrations that its migrant
population would eventually return to Mexico (Jimenez-Cuen 2008). For example, when the
Mexican government negotiated the Bracero Program it considered that the temporary laborers
would gain skills and experience while in the U.S, and then come back and use their expertise in
Mexico (Cohen 2001). The Mexican government did take some steps in order to battle increased
unemployment due to the end of the Bracero Program by opening free trade areas near the U.S
border to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) (De Genova 2004, 168). Nevertheless, as the
number of Mexicans moving permanently abroad increased, the Mexican government had
minimal associations with its emigrant community (Sherman 1999). The Mexican government
understood from its experience that there was little it could to do prevent outmigration.
Furthermore, it now viewed emigration as a way to help it control a population boom (Fitzgerald
2009, 55).
After 1964, Mexico disengaged with both its emigrant population as well as the United
States when it came managing emigration. Dominguez and Fernández de Castro explain this by
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stating, “[f]rom the end of the Bracero Program in 1964 to the late 1980s, Mexico developed a
policy of “not having a policy.” That is, Mexico was content with the status quo; it purposely left
the flow of Mexican immigration into the United States to the forces of supply and demand, and
it eschewed official discussion about migration with the U.S. government” (2001, 154).82
Notwithstanding, Mexican policymakers moved away from this policy of “laissez-faire” (Durand
2004; Fitzgerald 2009) to a much more active role in the mid-1980s when it became clear to
many Mexican policymakers that the previously held position of non-interference was no longer
advantageous (Rosenblum 2004).
As will be discussed in the next section, the politics of Mexico were changing as the PRI
saw its political supremacy challenged (Durand 2004). Also, once again, several external events
in the United States pressured the Mexican government to take a more active role, in particular
the 1986 U.S. Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). This law was a major change to
immigration policy of the United States. It provided a route to authorization for more than 2
million undocumented Mexican immigrants (Orrenius and Zavodny 2003, 437); the subsequent
family reunifications resulted in approximately 3 million Mexicans securing legal status
(Goldring 2002). This resulted in more families permanently settling in the United States
(Fitzgerald 2009). It also encouraged the Mexican government to reach out to their emigrant
community since they could advocate on its behalf. For example, during the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations Mexico saw those living abroad as a strategic
resource to lobby the United States government (Goldring 2002, 65-66). Furthermore, as
Fitzgerald writes “[e]migrants and their resources became less accessible within Mexico,
prompting the Mexican government to reach out to them more aggressively” (Fitzgerald 2009,
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There were some minor periods of more engagement for example under President Luis Echeverría (1970-1976)
(Cano and Délano 2007; Fitzgerald 2009)
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56). The Mexican government also wanted to foster a stronger relationship due to the
remittances Mexicans abroad send home (González Gutiérrez 1999).
On the other hand, the Mexican government also needed to step in for undocumented
migrants whose lives in the United States became more difficult after IRCA and the subsequent
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) (Dominguez
and Fernández de Castro 2001). A major component of IRCA was to reduce the flow of
migration by putting in place punishments for employers who hired undocumented immigrants.
However, this provision was not fully implemented (Dominguez and Fernández de Castro
2001).83 Wages for undocumented migrants went down considerably after IRCA. Massey and
Gentsch (2014, 496) argue that many employers continued to hire undocumented workers but
they passed down the potential extra costs of being penalized by lowering the wages of
undocumented migrants. Furthermore, Rosenblum argues that by “making it illegal to employ
undocumented immigrants but failing actually to punish employers who did so, the 1986 IRCA
made the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service essentially a tool of employers, and
thereby depressed migrant wages” (2004, 108).
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If the goals of the United States was to limit migration from Mexico then it is questionable how effective these
policies have been. Studies have indicated that the efforts of the United States government have been
counterproductive in trying to stop emigration (see Massey, Pren, and Durand 2016, 1558). For example, De
Genova argues “restrictive immigration laws purportedly intended to deter migration have nonetheless been
instrumental in sustaining Mexican migration” (2004, 161). However, others would argue that more restrictive
immigration policies in the United States in the 1980s and 1990s did slow down the flow of migration (see
discussion by Rosenblum 2004, 94). The stricter immigration regulations did change the routes for undocumented
migrants which resulted in more people dying while crossing the border (Dominguez and Fernández de Castro 2001,
153). It is clear that migration policy is a complex issue in American politics with certain industries in the United
States, such as agriculture, have come to depend on cheap labor from abroad. These industries have pressured the
U.S government not to crack down on immigration to the United States. De Genova also point out that the U.S
Border Patrol was from its founding in 1924 up until 1940 under the U.S Department of Labor (2004, 163). There
have been instances when Mexico has taken a strong stance against emigration, but the Border Patrol has allowed
undocumented migrants to enter the United States going against the wishes of the Mexican government (see for
example Cohen 2001, 120; Fitzgerald 2009, 49).

99

In order to achieve this, IRCA greatly increased both the number of people working for
the Border Patrol along with substantively increasing its budget (Orrenius and Zavodny 2003).
This was a start in a process where militarizing the border began (Massey, Pren, and Durand
2016). Furthermore, in 1996, with the implementation of IIRIRA, the U.S federal government
started to provide local and SNGs more powers to police the border (García et al. 2011). Greater
police presence at the border made it more difficult to cross illegally, which subsequently
resulted in more dangerous routes being taken by migrants, in turn leading to more migrants
dying while trying to cross (Dominguez and Fernández de Castro 2001, 153). IRCA also made it
more difficult for new migrants coming to the United States to obtain legal status (De Genova
2004). All of this changed the way migrants went back and forth to Mexico, as now it was more
costly to go to Mexico and return to the United States (Fitzgerald 2009). Additionally, the
Mexican population abroad was now in greater need for consular protection by the Mexican
government (Délano 2009).
In the 1990s, engagement by the Mexican government continued, Durand (2004) calls
this the "damage control" phase. Mexican policymakers felt that hostility towards migrants was
increasing in the United States (Dominguez and Fernández de Castro 2001). For example, in the
1990s, several laws passed which went against the interest of undocumented migrants, such as
Proposition 187 in California, IIRIRA, and welfare reform (Rosenblum 2004, 107). In the
1990s, the Mexican federal government created the Program for Mexican Communities Abroad
in order to strengthen the relationship between the Mexican government and its expatriate
community (Jimenez-Cuen 2008). The Mexican federal government also encouraged SNGs to
create similar offices (Burgess 2005), which is important as SNGs became pioneers by putting in
place policies for those residing abroad, see upcoming federalism section. Democratization also

100

helped Mexico move on from the policy of no policy (Rosenblum 2004). Mexican policy during
the Fox administration was much more vocal in its defense of its migrant population (Délano
2009). The opening up of the political system also increased pressure on the government to
allow those abroad the opportunity to vote.

Role of Democracy: The decline of the PRI
Democratization was a crucial step in allowing for external voting in Mexico. More
specifically, the end of the dominance of the PRI created an opening for Mexicans living abroad
to become politically active in national politics. As well as in their subnational entity of origin
because the flexibility of SNGs to take decisions independently of the federal government was
severely limited during the reign of the PRI (Schiavon 2017a). It was not until the PRI’s power
started to diminish that the Mexican government started placing more emphasis on reaching out
to Mexicans abroad (Burgess 2018). Moreover, when Mexican elections became more
competitive, pressure on the Mexican government to enfranchise those abroad increased
(Takahashi 2017). The main opposition parties at the time (PAN and PRD) had both called for
the enfranchisement of Mexicans abroad (Takahashi 2017). Contrarily, the PRI argued that it
was problematic due to numerous logistical concerns that had to be considered before embarking
on allowing voting from abroad (Martínez Saldaña 2003).84
Scholars have argued that the PRI opposed allowing those abroad to vote due to the
likelihood it would hurt them electorally (Waldinger 2008; Lafleur 2013a). The decline of the
hegemonic power of the PRI was a slow process, as the party controlled the presidency from
1929 to 2000. The party also controlled both chambers of the Mexican Congress from 1929 to
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The independent Mexican Federal Election Institute (IFE at the time) also shared concerns about the logistics
about holding elections abroad (Suro and Escobar 2006).
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1997 (Schiavon 2017a). In fact, the party did not concede a seat in the Senate until 1988 in
addition to controlling all of Mexico’s SNGs until 1989 (Domínguez and McCann 1995). Along
the way, several electoral reforms were passed that made concessions to the opposition parties
and created an independent electoral institution (Schedler 2001).
The first major electoral reform took place in 1977 after the political backlash of the
Tlatelolco Massacre in 1968 (Burgess 2005). In the 1977 reform, 100 out of 400 seats in the
Chamber of Deputies were proportionally reserved for the opposition parties (Solinger 2001, 34).
Furthermore, the financial crisis of 1982 resulted in the PRI losing popularity as opposition
parties were able to challenge the PRI’s legitimacy to govern (see Schedler 2001, 182-183).
In 1986, an agreement was reached which limited the number of seats the PRI could win
in the lower chamber as well as increasing the number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies
which were allocated by proportional representation (Solinger 2001, 34). Furthermore, in 1986,
the PRI started splintering as three members of the party, including Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas,
formed a more left leaning faction in the party (Lafleur 2013a, 54). Cárdenas had served as the
governor of the migrant sending state of Michoacán and was very popular among many
Mexicans living in the United States (Lafleur 2013a). After Cárdenas was kicked out of the PRI,
groups supporting his cause were created in the U.S (Lafleur 2013a, 54).
Cárdenas ran for president in 1988. During his campaign, Cárdenas made stops in the
United States where he attempted to influence migrants to sway votes of family and friends in his
favor (Fitzgerald 2009, 56) and emphasized his support for Mexicans abroad (Waldinger 2008).
Cárdenas eventually lost to the PRI candidate, Carlos Salinas, in an election widely viewed as
fraudulent.85 The anger with the corrupt 1988 election put President Salinas in a difficult
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Six out of the seven registered opposition parties condemned the election and Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas declared
himself as the winner (Reding 1988, 615-616). A poll conducted by the Los Angeles Times of Mexicans in 1989
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position. In his inaugural speech, Salinas made concessions that his administration would focus
on improving electoral transparency (Reding 1989, 687).86 However, the electoral reforms
following the 1988 elections did not increase the political rights of Mexicans living abroad. In
fact, the opposite happened, the electoral code was changed to emphasize that voting in
presidential elections could only take place within Mexico (Lafleur 2013a, 55). Despite this
setback to the cause of achieving the right to vote from abroad, Martínez Saldaña describes 1988
as a year of great significance because it resulted in greater activism from Mexicans living
abroad (2003, 105).
It was not until 1996 when the electoral code was reformed to remove the requirement
that voters cast their vote in their respective electoral district (Lafleur 2013a, 56). In 2000, the
Mexican government took a further step in permitting its emigrant community to vote by
allowing migrants to vote in Mexico. However, it was evident that a miniscule percentage of
Mexicans living in the United States would make the trip across the border to vote. Moreover,
not enough paper ballots were printed (Lawson 2003). Also in 2000, Vicente Fox became the
first non-PRI president in over 70 years. Not only was this a defining moment for Mexico’s
movement towards democracy, but also a major development for proponents of external voting.
Fox was the former governor of the migrant sending state of Guanajuato where Fox had worked
with residents living abroad on agendas such as collective remittance programs (M Smith 2003).
During his presidential campaign, Fox spoke highly of Mexicans living abroad and committed to
work on their behalf (Lafleur 2013a; Pedroza 2015).
found that 73 percent of respondents were doubtful or did not think that Salinas had won the election (Miller 1989 as
cited in Reding 1989). Once the PRI government saw that early numbers were favorable for Cárdenas they
tampered with the computers calculating the results and eventually burned the ballots that were not counted (Wallis
2001, 231).
86
Furthermore, the surprisingly narrow “victory” of the PRI candidate in 1988 along with the need to concentrate
on fiscal issues encouraged a process within the PRI to decentralized power to subnational actors (see Cornelius
2000; Langston 2001).
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In his first year in office, Fox created the Presidential Office for Mexicans Abroad to
improve the communications with the Mexican government and those living abroad (Cano and
Délano 2007, 714). There was also hope that Vicente Fox and George W. Bush might come to
an agreement to attempt to regulate migration in a way that would be beneficial to both
countries. However, any expectation of a deal collapsed due to the attacks on the United States
on September 11, 2001. However, the Fox administration continued to advocate a closer
relationship with those living abroad and started pushing for the adoption of external voting laws
(Durand 2004).
In 2005, legislation was passed which allowed for expatriate voting in presidential
elections. A large majority of the deputies of all the three major political parties voted for the
bill. It was finally implemented in the 2006 presidential elections after numerous attempts had
previously failed (Palop-García and Pedroza 2018). The cooperation from the PRI in passing
such a bill might seem surprising since they had previously opposed such measures. Lafleur
explains the thought process of those who opposed the bill but ended up supporting it by stating,
“…political parties and individual politicians opposed to external voting felt they could not
express their position too openly because voter retaliation could take two forms. On the one
hand, they feared that, if the legislation passed, the party that would have opposed it could be
sanctioned by a negative vote of potentially millions of emigrant voters. On the other hand, even
if the legislation did not pass, frustrated emigrants could have encouraged their relatives at home
to sanction the party that prevented them from voting” (2008, 365).
However, the legislation that passed made it arduous for Mexicans abroad to cast their
vote, which in turn highly minimized the likelihood of it having any real significant political
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impact (Lafleur 2011).87 This turned out to be the case, as only 33,000 of estimated three million
eligible voters cast a ballot (Fitzgerald 2009, 166). In 2014, Mexico adopted an electoral reform
that made it easier for Mexicans abroad to vote and register. This allowed external voters to vote
for senators and also facilitated the process for those abroad to vote in subnational elections
(Takahashi 2017, 7). After the 2014 electoral reform there has been a spike in subnational units
implementing external voting. Those who predicted that the PRI would do poorly abroad were
correct. When the electoral support for the PRI within and outside of Mexico is examined it
becomes clear that the PRI has consistently unperformed among voters residing abroad (see table
5.2).

Table 5.2: PRI Underperformance Abroad
Presidential year
PRI abroad
PRI total
Difference
2006
4.17
22.23
-18.06
2012
15.62
38.21
-22.59
2018
4.28
22.27
-17.99
Presidential vote
Senate vote
Governor vote
96/96
32/32
18/19
Source: Information gathered from the Mexican National Electoral Institute and various
subnational state electoral institutes
In the three presidential elections (2006, 2012, 2018) where voting from abroad has been
allowed, the PRI has unperformed in all 32 subnational entities in all three election cycles.
Similarly, the PRI has also lost in all subnational entities when it comes to senate elections (see
appendix H table 1). The only election at the subnational level in which the PRI candidate has
not unperformed abroad compared to domestic voters was in the 2016 Colima gubernatorial
election. The 2016 elections were held under special circumstances as the elections that had
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For some of the specific barriers placed in the legislation see Smith (2008, 727); Lieber (2010, 143); Lafleur
(2011, 488)
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been held in 2015 were annulled due to electoral fraud. The PRI candidate and eventual winner,
José Ignacio Peralta, ended up receiving 20 out of the 42 votes from abroad (Navarro 2016).
This followed a process in which SNGs had been more active in promoting electoral rights for
their residents abroad. External voting at the subnational level also depended on the PRI losing
its dominance in Mexican politics.
The flexibility of SNGs to make decisions independently of the federal government was
limited during most of the PRI’s reign. Schiavon (2017a) points out that the Mexican
Constitution does put in place a rigid separation of powers between the federal and subnational
governments. However, under the supremacy of the PRI, “Mexico functioned as one of the most
centralized political systems in the world” (2017a, 287). The Mexican president enjoyed great
powers to stifle policies put in place at the subnational level, such as the ability to remove sitting
governors (Schiavon 2017a). It was not until the scandals and the subsequent electoral reforms
that have been discussed that the PRI started relinquishing power to SNGs.
President Salinas became the first PRI president to admit defeat in a gubernatorial
election to the National Action Party (PAN) in 1989 in Baja California (North), although Salinas
did not recognize the victory of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) candidate in
Michoacán in the same year (Reding 1989, 685-686). Migrants were more likely to have a
partner willing to increase their political rights in states with a non-PRI governor. For example,
Jimenez-Cuen (2008, 240) describes how migrants clubs in Zacatecas were able to make
progress in advocating for greater political rights when a non-PRI governor came into power
after the 1998 elections. Similarly, when the PAN replaced PRI governors in several states
including Aguascalientes, Guanajuato, Jalisco, San Luis Potosí and Nayarit, the SNGs became
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more involved in the lives of their residents living abroad (Yrizar Barbosa and Alarcón 2010,
175). Certain SNGS have also taken the lead in promoting the interest of their residents abroad.

Federalism
No country in Latin America has the same level of outreach as Mexico to their emigrant
community, it takes place both at the federal and subnational level (Pedroza 2015, 18). Since
emigration to the United States has historically originated primarily from a handful of states,
some SNGs are more impacted by migration than others. For example, officials in Michoacán
estimate that approximately 4 million people from the state and their descendants live in the
United States. This is a very large number since around 4.5 million people live in the state. It
has been the subnational units with a large population abroad, in particular Zacatecas and
Michoacán (Yrizar Barbosa and Alarcón 2010), which have been at the forefront of putting into
place policies for those living abroad. Moreover, it has also been state officials in these states
where some have complained that the federal government has not done enough to protect the
interest of their emigrant community (authors’ discussion August 2017).
For example, before external voting was approved at the national level in Mexico, the
state legislatures in Michoacán and Zacatecas both passed resolutions calling on the Mexican
Congress to take actions to allow those living abroad to vote (Lafleur 2013a, 59). In addition, in
1985, Zacatecas became the first SNG to put in place the Program for Zacatecanos Abroad
(Smith 2008, 711). The Program initially was a collaboration between the Zacatecas government
and migrants to use collective remittances to finance development projects in the state
(Fitzgerald 2000). The first agency for migrants that was not only focused on remittances was in
Michoacán in 1992 (Yrizar Barbosa and Alarcón 2010, 174). Furthermore, the state of
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Michoacán was the first to implement a program to try to improve the educational experiences of
migrant kids living in California (Ortega Ramírez 2013, 107). In 1994, Guanajuato started
setting up community centers (Casa Guanajuato) in the United States meant to in part strengthen
the relationship between the SNG in Guanajuato and the migrant community in the U.S (M
Smith 2003, 478). Since the early 2000s, more SNGs started to become active participants on
migrant related issues (Ortega Ramírez 2013).
In 2000, 11 SNGs signed the Declaration of Puebla (Yrizar Barbosa and Alarcón 2010).
Within this document, 17 objectives are laid out such as helping migrants retain their culture,
launching health campaigns, and promoting productive investments in the communities of origin
(Yrizar Barbosa and Alarcón 2010, 182). The 2002 creation of the National Conference of
Governors (CONAGO) also provided a forum for governors to express their preferences to the
federal government on issues related to migration. For example, governors from migrant
sending states used this organization to pressure the federal government to adopt external voting
legislations (Lafleur 2013a, 59-60). Also, during the CONAGO meeting in 2003, a resolution
was passed that stated its members would take a more autonomous role, away from the federal
government, in working with the Mexican emigrant community (Hazan 2006, 126-127).
The Mexican federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over foreign affairs, but there is
leeway for SNGs to act independently when it comes to certain policy areas as long as there is
not a conflict with the federal government (Schiavon 2017a, 313).88 After the federal government
became more involved in the affairs of its emigrant community it encouraged SNGs to take an
interest in those residing abroad, particularly after the success Zacatecas had in pooling
remittances (Fitzgerald 2009, 64). However, there have also been tensions among federal
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Some polices where SNGs can cooperate on internationally include trade, education, culture, and tourism
(Schiavon 2017b, 101).
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officials about how much policy space SNGs should have in carrying out policies that resemble
foreign policy in terms of reaching out to the emigrant communities (Fitzgerald 2009, 64). For
example, as of 2017, nine Mexican subnational entities had set up offices in cities in the United
States to help serve the needs of their emigrant community (Schiavon 2017a, 307-308).
Nonetheless, following the 1982 debt crisis, the Mexican federal government started
decentralizing power to the Mexican states (Burgess 2005). This decentralization meant that
SNGs had more flexibility to come up with policy solutions to problems facing their population
(Jimenez-Cuen 2008). The move towards decentralization along with Mexico’s democratization
resulted in SNGs having greater abilities and motivations to go abroad (Schiavon 2017a, 312).
The number of SNGs that have set up their own agencies for international migrants has
increased greatly in the last three decades. In 1997, nine SNGs had set up such offices, including
Durango’s which was not fully functional (Goldring 2002, 73). Yrizar Barbosa and Alarcón
(2010, 180) find that 24 of 32 subnational entities had such agency in 2008. In 2010, according
to Ortega Ramírez (2013, 102), 29 of 32 SNGs had set up such an agency. The specific
functions of these agencies and their names depend on the subnational entity (Ortega Ramírez
2013). Despite the case by case differences, after conducting interviews with staff from seven
emigrant agencies Goldring (2002), states “…their mandate was to maintain contact with
Mexicans in the United States, make them feel that their interests and problems were being
attended to, and encourage their long-term contact with Mexico” (79). However, the primary
objectives of many of these institutions concerned with those abroad is much broader (see M
Smith 2003, 473).
For example, the author’s discussions with officials in Michoacán’s Secretary of
Migration (Secretaría del Migrante) in 2017 illustrated that they conduct a wide array of services.
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These services include repatriating dead bodies to the state, providing advice on how to deal with
U.S Immigration and Customs Enforcement, translating documents, and helping return migrants
adjust to life in Michoacán (see also Yrizar Barbosa and Alarcón 2010; Lestage 2013).
Furthermore, Michoacán’s Secretaría del Migrante helps organize cultural events such as the
yearly day of the migrant celebration as well as helping migrants invest in their community of
origin. Yrizar Barbosa and Alarcón (2010, 190-191) argue that subnational public agencies for
emigrants have become the norm among subnational entities because of three factors. First, the
federal government saw it as supplementing the services provided by the Foreign Affairs
Ministry. Second, emigrants pushed SNGs to create such agencies to help address the problems
they are facing abroad. Third, politicians in subnational entities started seeing migrants as part
of their electorate.
Additionally, it has become increasingly common for SNGs to increase their presence in
the United States in order to try to attract more investments and to increase exports (Yrizar
Barbosa and Alarcón 2010). Schiavon (2017a) argues that globalization and the adoption of
NAFTA has fueled this push for subnational entities of going abroad. The author points to some
main financial objectives SNGs have when establishing offices in the United States. They want
to increase their exports, attract FDI, grow the number of tourist, and improve their relationship
with their emigrant community to promote the flow of remittances (Schiavon 2017a, 292). In
fact, the importance of remittances and promoting investments are also seen as why Mexico
became more interested in building a relationship with its emigrant community (Goldring 2002).

Remittances
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Remittances have become a very stable source of foreign reserves for Mexico, reaching
more than 20 billion dollars every year since 2005. Remittances did drop by more than 15
percent at the beginning of the Great Recession from 2008 to 2009 and did not recover to levels
prior to the recession until 2016. However, they were still more reliable in comparison to inflow
of FDI, which dropped by almost 40 percent between 2008 and 2009 (World Bank n.d).89 This is
enormous growth, as the World Bank estimates that remittances in Mexico were little over a
billion dollars in 1980 (nominal dollars) (see figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1: Remittances to Mexico 1980-2018 in constant U.S Dollars
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Source: Reproduced from data from the World Bank and Bank of Mexico
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According to the World Bank, net inflows of FDI to Mexico went from 32.189 billion dollars in 2008 to 19.464
billion in 2009 in current US dollars. Information available at https://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD?locations=MX (Last accessed April 29, 2019).
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Data from the Bank of Mexico show that from 2003 to 2018 remittances to subnational
entities increased on average by more than 170 percent (author’s calculation).90 The highest
increase was in Baja California where remittances increased by 520 percent (from 142 to 880
million dollars) while the lowest increase of 37 percent was in Veracruz (999 million to 1.375
billion).91 The growth of remittances to Mexico has puzzled many as pure economic explanations
do not seem adequate to explain this rise (Cañas, Coronado, and Orrenius 2007, 3).
Despite the enormous increase in the flow of remittances, the number of households
receiving remittances has been decreasing. The Mexican Secretary of Welfare (Secretaría de
Bienestar) estimates that in 2010, 3.6 percent of households in Mexico received remittances.
This is down from 4.5 percent in 2000. In 2010, there were 10 states in which the percentage of
households receiving remittances was over 5 percent. The state of Zacatecas had the highest
percentage of households receiving remittances at 11 percent. At the municipal level in 2010,
approximately 22 percent of Mexican municipalities had 10 percent or more of all households
receiving remittances (CONAPO n.d.).92 These 547 municipalities in which at least one in ten
households received remittances tend to be located in small localities, as their average number of
households is 3,905 (authors calculation). Recently, more urban areas have seen higher levels of
outmigration (Durand, Massey, and Zenteno 2001; Unger 2005). However, rural households
receive more remittances from the U.S compared to urban areas (Aguayo-Téllez and MartínezNavarro 2013).
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The data is available at http://www.banxico.org.mx/SieInternet/consultarDirectorioInternetAction.do ?accion=
consultarCuadroAnalitico&idCuadro=CA79 (Last accessed May 5, 2019).
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The information for state and municipal level for both 2000 and 2010 is available at https://datos.gob.mx/
busca/dataset/indice-absoluto-de-intensidad-migratoria-mexico--estados-unidos-2000--2010
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The work of Zarate‐Hoyos (2004) illustrates how remittances have impacted many
communities in Mexico. Using survey data, the author finds that “[o]ver 10% of households in
rural areas receive remittances, and for these household remittances represent almost 48.9% of
their total current monetary income. In the urban areas, over 4% of household receive
remittances that account for almost 50% of their current monetary income” (2004, 556).
Furthermore, on average, those households that do receive remittances received 476 dollars per
month (Zarate‐Hoyos 2004, 563). The impact of remittances is highly concentrated in the states
with the highest outmigration rates, and they are often most observable in many small Mexican
communities where they have literally changed the landscape in the communities of origin.93
Money sent back has been used to renovate and build plazas, churches, and houses
(Lopez 2010 and 2015). Similarly, streets have been named for the absent sons and daughters
(Lopez 2015) and people flock to churches in Santa Ana, Jalisco to pray at the remains of Father
Toribio, the patron of migrants (Fitzgerald 2009, 70-73).94 Some rural communities have seen a
significant portion of their working age population leave for the United States and those
remaining in the villages become financially dependent on these money transfers.
Studies from rural areas in the state of Michoacán have illustrated this. For example, a
study by Reichert and Massey (1979, 620) found that 79 percent of the inhabitants of a small
town were in some way dependent on money earned in the United States. Another study found
that in 1982, 70 percent of households in a small village in Michoacán had family members
living in the United States and that over a quarter of the total income in the village came from
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See Fussell and Massey (2004, 153-154) for a theoretical discussion of why migrants are more likely to come
from rural areas. Furthermore, Cardoso (1980, chapter one) discusses how Mexican geography has influenced the
outmigration rates among Mexican subnational entities.
94
Father Toribio became a saint in 2000, but he has not been recognized by the Catholic Church as the patron of
immigrants (Bermudez 2000)
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remittances (Adelman, Taylor, and Vogel 1988, 8). Furthermore, Grey and Woodwork (2002,
368) discuss how at one time approximately one-third of the adult population of a town in
Michoacán were working at a meatpacking plant in Iowa.
The binational connection between these two towns in Michoacán and Iowa illustrates
how many small towns in the two countries have become dependent on each other. Some towns
in Mexico have become economically reliant on residents who are living in the United States to
send back financial resources. On the other hand, many American businesses, and at times the
federal government, count on Mexican towns to provide them with workers. 95 As was discussed
in chapter two, some authors argue that the augmentation of migration, which led to more
remittances and more reliance on these money transfers occurred because of the adoption of
neoliberal policies and a change in how the countries view their expatriate community. The next
section discusses how neoliberal reforms have resulted in both the Mexican federal and SNGs
seeking foreign reserves.
In order to explain the theoretical argument of why regional governments in Mexico
might be more likely to implement external voting due to remittances, it is important to look at
why remittances have increased so much, while also examining the divergence in the flow of
remittances that exist among subnational units. Mexico, like many other Latin American
countries, followed an economic policy of import-substitution industrialization (ISI) from the
late 1930s/early 1940s to the 1980s (Sánchez‐Reaza and Rodríguez‐Pose 2002). During this
time, the Mexican government played an active role in protecting strategic sectors by banning
certain imports and forbidding or limiting foreign investment (Moreno‐Brid, Santamaria, and
Rivas Valdivia 2005, 1097). This followed more of a mercantilist approach where the
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For a much more detailed discussion of this relationship see Cardoso (1980).
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population of a state was seen as a source of power (Fitzgerald 2009). For example, there was
opposition by both the Mexican federal and subnational governments to the Bracero Program
due to the loss workers going to the United States (Fitzgerald 2009).
However, after a period of heavy borrowing from international banks, in August 1982,
Mexico briefed its creditors in New York that Mexico was no longer able to pay interest on its
debts (Tuman and Morris 1998, 7). Consequently, the Mexican government, under the
leadership of President De la Madrid, started putting in place economic policies to liberalize the
economy via eliminating subsidies, privatizing industries, and deregulating the economy
(Moreno‐Brid, Santamaria, and Rivas Valdivia 2005, 1099). These policies resulted in Mexico
joining the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986 and the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 (Sánchez‐Reaza and Rodríguez‐Pose 2002).
In the post ISI period, the Mexican federal and SNGs became more eager to attract
investment from abroad as they were competing in global markets to attain not only investments,
but also remittances (Schiavon 2017b). Migrants (particularly males) became a source of capital
to aid development (M Smith 2003, 467). Arguably, sending states such as Mexico started to
view those that send money back home as exemplary citizens, because they provide essential
foreign reserves but use few services (M Smith 2003). For instance, Fitzgerald writes “[i]n
addition to funding an alternative to social welfare, emigration is an escape valve. Citizens who
might otherwise increase demands on Mexico’s social services remove themselves from the
country and then generate resources via remittances that alleviate the poverty of those who stay
behind. From the sending state’s point of view, emigrants who remit are perfect citizens: They
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indirectly give to the state while taking little in return” (2009, 159).96 Subsequently, detractors
could say that in this era governments encouraged emigration.
The move away from ISI towards neoliberal economic policies had numerous
consequences. Some Mexican states benefited due to increased trade while others became less
competitive (Sánchez‐Reaza and Rodríguez‐Pose 2002; Aguayo-Téllez 2006). These changes in
the Mexican economy impacted where internal migrants, within Mexico, went and who was
more likely to migrate to the United States (Aguayo-Téllez and Martínez-Navarro 2013).
Furthermore, due to the decline in wages, social welfare, and job security, emigration to the
United States was amplified which led to an increased flow of remittances coming back (Burgess
2009, 181). This was not a total surprise; many neoclassical economists who see the decision to
migrate in terms of maximizing income expected migration to increase with the implementation
of NAFTA and neoliberal economic policies (Helmke 2010).
The economic reforms also led to subnational and local governments having to find new
sources of capital to finance programs and policies (Hazan 2006, 122-123). Lopez (2015) calls
this reliance of remittances to spark entrepreneurship in rural Mexico as the “remittance
development model” (67). Studies have illustrated how remittances have become a key source
of capital; for example, Woodruff and Zenteno (2001, 5) find that in the ten states with the
highest outmigration close to one-third of the capital to microenterprises are linked to
remittances. Collective remittance programs also help fund various types of infrastructure
improvements and social service programs (Waddell 2015a). The money sent through these
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It should be noted that Fitzgerald disagrees with the argument that Mexico reformed it emigration policies because
of a move away from ISI towards neoliberal reform since the “Mexican government effectively stopped trying to
control emigration in 1974, when its economic model was still geared toward national economic self-sufficiency
(2009, 38). Furthermore, the policy of using emigration to alleviate social pressures is not a new strategy. For
example, in the 1800s Württemberg, a state north of Switzerland, assisted residents to make the trip to North
America since it was cheaper than providing them with social services (Seeleib-Kaiser 2019, 3).
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remittance arrangements can make a significant impact in the lives of those in the community
receiving the money (Fitzgerald 2000). In many subnational entities, the flow of remittances
became higher than spending on key social programs by the federal government (Zarate-Hoyos
2004, 557).
The problematic aspect is that in municipalities in which a high percentage of the
residents receive remittances, the government might be less incentivized to provide public
services. Therefore, leaving those who do not receive these transfers worse off. For example,
studies have shown that remittances are used to fund public goods such as drainage systems and
clean water (Adida and Girod 2011). Waddell (2015b) shows that personal remittances received
in municipalities in Guanajuato had a negative impact on development. Similarly, descriptive
statistics point to little correlations between the amounts of remittances a state receives and its
level of human development (Engstrøm 2015).
While those that receive remittances might benefit, it increases inequality for those who
do not receive remittances (García Zamora 2005). Similarly, relying on the working age
population to leave and send back remittances is not a promising development strategy for the
long term. Delgado Wise and Márquez (2007b, 8) lay out how this relationship how an
increased reliance on remittances can results in a vicious cycle. It starts with people leaving who
send back remittances, which is supposed to lead to more socioeconomic stability, but leads to
depending underdevelopment, and growing disparities between Mexico and the United States.
This in turn leads to more migrants leaving Mexico and more dependence on remittances. In
order to promote development, governments are eager to shift remittances spending towards
productive means (Fitzgerald 2009). Both the federal government and SNGs have come up with
collective remittance programs in order to try to maximize these types of investments.
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Mexico has been a pioneer in creating remittance-matching programs meant to help
develop poor municipalities (Burgess 2009). These programs started at the provincial level as
SNGs in traditional sending states saw an opportunity to work with their residents abroad to
encourage investments in their community of origin.97 It was in the state of Zacatecas where
migrant organizations initially started to raise money for projects in their communities of origin
in the 1960s (Aparicio and Meseguer 2009, 9). In 1986, during the administration of PRI
Governor Genaro Borrego, the first remittance matching program was set up in the state. In the
1X1 program the Zacatecas government matched the amount sent from abroad for public works
projects (Jimenez-Cuen 2008; Aparicio and Meseguer 2009). In 1993, the 2X1 program was
implemented as a way to try to consolidate these flows of HTAs from Zacatecas (García Zamora
2005b). Under this program the Mexican federal government along with the state of Zacatecas
matched the money sent by the HTAs. Then, in 1999, municipalities in Zacatecas also joined the
matching plan to create the 3X1 program (García Zamora 2005b).
A similar story can be told about the sending state of Guanajuato, it was a pioneer in
implementing collective remittance programs. It was the PAN Governor Vicente Fox who first
put in place the “My Community” program (Mi Communidad) in 1997. The goal of this
program was to try to shift the vast amount of remittances toward more productive means (M
Smith 2003). In particular, those abroad were given the opportunity to invest their money in
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A criticism of the collective remittance programs such as the 3X1 program has been that migrants were funding
projects they were mostly interested in instead of what was most needed in the community. For example, HTAs
might want to invest in something symbolic like churches or sports facilities while local official might prefer
something that helps with sanitation, but cannot be seen (Lopez 2015, 91-93). However, states such as Michoacán
now require all parties to accept the project for it to be eligible (discussions with officials at the Secretary of
Migration in Michoacán August 2017). Studies on Mexico have also shown that subnational political leaders use
collective remittances for political purposes (Aparicio and Meseguer 2012; Meseguer and Aparicio 2012; Simpser,
Duquette-Rury, and Ibarra 2016). For example, state officials can use 3X1 project in their states to emphasize both
their administration commitment to development and by emphasizing projects that are more noticeable to the public
(Waddell 2015a, 11).

118

textile manufacturing (M Smith 2003, 484). In 2001, the SNG in Jalisco also set up the program
“For my Jalisco” (Por mi Jalisco) which helps residents abroad to invest in their community of
origin (Fitzgerald 2009).
When Vicente Fox became president of Mexico, following pressures from HTAs in the
United States that collective remittance program of 3x1 (Tres por Uno) was put in place at the
federal level with local, subnational, and the federal government all matching the dollars from
sent by HTAs (García Zamora 2005a). This was a change as previously the funding for the 3X1
Program had to be taken from Secretariat of Social Development (Secretaría de Desarrollo
Social) programs that had already been put in place. However, the Fox administration
institutionalized the program by providing it with funding (García Zamora 2005b, 11). The next
chapter delves deeper into the influence remittances have on the decision making of SNGs to
implement external voting by testing the relationship quantitatively.

Theoretical Expectations
Based on the review of the literature, I expect that Mexican subnational entities which are
more dependent on remittances are more likely to implement external voting. Political elites in
Mexico at the national, subnational, and municipal levels are fully aware of the economic impact
from the remittances they receive (M Smith 2003). Jimenez-Cuen (2008) argues that there is a
consensus among the political elites that the remittances Mexicans abroad send back justifies
their claim to political participation. For example, in 2004, when addressing the importance of
remittances migrants send back, the former governor of Zacatecas, Ricardo Monreal, was quoted
saying, "their economic influence is huge and their political clout as a consequence of that is
huge too" (Lizarzaburu 2004 as quoted in O'Mahony 2013). Furthermore, when discussing the
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binational law in Zacatecas, Martínez Saldaña (2003, 116) associates the reliance of remittances
to the assumption that “it is not possible to imagine a future without political participation of
citizens abroad” (author’s translation). The political influence has led to increased political
legitimacy for those abroad living to use to their benefit when negotiating with all levels of
government (Goldring 2002, 84).
Both the federal and subnational governments have emphasized working with HTAs
when coming up with collective remittances projects (Burgess 2005; Boruchoff 2013; Waddell
2015a). This is important because collaborating with HTAs has given these organizations a
voice as representing those living abroad (Fitzgerald 2009). Yrizar Barbosa (2008, 177)
contends that remittances along with philanthropic work migrants do in their subnational entities
have resulted in them no longer being ignored and amplified their voices to make demands of
SNGs. Working with all levels of Mexican governments has also led to migrants building
connections with policymakers and increased their political efficacy (see Hazan 2006; Boruchoff
2013). This has given them considerable political power to make political demands. As Burgess
states “[m]igrants who send collective remittances also gain a degree of access to local, state, and
even national politicians that they never would have imagined prior to leaving home” (2009,
191).
Once again, there is a great variance in how subnational entities are reliant on money
transfers coming from abroad. Historically, eight to ten out of the 32 Mexican subnational
governments have had the most outmigration to the United States and received the majority of
remittances (Zarate‐Hoyos 2004).98 For example, Villegas Rivera argues that since the state of
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Traditional area includes the following states: Aguascalientes, Colima, Durango, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacán,
Nayarit, San Luis Potosí, Zacatecas (Yrizar Barbosa and Alarcón 2010, 180)
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Sinaloa is not dependent on remittances they can exclude residents abroad (2019, 6). In poorer
parts of Mexico, remittances play a vital role in both sustaining the local economies and the
living standards (Cañas, Coronado, and Orrenius 2007, 3). Interviews with government officials,
politicians, migrant representatives, and individuals have often emphasized these sentiments, that
dire circumstances might arise if these flows of money were to stop (see Tuman 2009, 19;
Germano 2013, 875; 2018, 23). Also, a study which conducted interviews with elites from six
Latin American countries (a majority were from Mexico) showed that the interviewees viewed
remittances as being the most positive aspect of emigration to the United States (Rosenblum
2004, 97).

Figure 5.2: Remittances to Mexico 2003-2018 by region in constant U.S Billion Dollars
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Source: Reproduced from data from the Bank of Mexico
However, it should also be noted that authors such as Joseph (2012) argue that “[t]here is
no link, strategy or policy objective connecting remittances and the Mexican government's
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services to its citizens abroad” (2012, 234-235). Joseph makes the argument that although the
billions of dollars Mexico receives from abroad is a large sum, it is a relatively small number
when compared to the size of the Mexican economy. The author is correct that although Mexico
received over 26 billion in current U.S dollars in 2015, this figure only represents approximately
2.2 percent of national GDP, which is inconsequential compared to other countries (see
Appendix G, table 1). Nonetheless, Joseph does recognize that the impact of remittances on
some subnational units should not be minimized (2012, 235). There is a great variance in how
much remittances subnational units receive, which makes Mexico a good case study to
investigate their influences on the political system. The subsequent chapter will test whether
reliance on remittances impact the likelihood of subnational entities implementing external
voting.

Conclusion
The first part of the chapter has reviewed the small but burgeoning literature on external
voting at the subnational level. The pioneering studies by Arrighi and Bauböck (2017) and
Arrighi and Lafleur (2019) indicate that external voting at the provincial level is not viewed as a
democratic norm as one might argue it has become at the national level. In some countries such
as the United States, it has been the federal government telling the subnational entities to
implement such a policy (Arrighi and Lafleur 2019). In other countries such Mexico, the reason
why some SNGs have implemented external while others have not is less clear. The study by
Jimenez-Cuen (2008) suggests that high levels of outmigration and remittances, along with
meeting specific political factors, increase the likelihood that Mexican subnational entities will
put in place policies for those abroad.
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The second part of the chapter reviewed the literature on Mexico which will be the focus
of the next chapter. Mexico illustrates a case where all levels of government have had to deal
with high levels of emigration to the United States. The post-revolutionary Mexican
governments, dominated by the PRI, tended to oppose emigration as it illustrated a failure on
their behalf to provide enough economic opportunities for citizens to stay. For several decades,
the Mexican federal government also did not have much interaction with its migrant community
since it was seen as going against Mexico’s policy of respecting sovereignty and not interfering
in the domestic matters of the United States. However, at times the Mexican government did
become more active in the affairs of their emigrant population particularly when the abuses
against Mexicans living in the United States were seen as going too far. Both the federal and
SNGs also at times saw emigration as a way to release economic and political pressures
(Fitzgerald 2009).
Mexico’s move toward democratization opened up the possibility for external voting to
be put in place at both the federal and subnational levels. Before the PRI started losing power,
Mexico’s power was centralized in the capital with subnational governments having little power
to implement policies that went against the policy of the federal government (Schiavon 2017a).
Once the PRI started splintering and conceding elections, politicians started paying much more
attention to the wishes of those living abroad. Furthermore, the Mexican federal government
saw their emigrant community as an important financial resource both in terms of the enormous
sums of remittances they send back, and also as a lobbying force for Mexico to join NAFTA
(Fitzgerald 2009). The next chapter will test whether remittances influence the likelihood of
Mexican subnational units implementing external voting.
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Chapter 6
Implementation of External Voting by Mexican Subnational Units
In this chapter, I examine the hypothesis from chapter four (looking at countries) at the
subnational level in Mexico. In particular, this chapter attempts to discern whether remittances
influence SNGs to implement external voting. Similar to explanations at the country level, there
is a theoretical expectation that subnational entities, which receive greater remittances are more
likely to put in place policies for their emigrant community (Martínez Saldaña 2003; JimenezCuen 2008; Yrizar Barbosa 2008). However, this is the first study to quantitatively test this
argument at the subnational level by investigating the impact of remittances on Mexican
subnational units. The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The first section discusses the
data and methods employed in the chapter. The second section presents the result of the
quantitative analysis. The third section provides an interpretation of the results and concludes
the chapter.

Data and Methods
The study includes information for all 32 Mexican subnational units for 15 years, from
2004 to 2018. This time period captures the first subnational unit to implement external voting
(Michoacán in 2007) along with the most recent implementations in 2018. The dataset starts in
2003, which is the first year that subnational remittance data is available from the Bank of
Mexico. However, since data for the level of globalization among the Mexican subnational units
is not available until 2004, that year becomes the starting point of the study. During the time
span of the study, 15 subnational units implemented external voting (see table 6.1).99
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The Mexican states Guerrero and Querétaro have also changed their constitutions to allow for external voting, but
they have yet to implement the law.

124

The Cox Proportional Hazard Model (Cox 1972), which has been employed extensively
to study external voting (Turcu and Urbatsch 2015; Erlingsson and Tuman 2017) is used with
robust standard errors to correct for dependence in the dataset. Diagnostic tests of the variables
in the equations signal that they do not violate the assumptions of the hazard models (tests of
proportional hazard assumptions, correlation matrix, and summary statistics are provided in the
appendix H tables 2-6).

Table 6.1: First Year External Voting Implemented by Mexican Subnational Units
Subnational unit
Year
Election
Aguascalientes
2016
Governor
Baja California Sur
2015
Governor
Chiapas
2012
Migrant representative
Coahuila
2017
Governor
Mexico City
2012
Head of government
Colima
2015
Governor
State of Mexico
2017
Governor
Guanajuato
2018
Governor
Jalisco
2018
Governor and proportional
representative
Michoacán
2007
Migrant representative
Morelos
2018
Governor
Oaxaca
2016
Governor
Puebla
2018
Governor
Yucatán
2018
Governor
Zacatecas
2016
Governor
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable for the study is whether a subnational entity implemented
external voting for the first time during a particular year. If a subnational unit did implement
external voting in that year, it was coded as “1” and removed from the sample since it had
already implemented the law. Subnational units that did not implement external voting were
coded as “0” for each year and remained in the dataset for the duration of the study. An
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argument could be made that Zacatecas should be coded as “1” in 2003, since the subnational
unit was the first state to put in place representation for Zaccateans living abroad. However,
since this legislation did not allow for those living outside of the state to vote, the subnational
unit is coded as “0” until 2016 when Zacatecans abroad had the chance to vote in the
gubernatorial elections.100 The information for whether a subnational unit has implemented
external voting is gathered from the National Electoral Institute of Mexico (INE-Instituto
Nacional Electoral) and the various Mexican subnational electoral agencies.101
Independent Variable: Level of Remittances
Remittances per capita in current dollars are used as a proxy to test for the importance of
remittances at the subnational level on the likelihood that external voting will be implemented.102
The remittance data comes from the Bank of Mexico, while the population data comes from the
National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Information Technology (INEGI).103 The
population data is available for every five years (2000, 2005, 2010, and 2015); subsequently, I
applied multiple imputation to fill in for the missing years. The subnational population data for
2005 is used for the years from 2005 to 2009 and the information for 2015 is entered for 2015 to
2018. There is great variance in how much remittances per capita the subnational units receive.
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Separate trials showed that coding Zacatecas as having implemented external voting in 2003 did not change the
results of the estimation model.
101
Information of Mexican subnational units that have implemented external voting is available at
http://www.votoextranjero.mx/web/vmre/como-votar
102
Unfortunately, data availability for Mexican subnational units is not as comprehensive compared to national
levels. Ideally, in accordance with chapter four, I would have preferred to proxy the reliance of remittances in terms
of remittances as a percentage of GSP. However, there are two problems with using that variable. First, as of
writing this, the GSP for 2018 has yet to be published by INEGI. Second, I was not able to find the same base year
for remittances (2010 constant dollars) and GSP (2013 constant pesos). Estimation models in which reliance on
remittances was measured in terms of remittances in constant 2010 dollars divided by gross state product (GSP) in
2013 constant dollars resulted the same results as remittances in current dollars per capita. Furthermore, remittances
per capita in 2010 constant dollars also yielded the same results.
103
Population data for 1990-2010 is available at https://www.inegi.org.mx/temas/estructura/default.htm l#Tabulados
the information for 2015 is gathered from http://cuentame.inegi.org.mx/poblacion /habitantes. aspx?tema=P
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For example, in 2007, when Michoacán became the first to implement external voting, the state
received over 600 dollars in remittances per capita. This is almost ten times the amount Baja
California (South) received ($62) and more than $350 above what the average subnational unit
obtained.
I expect that subnational entities which receive more remittances per capita are more
likely to implement external voting. However, previous findings have indicated that the
relationship between remittances and the adoption of external voting laws in Latin America and
the Caribbean (Erlingsson and Tuman 2017) and the implementation by low and middle-income
countries (chapter four) is nonlinear. The likelihood of this relationship is particularly relevant at
the subnational level. For example, at one point in the state of Zacatecas had roughly half its
population living abroad (Wucker 2004). Therefore, it is likely that politicians in migrant
sending states will be wary to open up the voting process to those abroad. Theoretically, the
political power of emigrants in subnational unit with high migration rates could be monumental.
Hypothesis 1: Subnational units who receive more remittances per capita are more likely
to implement external voting.
Hypothesis 2: The impact of remittances per capita on the likelihood that subnational
units will implement external voting is non-linear, and it starts to curtail when remittances per
capita are at moderate to high levels.
Independent Variable: Political Control
I assume that subnational units that have a non-PRI governor are more likely to
implement external voting. Compared to the PRI, both the left leaning Party of the Democratic
Revolution Party (PRD) and the right leaning National Action Party (PAN) built up stronger
relationship with the emigrant community. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, one of the founders of the
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PRD put an emphasis on building support among Mexicans living abroad. Furthermore, the
PRD explicitly promoted supporting external voting in its advertisement for the 2000 elections
(Fitzgerald 2009, 57).
Members of the PAN such as the former governor of Guanajuato Vicente Fox played a
key role in putting in place external voting legislation at the federal level. Since PAN gained
power in some of the states that have highest outmigration rate, the SNGs did take a more active
approach to those abroad (Yrizar Barbosa and Alarcón 2010, 174-176). Once in power, the PAN
did not throw away their opportunity to engage with the emigrant community and began working
on programs for those living abroad. President Fox gave speeches in which he praised the
contribution of the emigrant community to Mexico. Furthermore, in both 2006 and 2012, the
PAN candidate running for president received the most votes from Mexicans abroad, while in
2018 the candidate for the left leaning National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) received
the most votes. If a PRI governor is in power in a particular year, the observation is coded as “1”
otherwise it is coded as “0.”
Hypothesis 3: PRI governors are less likely to implement external voting.
Independent Variable: International Negotiations of Subnational Government
Mexican SNGs have started to emphasize trying to attract capital from out of the country
into their subnational unit (Schiavon 2017a). The argument goes that after the economic
problems Mexico experienced in 1982, and the subsequent neoliberal reforms, Mexican SNGs
became more eager to attract investments (Schiavon 2017b). In order to compete for capital and
to protect their emigrant community, SNGs have expanded their footprint in the United States by
establishing offices, and sending officials to international meetings (Schiavon 2017a, 295).
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In order to test whether SNGs that are more internationally involved in the globalized
economy are more likely to implement external voting, I used the international negotiations of
sub-State governments’ information provided by Schiavon (2017a). This data gives SNGs a
score based on various aspects of how active SNGs are in promoting their interest, and residents
outside their subnational entity (see measurement in Schiavon 2017a, 295-296). Schiavon
(2017a) measures the international negotiation of SNGs by examining their international
structure, economic activity, and political activity (2017a, 295) and by providing a score ranging
from 0 (no activity) to 3 (very high activity). The data is provided for three years (2004, 2009,
and 2014). Therefore, I am forced to impute data for the missing observations.104
Hypothesis 4: Subnational units with higher levels of international negotiations are more
likely to implement external voting.
Jimenez-Cuen (2008) argues that a large migrant community is one of the factors that
will increase the likelihood that favorable policies for those abroad will be implemented. The
data for number of emigrants from each subnational unit comes from INEGI.105 Unfortunately,
this data is a rough estimate, as neither the federal government nor SNGs have an accurate list of
people living abroad.106 Similarly, the information is only given for 2000 and 2010. Therefore,
in order not to lose observations the data for 2000 is used from 2003 to 2009 and the data for
2010 for 2010 to 2018. In order to proxy for the impact of emigration of each subnational unit,
the number of emigrants is divided by its population data from INEGI.
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The year 2004 is used from 2004 to 2008. The year 2009 is used for 2009 to 2013, while 2014 is used from 2014
to 2018.
105
Information is available at https://www.inegi.org.mx/temas/migracion/default.html#Tabulados
106
The correlation between remittances and the number of emigrants divided by its population was 0.0835 see
Appendix H Table 4
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Hypothesis 5: Subnational units with higher levels of emigration are more likely to
implement external voting.
I expect that there is a level of policy diffusion within SNGs when it comes to external
voting in accordance to what we see at the country level (see Turcu and Urbatsch 2015; findings
chapter four). Similar to chapter four, in order to test for diffusion, I divide Mexico up into four
regions based on the classifications from the Bank of Mexico.107 The percent of subnational units
in each category is calculated by taking the percentage of units which have implemented external
voting. Therefore, before Michoacán implemented external voting in 2007, all observations
were coded as 0. Hypothetically, if all subnational units in Mexico were to implement external
voting then all observations would be coded as 100. I hypothesize that when more SNGs in a
region have implemented external voting other subnational entities will be more likely to follow.
Hypothesis 6: Subnational units are more likely to implement external voting when other
SNGs in their region have done so.
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Mexico is divided up as follows. North region: Baja California, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, Sonora,
Tamaulipas. Center North region: Aguascalientes, Baja California Sur, Colima, Durango, Jalisco, Michoacán,
Nayarit, San Luis Potosí, Sinaloa, Zacatecas. Center region: Mexico City, State of Mexico, Guanajuato, Hidalgo,
Morelos, Puebla, Querétaro, Tlaxcala. South region: Campeche, Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo,
Tabasco, Veracruz, Yucatán. Gathered from the following source https://www.banxico.org.mx/publicaciones-yprensa/reportes-sobre-las-economias-regionales/%7B9B6D0688-DD40-0D16-3687-056C97D17A51%7D.pdf
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Table 6.2: Operationalization of Variables
Variable
Operationalization
Source
Implementation of external
If a subnational unit
INE and various subnational
voting (dependent variable).
implemented external voting electoral agencies
it is coded as 1, and 0
otherwise
Importance of remittances
Remittances per capita in
Bank of Mexico and INEGI
and squared value.
current dollars
Political Control
If a state has a PRI governor
Various sources
in a particular year it is coded
as 1, and 0 otherwise
Subnational international
International negotiations of
Schiavon 2017a
negotiations
sub-State governments
Potential political impact of
The number of emigrants
INEGI
emigrant community.
divided by the population of a
subnational unit
Policy diffusion
What percentage of the
Bank of Mexico and various
subnational units within the
subnational electoral agencies
sub-region have implemented
external voting
Results
The results in table 6.3 signal that remittances do influence Mexican subnational units to
implement external voting. The unsquared term has a negative coefficient and is statistically
significant. On the other hand, the squared term has a positive coefficient and is also statistically
significant at the five percent level. This indicates that states receiving low to medium levels of
remittances per capita are less likely to implement external voting. However, once the levels of
remittances increase, and reach a certain threshold, the relationship becomes positive and
statistically significant.
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Table 6.3: Determinates of the Implementation of External Voting by Mexican Subnational
Units
Variable
Coefficient
Standard error
Remittance pc
-0.01**
(0.01)
Remittance pc squared
.00**
(0.00)
PRI Government
-0.74
(0.55)
Levels of INSSG
0..96
(0.69)
Emigrant/population
0.71
(2.92)
Diffusion
0.04
(0.03)
N-size 444
Log pseudolikelihood42.213508
Chi square 19.10***
**** p < .001; *** p < .01; ** p < .05 *p <0.10

The negative relationship between the unsquared remittance variable and the
implementation of external voting goes against my theoretical expectations. Additionally, there
are numerous Mexican subnational units that receive low amounts of remittances per capita who
have implemented external voting. This could suggest that certain states implement external
voting as a way to build stronger relationship with their population abroad perhaps in order to
attract more remittances. The three subnational units that received the highest amount of
remittances per capita in 2018 (Michoacán, Zacatecas, and Guanajuato) have all implemented
external voting (see Appendix H table 7). This fits well with the theoretical expectations that
subnational government in which there is a high impact of remittances are more likely to put in
place such policies. These three states are reliant on remittances and they have been at the
forefront of putting in policies for their emigrant community. However, based on this theoretical
assumption that subnational governments enfranchise those living abroad either to reward them
or try to encourage more remittances, the question remains why the states such as Durango and
San Luis Potosi have yet to implement external voting. Few patterns appear when examining the
descriptive data of the relationship between the states that received the most remittances per
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capita in 2018 and whether they had enfranchised those living abroad. Of the 10 states that
received the most remittances per capita in 2018, five states had implemented external voting.
On the opposite end of spectrum, five out of the 10 subnational units that received the least per
capita had also done so.
The variables testing for the control of the PRI, level of international negotiations,
emigrants living abroad, and policy diffusion were all insignificant. Subsequently, trials
including the economic developmental levels of states in terms of log of gross state product in
2013 Mexican pesos and human development indicators for the subnational levels did not yield
significant results. In order to better understand what influences subnational governments to
implement external voting, future case studies should further examine the political debate that
occurred when the laws were in the state legislatures. That way we can get a better
understanding of the underlying political motivations that lead subnational governments to make
such decisions.
The potential political impact is much greater in many Mexican states compared to the
national level. The Mexican government estimates that 11.9 million Mexicans live abroad, with
almost 98 percent of them living in the United States.108 Due to the size of Mexico’s emigrant
community, even low levels of turnout among Mexicans abroad could certainly play a decisive
role in tipping elections. In 2006, when external voting was allowed for the first time, the
Mexican presidential elections ended up being decided by only half a percentage point.
However, fewer than 33,000 Mexicans abroad voted (Fitzgerald 2009) and the plurality of
external voters ended up voting for the winning PAN candidate.

108

Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs (n.d) available at https://www.gob.mx/sre/articulos/do-you-know-howmany-mexicans-live-abroad
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At the subnational level, in certain states with high outmigration rates, the potential
political power of the emigrant community is substantial. In the state of Michoacán, the
Secretary of Migration, José Luis Gutiérrez Pérez, has been quoted as saying that there is an
“another Michoacán in the United States” (authors translation) (Arrieta 2018). If the migrant
community of a Mexican state like Michoacán or Zacatecas were to become engaged in the
political process, they could have enormous political power. Politicians in states with large
outmigration—who are not sure whether the emigrant community will support them should be
leery of the idea of implementing external voting. However, it must also be considered that
similarly to the national level, it is unlikely that residents living abroad will vote in large
numbers as to change election outcomes. For example, despite the substantial number of citizens
from Michoacán who live in the United States, in the inaugural 2007 elections less than 350
residents abroad voted (Instituto Electoral de Michoacán 2007). In the gubernatorial elections in
2011, the number of voters from abroad declined to 341 (Valdez Morales 2016).

Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to examine what makes Mexican subnational entities
more likely to implement external voting. The results from the chapter indicate that the levels of
remittances per capita does have an impact. Interestingly, states that receive low to moderate
levels of remittances were less likely to implement external voting. However, once the amount
of remittances per capita increased, this relationship shifted and subnational units became more
likely to put in place such policies. This goes against research in Latin America and the
Caribbean (Erlingsson and Tuman 2017) as well as developing countries (chapter four), which
have shown the opposite effect. The statistical results in chapter four indicate that countries
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become less likely to implement external voting once they receive medium to high levels of
remittances. It is not surprising that subnational governments do not follow the same patterns as
nation states. In countries like Mexico there are enormous subnational variations in how
impacted they are by emigration and money transfers from abroad. The findings of this chapter
illustrate a contribution of this dissertation to the political science literature, they highlight what
many other works have found in the past, remittances do have political impacts, but it varies on
the circumstances. The next chapter will review the findings of the dissertation along with
discussing its contribution to the literature, limitations, and suggestions for future research.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
More than 250 million people are situated in another country other than they were born in
(United Nations 2017). The question arises whether those situated abroad should have any
political rights? The voting rights of immigrants in federal, subnational, and local elections is a
highly politicized issue in countries around the world. Due to the number of immigrants living
in many wealthier countries, it is clear that they will have substantial political impact, as a recent
blog by the United States Census Bureau on immigrant voting concluded “…immigrant voting
will be increasingly relevant to electoral outcomes in years to come” (Trevelyan 2016). Most
countries do not allow their non-resident citizens to vote (Collyer and Vathi 2007). In fact,
migrants are much more likely to vote in their country of origin, as a majority of the countries in
the world have implemented external voting (Collyer and Vathi 2007). This dissertation has
examined the question why some countries and Mexican subnational governments have
implemented expatriate voting.
Numerous theoretical explanations have been put forth in order to explain the sudden
increase in the number of countries enfranchising those living abroad. For instance, the surge in
the number of democracies around the world have provided an opening for such policies to be
put in place. Mexico is an example of this process. It was not until the Institutional
Revolutionary Party started losing power that an opportunity arose for both the national and
subnational governments to increase rights for those living abroad. Enfranchising citizens
abroad has been viewed as a way to begin national reconciliation after conflicts in which people
have had to flee their homeland (Grace 2007). Implementing external voting is a way for states
to indicate their democratic consolidation (Bauböck 2007). It can also be argued that external
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voting is becoming a democratic norm (Rhodes and Harutyunyan 2010). Studies have shown how
there is a relationship between democratic diffusion and external voting (Turcu and Urbatsch
2015). In chapter four of this dissertation the only variable that was consistently significant in all
four models was that proxying for diffusion that indicates countries in regions where external
voting is common are more likely to implement external voting. Nonetheless, this study did not
find evidence of such a relationship at the subnational level in Mexico.
The rise in democratic governance also facilitated the process of those living abroad to
stay attached to their country of origin. Studies have shown that many emigrants stay engaged in
the politics of their home country by discussing political issues with their family and friends
(Escrivá, Santa Cruz, and Bermúde 2010; Vari-Lavoisier 2016). Emigrants have also donated to
political parties (Guarnizo, Portes, and Haller 2003) and their remittances have been seen as an
indication of their continued connection (Fitzgerald 2000). The engagement of emigrants helped
them remain on the political agenda by illustrating that their departure did not express total
withdrawal from the affairs of their country of origin. Politicians also often assume that relatives
abroad can sway voters in the homeland (Paarlberg 2017b), which can make it politically costly
to be against policies seen favorably by the emigrant community.
States also started moving away from a concept of nationhood that viewed residency as a
crucial part of suffrage (Caramani and Grotz 2015). In this post-Westphalian notion, states have
even started creating special seats in their legislatures for citizens living abroad (Collyer 2014b).
This change was a part of a process in which government started portraying their emigrant
community in a much more favorable manner. For example, the Mexican state used to portray
their emigrant community negatively (Lafleur 2008). However, it was when the Mexican
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government moved away from the policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of the
United States that it became much more involved with its citizens abroad (Rosenblum 2004).
Another theoretical explanation views economic reasons as a motivator for states to
implement external voting. In the 1980s, several developing countries started a process of
economic liberalization in which attempts were made to make their economy more hospitable to
free market ideas and foreign capital (Moreno-Brid et al. 2004). The World Bank, along with
other international financial institutions, started emphasizing remittances as a way to spark
development (Delgado Wise and Márquez 2007b, 4). In the last three decades, remittances
received by developing countries have skyrocketed and they now surpass official developmental
assistance (World Bank 2017). The argument goes that states want to put in place favorable
policies for those living abroad in order to sustain or increase these money transfers.
Furthermore, politicians who might be wary to enfranchise the emigrant community due to their
unknown political consequences and logistical challenges, have to balance their concerns with
the benefits their constituencies receive from remittances. Migrants also point to the remittances
they send as a justification for why they should be able to vote (Jimenez-Cuen 2008).
The statistical findings of this study indicate that remittances do influence countries and
subnational units in Mexico to implement external voting. The results in chapter four support the
conclusion of a study by Erlingsson and Tuman (2017) on the adoption of external voting in
Latin America and the Caribbean, remittances make countries more likely to adopt external
voting, but the impact of remittances are nonlinear. The statistical findings from chapter four
also indicate that non-autocracies and developing countries are more likely to implement external
voting if they are more democratic while less likely if they have high levels of outmigration.
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The statistical results from Mexican subnational units also indicate a non-linear
relationship. Contrary to the results of countries in chapter four, low to medium levels of
remittances make Mexican states less likely to implement external voting, but once remittances
per capita reach higher levels subnational units become more likely to enfranchise those abroad.
The statistically significant and negative coefficient of the unsquared remittance variable is
surprising. Subnational units such as Mexico City, Chiapas, State of Mexico, Baja California
(South), and Yucatan who are all ranked from 25-30 out of 32 entities in terms of remittance per
capita in 2018 have implemented external voting (Appendix H Table 7). It is possible that states
receiving less inflow of remittances are motivated to build up a stronger relationship with those
living abroad in order to attempt to attract more remittances in the future. On the other end of
the spectrum, subnational units that receive the most remittances per capita are more likely to
implement external voting. Theoretically, an organized migrant community in states like
Michoacán and Zacatecas could have an enormous impact on the outcomes of elections.
Consequently, office holders should be cautious to adopt and implement such laws unless they
are confident the voters abroad will not hurt their electoral prospects. However, state politicians
might assume that citizens abroad are less likely to vote in regional elections since they tend to
get less exposure. Moreover, politicians in Mexican states that are most dependent of
remittances want to do what they can in order to please those living abroad. The reliance of
remittance is often much greater at the subnational level and this in turn gives migrants a
stronger voice when they ask politicians to put in place favorable policies such as expatriate
voting.
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Contribution
The results of this study contribute to the political science literature by indicating that
developing countries and Mexican subnational governments are influenced by the level of
remittances they receive on whether they implement external voting. Previous quantitative
studies have tended not to find a relationship between remittances and external voting, though
many authors have argued for such a correlation. Therefore, scholars have tended to emphasize
country specific factors instead of general explanations (Collyer 2014a, 55). The macro-level
approach and findings give more credence to the argument that remittances similarly to foreign
direct investments and other flows of money coming into a country, do have a political impact. I
argued that the distinctions should be made between developed and developing countries, but
also countries that share some characteristics of democratic rule and non-democracies.
This dissertation adds to the scholarly literature by illustrating the nuanced impacts
remittances have on political decisions. For non-autocratic developing countries, remittances at
low to medium levels make it more likely that they will implement external voting. However, as
the level of remittances increase they become less likely to put in place voting from abroad.
Subnational governments in Mexico are less likely to implement external voting at low to
medium levels, but once the remittances per capita increase they become more likely to
implement external voting. These results correspond with the burgeoning literature on the
political and economic influences that remittances have. For example, studies have shown that
remittances can aid the likelihood of democratic transitions (Escribà-Folch, Meseguer, and
Wright 2015), but also help autocrats remain in power (Ahmed 2012). Ruis and Vargas-Silva
(2014) show that remittances are at times pro-cyclical while in others counter-cyclical. Imai et
al. (2014, 524) argue that remittances are advantageous for economic growth, but that the
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volatility of remittances can be harmful for economic growth. Mabrouk and Mekni (2018) show
the complicated relationship between remittances and food security. The results of this study
further add to this literature by illustrating the complicated influence remittances have on the
implementation of expatriate voting. In the next section I will discuss the numerous limitations
of this dissertation.

Limitations
As stated, a contribution of this study is the macro-level approach it takes to the
examination of external voting not only at the worldwide level, but also by looking at SNGs in
Mexico. However, this is also a limitation since this project is not able to look at the political
processes that take place within countries and subnational units when external voting is
implemented. This dissertation makes no distinction between variations in external voting laws.
When numerous stipulations are put in place to limit the potential impact of voters abroad,
politicians are unlikely to face any negative electoral consequences of enfranchising their
emigrant community.
There are also issues with the data used to test for the determinants of external voting.
Scholars have documented that there are numerous problems with the World Bank remittance
data. The data underestimates the real levels of remittances (Ratha et al. 2011). There is also a
question whether the great increase in the levels of remittances chronicled by the World Bank is
in large part due to changes in the way it documents these money transfers (Gibson and
McKenzie 2017). Additionally, using the United Nations net migration data and the number of
registered Mexicans abroad from the Mexican National Institute of Statistics (INEGI) are
imperfect ways to proxy for the size of the emigrant community.
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The study also does not make the distinctions between individual remittances and
collective remittances. It is likely that when migrants pool their remittances together, they are in
a much stronger bargaining positions to ask for favorable policies such as external voting.
Moreover, this study does not distinguish where the emigrant community lives. Numerous
studies have discussed differences in outcomes based on where the migrant community reside
(Spilimbergo 2009; Batista and Vicente 2011; Tran, Cameroon, and Poot 2017; Miller and Peters
2018). It is possible that emigrant communities that live mostly in host countries that are
democratic will be more likely to push for external voting rights. Despite these various
constraints, I hope this research does help us better understand why governments implement
external voting.

Future Research
An interesting avenue for research in the future is to continue to delve into the voting
behavior of those living abroad. It is more costly for migrants to get political information on
their country of origin compared to voters living in the country. How does this impact the
political activities of migrant voters? For example, do voters from abroad engage in economic
voting? If so, are they sociotropic or pocketbook voters? Or do they mostly vote for symbolic
reasons? This study has shown that the Mexican Institutional Revolutionary Party consistently
underperforms abroad compared to domestic voters. The question remains, is this a phenomenon
specific to Mexico or does it also apply to other countries, do migrants electorally punish long
ruling political parties that are associated with the undemocratic history of the country? Future
research should continue to look at the political impact of remittances. Such as, are migrants
pressuring governments in their country of origin to put in place good governance reforms?
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These types of study should also look at the influence migrants have on subnational governments
as those living abroad are likely to have the greatest political power in provincial governments
that are reliant on remittances. Prospective studies should also build on this study by testing the
determinants that make subnational governments more likely to adopt and implement external
voting.

Concluding Remarks
Remittances will certainly continue to be an important political issue in the upcoming
years. Political leaders in host countries will presumably float ideas to tax remittances.
President Trump has suggested doing this in order to build a border wall with Mexico (Germano
2017) and to punish Guatemala if they refused to take in migrants (McDonald 2019). On the
other hand, developing countries will attempt to make sending remittances cheaper and more
efficient. The Mexican Congress has debated proposals on how much money financial
institutions can charge to send remittances (Villarreal and Davy 2007). Countries are also likely
to try put in place policies to build a stronger relationship with their emigrant community.
Allowing external voting is one such policy, it does strengthen the bond between the state and
those living abroad (Moctezuma 2015). However, it is questionable whether the trend of more
countries implementing external voting will continue. It is debatable whether the costs
associated with implementing expatriate voting is justified when the voter turnout is very low.109
Second, it is questionable how politicians on the losing side will react when elections are seen as
having been tipped by electors abroad.

109

However, improvements in technology certainly have the potential to minimize these costs in the future. For
example, by allowing voters from abroad to vote online. In 2018, West Virginia became the first state to allow
military members and residents overseas to use Blockchain, an application on cellphones (Vasquez 2018).
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There are many reasons for why states and subnational units have decided to implement
external voting. In this dissertation, the argument has focused on the reliance of remittances as a
relevant determinant in the decision of lower-and-middle-income countries and subnational
governments in Mexico to enfranchise those living abroad. However, there are certainly many
cases in which the reliance on remittances had little to no impact on the decision making process
of politicians to implement external voting. Nonetheless, remittances have helped migrants gain
a political voice in many lower-and-middle-income countries because of their economic impact
and since sending remittances illustrate a continued commitment to their country of origin. For
example, Fox (2007) discusses the puzzle of how migrants can gain political rights, the author
writes, “[t]he issue of how migrants can gain political representation poses a puzzle. If they lack
voting rights in their host country, then host country politicians have little electoral incentive to
make the political investment necessary to enfranchise them. If they lack voting rights in their
home country, then their home country politicians will lack political incentives to enfranchise
them. This presents a ‘chicken and egg’ problem—migrants need to gain electoral clout for
politicians to pay attention, yet they need politicians to pay attention to get electoral clout” (Fox
2007, 325). In this study, I argued that remittances have encouraged politicians to pay attention
to their emigrant community.
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Appendices
Appendix A
Appendix A: Table 1Countries in Study
Country
Sub-Region
Year Implemented
Algeria
Northern Africa
1976
Egypt
Northern Africa
2011
Libya
Northern Africa
Morocco
Northern Africa
Sudan
Northern Africa
1986
Tunisia
Northern Africa
2004
Burundi
Eastern Africa
Comoros
Eastern Africa
Djibouti
Eastern Africa
Eritrea
Eastern Africa
Ethiopia
Eastern Africa
Kenya
Eastern Africa
Madagascar
Eastern Africa
Malawi
Eastern Africa
Mauritius
Eastern Africa
Mozambique
Eastern Africa
2004
Rwanda
Eastern Africa
2003
Seychelles
Eastern Africa
Somalia
Eastern Africa
Uganda
Eastern Africa
United Republic of Tanzania
Eastern Africa
Zambia
Eastern Africa
Zimbabwe
Eastern Africa
1980
Angola
Middle Africa
Cameroon
Middle Africa
2011
Central African Republic
Middle Africa
Chad
Middle Africa
2001
Congo
Middle Africa
Democratic Republic of the
Middle Africa
Congo
Equatorial Guinea
Middle Africa
Gabon
Middle Africa
2009
Sao Tome and Principe
Middle Africa
Botswana
Southern Africa
1997
Eswatini
Southern Africa
Lesotho
Southern Africa
Namibia
Southern Africa
1994
South Africa
Southern Africa
1994
Benin
Western Africa
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Burkina Faso
Cabo Verde
Côte d’Ivoire
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Liberia
Mali
Mauritania
Niger
Nigeria
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Togo
Antigua and Barbuda
Bahamas
Barbados
Cuba
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Grenada
Haiti
Jamaica
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines
Trinidad and Tobago
Belize
Costa Rica
El Salvador
Guatemala
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Argentina
Bolivia (Plurinational State
of)
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Ecuador
Guyana

Western Africa
Western Africa
Western Africa
Western Africa
Western Africa
Western Africa
Western Africa
Western Africa
Western Africa
Western Africa
Western Africa
Western Africa
Western Africa
Western Africa
Western Africa
Caribbean
Caribbean
Caribbean
Caribbean
Caribbean
Caribbean
Caribbean
Caribbean
Caribbean
Caribbean
Caribbean
Caribbean
Caribbean
Central America
Central America
Central America
Central America
Central America
Central America
Central America
Central America
South America
South America
South America
South America
South America
South America
South America
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1991
1995
2008
1993
1992

1993

2004

2001
2006
1993
2009
1989
1962
2006
1993

Paraguay
Peru
Suriname
Uruguay
Venezuela (Bolivarian
Republic of)
Canada
United States of America
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
China
Democratic People's Republic
of Korea
Japan
Mongolia
Republic of Korea
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People's Democratic
Republic
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Timor-Leste
Viet Nam
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Iran (Islamic Republic of)
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Armenia
Azerbaijan

South America
South America
South America
South America
South America

1980
1998

Northern America
Northern America
Central Asia
Central Asia
Central Asia
Central Asia
Central Asia
Eastern Asia
Eastern Asia

1944
1942
1994
2000
1994

Eastern Asia
Eastern Asia
Eastern Asia
South-Eastern Asia
South-Eastern Asia
South-Eastern Asia
South-Eastern Asia

2002

South-Eastern Asia
South-Eastern Asia
South-Eastern Asia
South-Eastern Asia
South-Eastern Asia
South-Eastern Asia
South-Eastern Asia
Southern Asia
Southern Asia
Southern Asia
Southern Asia
Southern Asia
Southern Asia
Southern Asia
Southern Asia
Southern Asia
Western Asia
Western Asia

110

1994

1955
2006

2004
2006
2000
1999
2004
2004
1980

1996110
2000

Armenians abroad were allowed to vote for the first time in 1996 (Hong and Haldane 1996)
http://articles.latimes.com/1996-09-23/local/me-46773_1_people-of-armenian-descent
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Bahrain
Cyprus
Georgia
Iraq
Israel
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Syrian Arab Republic
Turkey
United Arab Emirates
Yemen
Belarus
Bulgaria
Czechia
Hungary
Poland
Republic of Moldova
Romania
Russian Federation
Slovakia
Ukraine
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
Iceland
Ireland
Latvia
Lithuania
Norway
Sweden
United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland
Albania
Andorra
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Croatia
Greece
Italy
Malta
Montenegro
Portugal

Western Asia
Western Asia
Western Asia
Western Asia
Western Asia
Western Asia
Western Asia
Western Asia
Western Asia
Western Asia
Western Asia
Western Asia
Western Asia
Western Asia
Western Asia
Eastern Europe
Eastern Europe
Eastern Europe
Eastern Europe
Eastern Europe
Eastern Europe
Eastern Europe
Eastern Europe
Eastern Europe
Eastern Europe
Northern Europe
Northern Europe
Northern Europe
Northern Europe
Northern Europe
Northern Europe
Northern Europe
Northern Europe
Northern Europe
Northern Europe
Southern Europe
Southern Europe
Southern Europe
Southern Europe
Southern Europe
Southern Europe
Southern Europe
Southern Europe
Southern Europe
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1995
2004

1994
1990
2002
2004
1990
1993
1990
1994
1980
1992
1958
1949
1992
1992
1921
1968
1918

1996
1992
2003
1976

San Marino
Southern Europe
Serbia
Southern Europe
Slovenia
Southern Europe
Spain
Southern Europe
The former Yugoslav
Southern Europe
Republic of Macedonia
Austria
Western Europe
Belgium
Western Europe
France
Western Europe
Germany
Western Europe
Liechtenstein
Western Europe
Luxembourg
Western Europe
Monaco
Western Europe
Netherlands
Western Europe
Switzerland
Western Europe
Australia
Australia and New Zealand
New Zealand
Australia and New Zealand
Fiji
Melanesia
Papua New Guinea
Melanesia
Solomon Islands
Melanesia
Vanuatu
Melanesia
Kiribati
Micronesia
Marshall Islands
Micronesia
Micronesia (Federated States
Micronesia
of)
Nauru
Micronesia
Palau
Micronesia
Samoa
Polynesia
Tonga
Polynesia
Tuvalu
Polynesia
Source: Ellis et al. 2007; Lafleur 2013b
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1992
1985
1990
1999
1976
1985
2004
1984
2007
1989
1977
1902
1957

1980

2004
1981

Appendix B
Appendix B: Table 1 Determinates of the Implementation of External Voting
Variable
(1) All Countries (2) All LMICS
(3) Non
(4) LMICs Non
Autocracies
Autocracies
Remittance
11.00325
7.141637
19.19845**
22.51036**
GDP
(9.662009)
(8.681774)
(9.117948)
(8.944402)
Remittance
-.5783645
-.3748881
-.5813651
-.6232144**
GDP squared
(.5610476)
(.4032212)
(.3695971)
(.2848839)
Net migration
.0102351
.0300346
.0800566**
.1720084***
(.0307627)
(.0418387)
(.0384178)
(.0572338)
Polity2
.0321498
.0172463
.2239164**
.2308482**
(.0341782)
(.0346877)
(.1058047)
(.1088148)
globalization
-.0136017
.0019012
-.0285082
-.0021798
(.0161221)
(.0166422)
(.0212826)
(.0198673)
Diffusion
1.538735***
1.921108****
1.506028**
2.337268***
(.5405573)
(.5984993)
(.6604595)
(.7841759)
N-Size 2,700
N-Size 1,611
N-Size 1,771
N-Size 1,057
Log
Log
Log
Log
pseudolikelihood- pseudolikelihood pseudolikelihood pseudolikelihood
-156.73
-110.08
-101.88
-61.01
Chi Square 13.68
Chi Square
Chi Square 14.85
Chi Square
13.64
19.33
**** p < .001; *** p < .01; ** p < .05 *p <0.10
Appendix B: Table 2 Descriptive Statistics Model 1 (All Countries)
Variable
Mean
Standard
Minimum
Maximum
Deviation
Remittance GDP
.0361323
.0870784
2.89e-07
1.066045
Remittance GDP
.8885377
6.451871
8.35e-12
113.6451
squared
Net Migration
-.4888115
5.847469
-40.93
65.158
Polity2
2.917037
6.808213
-10
10
globalization
48.13636
16.46192
15.37
89.67
Diffusion
.3023973
.3540735
0
1
Appendix B Table 3: Correlation Matrix of Cox Model 1 (All Countries)
Remittance Remittances
Net
Level of
globalization
Policy
% of GDP
Flows of
Migration Democracy
Diffusion
(2010)
GDP
squared
Remittance
1.0000
GDP
150

Remittance
GDP
squared
Net
Migration
Polity2
globalization
Diffusion

-0.8820

1.0000

0.1094

0.0290

1.0000

0.0367
0.2371
-0.1243

0.1281
-0.2501
0.0843

0.5148
-0.4462
0.2104

1.0000
-0.4864
-0.0154

1.000
-0.5161

1.0000

Appendix B: Table 4: Test of Proportional-hazards assumptions Model 1 (All Countries)
chi2
df
Prob>chi2
global test
3.26
6
0.7760
Appendix B: Table 5 Test of Proportional-hazards assumptions Model 1 (All Countries)
rho
chi2
df
Prob>chi2
Remittance GDP
-0.02767
0.03
1
0.8710
Remittance GDP
-0.08385
0.24
1
0.6231
squared
Net Migration
-0.13179
0.69
1
0.4057
Polity2
-0.15169
1.55
1
0.2136
globalization
-0.01195
0.01
1
0.9244
Diffusion
0.03046
0.04
1
0.8444
global test
3.26
6
0.7760
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Appendix C
Appendix C: Table 1 Descriptive Statistics Model 2 (All LMICS)
Variable
Mean
Standard
Minimum
Maximum
Deviation
Remittance GDP
.0441179
.0808147
2.89e-07
.9557287
Remittance GDP
.8473343
4.742882
8.35e-12
91.34174
squared
Net Migration
-1.437774
5.345633
-40.93
49.078
Polity2
2.581626
6.158971
-10
10
globalization
45.44926
12.86918
16.59
85.51
Diffusion
.287108
.3122789
0
.9452467
Appendix C: Table 2 Correlation Matrix of Model 2 (All LMICS)
Remittance
% of GDP
(2010)

Remittance
GDP
Remittance
GDP
squared
Net
Migration
Polity2
globalization
Diffusion

Remittances
Flows of
GDP
squared

Net
Migration

Level of
Democracy

globalization

Policy
Diffusion

1.0000
-0.8391

1.0000

0.0909

0.0336

1.0000

0.2242
0.1051
-0.1753

-0.0012
-0.1383
0.1532

0.4800
-0.1483
0.3219

1.0000
-0.3110
0.0143

1.000
-0.1788

1.0000

Appendix C: Table 3 Test of Proportional-hazards assumptions Model 2 (All LMICS)
chi2
df
Prob>chi2
global test
5.29
6
0.5071
Appendix C: Test 4 Test of Proportional-hazards assumptions Model 2 (All LMICS)
rho
chi2
df
Prob>chi2
Remittance GDP
-0.08775
0.22
1
0.6371
Remittance GDP
-0.18254
0.43
1
0.5128
squared
Net Migration
-0.06455
0.16
1
0.6934
Polity2
-0.23150
2.38
1
0.1232
globalization
0.14499
0.54
1
0.4645
Diffusion
-0.06183
0.13
1
0.7153
152

global test

5.29

153

6

0.5071

Appendix D
Appendix D: Table 1 Descriptive Statistics Model 3 (Non Autocracies)
Variable
Mean
Standard
Minimum
Maximum
Deviation
Remittance GDP
.0281297
.0586542
2.89e-07
.6194182
Remittance GDP
.4229653
2.379869
8.35e-12
38.36789
squared
Net Migration
-.3577284
4.919659
-27.752
49.078
Polity2
7.491248
2.572411
0
10
globalization
53.25369
16.45675
21.13
89.67
Diffusion
.3830925
.3859617
0
1
Appendix D: Table 2 Correlation Matrix of Model 3 (Non Autocracies)
Remittance Remittances
Net
Level of
globalization
Policy
% of GDP
Flows of
Migration Democracy
Diffusion
(2010)
GDP
squared
Remittance
1.0000
GDP
Remittance
-0.8411
1.0000
GDP
squared
Net
0.2445
-0.1248
1.0000
Migration
Polity2
-0.0590
0.2414
0.3063
1.0000
globalization
0.1944
-0.2248
-0.4726
-0.5777
1.000
Diffusion
0.0426
-0.0527
0.3675
0.0850
-0.5566
1.0000
Appendix D: Table 3 Test of Proportional-hazards assumptions Model 3 (Non Autocracies)
chi2
df
Prob>chi2
global test
0.77
6
0.9929
Appendix D: Table 4 Test of Proportional-hazards assumptions Model 3 (Non Autocracies)
rho
chi2
df
Prob>chi2
Remittance GDP
-0.01942
0.01
1
0.9258
Remittance GDP
-0.11236
0.14
1
0.7088
squared
Net Migration
-0.05749
0.05
1
0.8225
Polity2
-0.07331
0.09
1
0.7605
globalization
0.03938
0.08
1
0.7804
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Diffusion
global test

-0.01792

0.01
0.77

155

1
6

0.9165
0.9929

Appendix E
Appendix E: Table 1 Descriptive Statistics Model 4 (Non Autocratic LMICs)
Variable
Mean
Standard
Minimum
Maximum
Deviation
Remittance GDP
.0413259
.0719579
2.89e-07
.6194182
Remittance GDP
.6880871
3.049825
8.35e-12
38.36789
squared
Net Migration
-1.679651
4.669262
-27.752
49.078
Polity2
6.656575
2.505361
0
10
globalization
47.92322
12.81868
21.46
85.51
Diffusion
.3292796
.3358257
0
.9452467
Appendix E: Table 2 Correlation Matrix of Model 4 (Non Autocratic LMICs)
Remittance Remittances
Net
Level of
globalization
Policy
% of GDP
Flows of
Migration Democracy
Diffusion
(2010)
GDP
squared
Remittance
1.0000
GDP
Remittance
-0.8258
1.0000
GDP
squared
Net
0.1345
-0.0817
1.0000
Migration
Polity2
0.1106
0.0608
0.3043
1.0000
globalization
0.1150
-0.1430
-0.1089
-0.4147
1.000
Diffusion
0.0384
0.0508
0.4724
0.1534
-0.1106
1.0000
Appendix E: Table 3 Test of Proportional-hazards assumptions Model 4 (Non Autocratic
LMICs)
chi2
df
Prob>chi2
global test
5.65
6
0.4632
Appendix E: Table 4 Test of Proportional-hazards assumptions Model 4 (Non Autocratic
LMICs)
rho
chi2
df
Prob>chi2
Remittance GDP
-0.21053
0.93
1
0.3349
Remittance GDP
-0.03617
0.01
1
0.9233
squared
Net Migration
0.09700
0.14
1
0.7054
Polity2
-0.21300
0.29
1
0.5888
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globalization
Diffusion
global test

0.30293
-0.10134

1.32
0.26
5.65
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1
1
6

0.2504
0.6135
0.4632

Appendix F
Appendix F: Table 1 Determinants of the Implementation of External Voting in the
Americas
Variable
(1) All Countries (2) All LMICS
(3) Non
(4) LMICs Non
Autocracies
Autocracies
Remittance
67.6269**
86.80242****
63.14502**
82.61221****
GDP
(26.5147)
(22.97142)
(24.58818)
(22.50596)
Remittance
-3.531664**
-4.301561***
-3.162266**
-4.01286**
GDP squared
(1.661334)
(1.643871)
(1.543148)
(1.614031)
Net migration
.1850217*
.3033755**
.1912673*
.3046681**
(.1052951)
(.1199601)
(.1049866)
(.1196291)
Polity2
-.1288158
-.1268831
-.1918626
-.1800411
(.1462946)
(.1372389)
(.1461588)
(.1356535)
Globalization
.0157889
.1109963**
.0161335
.1095965**
(.0391754)
(.0553563)
(.0358345)
(.0535118)
Diffusion
1.483289
2.277378*
1.49818
2.287012*
(.9509065)
(1.273194)
(.9802997)
(1.282263)
N-Size 624
N-Size 395
N-Size 523
N-Size 381
Log
Log
Log
Log
pseudolikelihood pseudolikelihood pseudolikelihood pseudolikelihood
-19.40436
-16.955043
-19.197099
-16.798044
Chi Square 20.08
Chi Square
Chi Square 20.08
Chi Square
23.70
24.63
**** p < .001; *** p < .01; ** p < .05 *p <0.10
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Appendix G
Appendix G: Table 1 Ranking of Countries by Inflow of Remittances and Percent of GDP
Numbers rounded up
Ranking by inflow Inflow of remittances in
Ranking by
Remittances percent
of remittances in
millions of dollars
percentage of GDP
of GDP
2015 current U.S
in 2015
dollars
India
68,910
Tonga
34.42%
China
63,938
Liberia
32.17%
Philippines
29,799
Nepal
31.43%
Mexico
26,233
Tajikistan
28.76%
France
23,766
Kyrgyz Republic
25.27%
Nigeria
21,060
Haiti
25.17%
Pakistan
19,306
Moldova
23.65%
Egypt
18,325
Comoros
22.77%
Germany
16,133
El Salvador
18.53%
Bangladesh
15,296
Samoa
17.89%
Vietnam
13,200
Honduras
17.48%
Spain
10,281
Jamaica
16.64%
Belgium
9,873
Marshall Islands
15.21%
Indonesia
9,659
Lebanon
15.13%
Italy
9,517
Kosovo
15.08%
Lebanon
7,481
The Gambia
14.98%
Sri Lanka
7,000
Lesotho
14.80%
Morocco
6,904
West Bank and Gaza
14.41%
Russian Federation
6,903
Jordan
14.26%
Poland
6,783
Armenia
14.13%
Nepal
6,730
Ghana
13.34%
Guatemala
6,573
Cabo Verde
12.59%
United States
6,562
Zimbabwe
12.55%
Republic of Korea
6,444
Senegal
12.24%
Thailand
5,895
Montenegro
11.59%
Ukraine
5,845
Tuvalu
11.41%
Jordan
5,348
Albania
11.33%
Dominican Republic
5,196
Bosnia and
11.11%
Herzegovina
United Kingdom
5,003
Dominica
10.45%
Colombia
4,680
South Sudan
10.44%
Hungary
4,459
Georgia
10.42%
Portugal
4,363
Guatemala
10.31%
El Salvador
4,288
Philippines
10.18%
Honduras
3,666
Republic of Yemen
9.68%
Serbia
3,371
Guyana
9.56%
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Sweden
Republic of Yemen
Japan
Romania
Uzbekistan
Brazil
Austria
Peru
Czech Republic
Switzerland

3,364
3,351
3,325
3,085
3,062
2,897
2,843
2,725
2,675
2,517

9.52%
9.50%
9.31%
9.07%
8.89%
8.69%
8.11%
7.84%
7.55%
7.40%

1,971
1,929
1,826
1,801

Kiribati
Nicaragua
Ukraine
Serbia
Togo
Sri Lanka
Guinea-Bissau
Bangladesh
Dominican Republic
Micronesia, Fed.
Sts.
Pakistan
Morocco
Vietnam
Faroe Islands
Sao Tome and
Principe
Mali
Fiji
Egypt, Arab Rep.
St. Vincent and the
Grenadines
Latvia
Belize
Uzbekistan
Tunisia

Ecuador
Jamaica
Tajikistan
Haiti
Australia

2,388
2,361
2,259
2,196
2,141

Slovak Republic
Croatia
Ghana
Algeria

2,138
2,104
2,100
2,000

Tunisia
Senegal
West Bank and Gaza
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Kyrgyz Republic
Malaysia
Luxembourg
Syrian Arab
Republic
Kenya
Moldova
Bulgaria
Armenia
Georgia
Bermuda
Turkey
Lithuania
Islamic Republic of
Iran
Latvia
Netherlands
Albania

1,688
1,644
1,632
1,623

Nigeria
Grenada
Croatia
Djibouti

4.40%
4.34%
4.26%
3.87%

1,569
1,540
1,495
1,491
1,459
1,445
1,395
1,372
1,330

Burkina Faso
Hungary
Bolivia
Myanmar
Madagascar
Uganda
Lithuania
India
Vanuatu

3.69%
3.63%
3.61%
3.36%
3.35%
3.33%
3.31%
3.28%
3.26%

1,327
1,312
1,291

Congo, Dem. Rep.
Macedonia, FYR
Bulgaria

3.08%
3.05%
2.98%
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7.14%
6.86%
6.83%
6.40%
6.33%
6.12%
5.76%
5.51%
5.51%
4.92%
4.76%
4.58%
4.57%

Canada
Azerbaijan
Denmark
Nicaragua
Bolivia
Ethiopia
Iraq
Kosovo
Belarus
Mali
Uganda
Israel
South Africa
Finland
Liberia
New Caledonia
Norway
Ireland
French Polynesia
Panama
Paraguay
Costa Rica
Argentina
Estonia
Qatar
Greece
Slovenia
Cambodia
Tanzania
Myanmar
Hong Kong SAR,
China
Burkina Faso
Montenegro
Lesotho
Togo
Cote d'Ivoire
Macedonia, FYR
Afghanistan
Saudi Arabia
Guyana
New Zealand
Madagascar
Mongolia
Cyprus

1,274
1,270
1,258
1,198
1,191
1,087
1,004
971
932
920
902
853
825
806
641
613
609
603
564
554
554
552
494
456
437
429
423
400
388
387
387

Luxembourg
Benin
Kenya
Slovak Republic
Ecuador
Azerbaijan
Eswatini
Niger
Barbados
St. Kitts and Nevis
Mexico
Mongolia
Cambodia
Belgium
Malta
Paraguay
Estonia
Timor-Leste
St. Lucia
Rwanda
Afghanistan
Romania
Ethiopia
Burundi
Belarus
Solomon Islands
Colombia
Guinea
Thailand
Peru
Czech Republic

2.87%
2.58%
2.45%
2.44%
2.40%
2.39%
2.38%
2.37%
2.36%
2.30%
2.24%
2.22%
2.22%
2.17%
2.13%
2.03%
2.03%
1.98%
1.95%
1.92%
1.78%
1.73%
1.69%
1.66%
1.65%
1.61%
1.61%
1.47%
1.47%
1.43%
1.43%

385
381
371
364
336
307
301
295
294
285
272
261
254

Poland
Seychelles
Cyprus
Iceland
Algeria
Sierra Leone
Indonesia
Panama
Cote d'Ivoire
Costa Rica
France
Mozambique
Bhutan

1.42%
1.34%
1.29%
1.23%
1.20%
1.14%
1.12%
1.02%
1.01%
1.01%
0.99%
0.97%
0.95%
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Fiji
Mauritius
Cameroon
Malta
Benin
Iceland
Cabo Verde
Kazakhstan
Niger

251
249
242
226
214
209
201
194
172

0.87%
0.85%
0.78%
0.78%
0.74%
0.68%
0.65%
0.65%
0.64%

104
96
93
85
85
85
63
62
56
55

Slovenia
Tanzania
Cameroon
Palau
Austria
Sweden
Malawi
Lao PDR
Trinidad and
Tobago
Iraq
Malaysia
Italy
Russian Federation
Germany
Republic of Korea
Denmark
China
Namibia
Finland
Switzerland
Republic of Congo
Islamic Republic of
Iran
Netherlands
Israel
Qatar
South Africa
Zambia
Spain
Greece
Botswana
Ireland
Portugal

Venezuela, RB
Rwanda
Faeroe Islands
Sudan
Samoa
Mozambique
Curacao
Congo, Dem. Rep.
Tonga
The Gambia
Guinea
Comoros
Barbados

161
159
153
151
144
143
142
142
138
136
131
129
108

Chile
Swaziland
Lao PDR
Guinea-Bissau
Uruguay
Belize
Djibouti
Timor-Leste
Dominica
Sint Maarten (Dutch
part)
Burundi
Sierra Leone
Zambia
Namibia
Grenada
St. Vincent and the
Grenadines
Malawi
Macao SAR, China
Oman

51
48
47
47
43
42

United Kingdom
Turkey
Brazil
New Zealand
Uruguay
Australia

0.17%
0.16%
0.16%
0.16%
0.16%
0.16%

41
40
39

Norway
Sudan
Suriname

0.16%
0.16%
0.14%
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0.56%
0.55%
0.52%
0.50%
0.47%
0.47%
0.42%
0.40%
0.40%
0.37%
0.37%
0.35%
0.34%
0.30%
0.29%
0.27%
0.26%
0.22%
0.22%
0.22%
0.21%
0.21%
0.19%

Kuwait

34

0.13%

32
30
29

Hong Kong SAR,
China
Kazakhstan
Maldives
Macao SAR, China

St. Lucia
Botswana
Antigua and
Barbuda
Marshall Islands
Vanuatu
Micronesia, Fed.
Sts.
St. Kitts and Nevis
Sao Tome and
Principe
Bhutan
Solomon Islands
Seychelles
Kiribati
Turkmenistan
Angola
Papua New Guinea
Aruba
Suriname
Tuvalu
Maldives
Palau

27
24
23

Argentina
Canada
Japan

0.08%
0.08%
0.08%

20
20

Oman
Papua New Guinea

0.06%
0.05%

20
19
18
16
16
11
10
8
7
4
4
2

Saudi Arabia
Turkmenistan
United States
Kuwait
Chile
Mauritius
Angola

0.05%
0.04%
0.04%
0.03%
0.02%
0.01%
0.01%
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0.11%
0.09%
0.09%

Appendix H
Appendix H Table 1 Performance of the Institutional Revolutionary Party Abroad by
Subnational Unit
Year
Locality
Election
PRI abroad
PRI total
Difference
2006
National
Presidential
4.17
22.23
-18.06
2012
National
Presidential
15.62
38.21
-22.59
2018
National
Presidential
4.28
22.27
-17.99
2018
National
Senate
3.19
19.58
-16.39
2018
Aguascalientes
Presidential
5.37
18.49
-13.12
2018
Baja
Presidential
5.29
8.63
-3.34
California
2018
Baja
Presidential
5.47
9.31
-3.84
California Sur
2018
Campeche
Presidential
6.63
21.49
-14.86
2018
Chiapas
Presidential
2.74
23.21
-20.47
2018
Chihuahua
Presidential
5.48
16.12
-10.64
2018
Mexico City
Presidential
6.54
12.08
-5.54
2018
Coahuila
Presidential
4.83
26.13
-21.30
2018
Colima
Presidential
5.13
18.19
-13.16
2018
Durango
Presidential
5.17
19.29
-14.12
2018
Guanajuato
Presidential
4.33
16.44
-12.11
2018
Guerrero
Presidential
2.32
17.75
-15.43
2018
Hidalgo
Presidential
2.63
18.48
-15.85
2018
Jalisco
Presidential
5.13
14.57
-9.44
2018
Mexico
Presidential
5.38
19.27
-13.89
2018
Michoacán
Presidential
3.80
16.99
-13.19
2018
Morelos
Presidential
2.96
10.29
-7.33
2018
Nayarit
Presidential
4.67
13.72
-9.05
2018
Nuevo León
Presidential
4.36
14.49
-10.13
2018
Oaxaca
Presidential
1.73
17.76
-16.03
2018
Puebla
Presidential
2.57
15.94
-13.37
2018
Queretaro
Presidential
3.58
14.73
-11.50
2018
Quintana Roo
Presidential
2.54
10.55
-8.01
2018
San Luis
Presidential
4.56
20.70
-16.14
Potosí
2018
Sinaloa
Presidential
5.33
18.12
-12.79
2018
Sonora
Presidential
6.26
16.59
-10.33
2018
Tabasco
Presidential
3.01
8.95
-5.94
2018
Tamaulipas
Presidential
5.63
13.97
-8.34
2018
Tlaxcala
Presidential
2.25
12.19
-9.94
2018
Veracruz
Presidential
2.68
12.36
-9.68
2018
Yucatán
Presidential
6.57
27.83
-21.26
2018
Zacatecas
Presidential
5.77
23.37
-17.6
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2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006

Aguascalientes
Baja
California
Baja
California Sur
Campeche
Coahuila
Colima
Chiapas
Chihuahua
Mexico City
Durango
Guanajuato
Guerrero
Hidalgo
Jalisco
Mexico
Michoacán
Morelos
Nayarit
Nuevo León
Oaxaca
Puebla
Queretaro
Quintana Roo
San Luis
Potosí
Sinaloa
Sonora
Tabasco
Tamaulipas
Tlaxcala
Veracruz
Yucatán
Zacatecas
Aguascalientes
Baja
California
Baja
California Sur
Campeche
Coahuila
Colima
Chiapas
Chihuahua

Presidential
Presidential

15.00
18.00

36.79
35.69

-21.79
-17.69

Presidential

19.80

40.35

-20.55

Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential

25.49
13.80
18.64
27.53
18.88
10.15
21.64
18.27
21.25
21.55
17.77
15.74
21.25
15.20
28.66
8.43
16.75
15.38
11.34
8.33
18.66

38.58
38.35
39.54
29.80
44.76
25.09
45.77
37.90
35.31
40.77
38.59
42.21
41.45
32.15
46.02
32.36
32.85
33.35
37.42
31.81
36.21

-13.09
-24.55
-20.90
-2.27
-25.88
-14.94
-24.13
-19.63
-14.06
-19.22
-20.82
-26.47
-20.20
-16.95
-17.36
-23.93
-16.10
-17.97
-26.08
-23.48
-17.55

Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential

17.64
18.66
11.49
14.11
25.78
13.14
13.82
28.07
5.01
5.16

45.52
38.85
31.20
33.45
34.15
32.42
40.47
48.63
23.48
21.34

-27.88
-20.19
-19.71
19.34
-8.37
-19.28
-26.65
-20.56
-18.47
-16.18

Presidential

1.96

16.52

-14.56

Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential

0.00
4.51
8.30
9.09
4.28

28.15
26.44
29.66
33.64
29.39

-28.15
-21.93
-21.36
-24.55
-25.11
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2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2018
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
2018
2018
2018
2018
2018
2018
2018
2018
2018
2018
2018
2018
2018
2018
2018
2018
2018
2018

Mexico City
Durango
Guanajuato
Guerrero
Hidalgo
Jalisco
Mexico
Michoacán
Morelos
Nayarit
Nuevo León
Oaxaca
Puebla
Queretaro
Quintana Roo
San Luis
Potosí
Sinaloa
Sonora
Tabasco
Tamaulipas
Tlaxcala
Veracruz
Yucatán
Zacatecas
Aguascalientes
Baja
California
Baja
California Sur
Campeche
Coahuila
Colima
Chiapas
Chihuahua
Mexico City
Durango
Guanajuato
Guerrero
Hidalgo
Jalisco
Mexico
Michoacán
Morelos
Nayarit

Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential

2.23
6.97
3.44
4.12
4.47
4.04
2.92
4.54
3.78
7.18
4.06
3.14
5.21
4.00
10.14
7.03

8.54
26.85
18.80
26.52
24.95
24.17
18.10
18.96
15.65
33.69
27.56
31.72
23.18
20.11
27.22
21.78

-6.31
-19.88
-15.36
-22.4
-20.48
-20.13
-15.18
-14.42
-11.87
-26.51
-23.5
-28.58
-17.97
-16.11
-17.08
-14.75

Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Presidential
Senate
Senate

4.33
5.82
20.66
5.82
5.10
4.98
4.84
6.90
13.41
5.74

26.87
18.72
37.77
25.89
14.55
24.72
32.93
24.44
25.98
10.38

-22.54
-12.9
-17.11
-20.07
-9.45
-19.74
-28.09
-17.54
-12.57
-4.64

Senate

6.16

8.11

-1.95

Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate

10.90
8.02
8.39
4.12
9.84
5.21
6.40
5.02
3.07
5.00
4.11
6.25
3.77
5.02
4.59

30.66
32.51
29.27
29.51
21.92
9.69
21.49
14.00
23.07
27.09
12.18
24.26
17.31
20.28
14.22

-19.76
-24.49
-20.88
-25.39
-12.08
-4.48
-15.09
-8.98
-20.00
-22.09
-8.07
-18.01
-13.54
-15.26
-9.63

166

2018
2018
2018
2018
2018
2018

2012

Nuevo León
Oaxaca
Puebla
Queretaro
Quintana Roo
San Luis
Potosí
Sinaloa
Sonora
Tabasco
Tamaulipas
Tlaxcala
Veracruz
Yucatán
Zacatecas
Locality
Aguascalientes
Baja
California Sur
Chiapas

2015

Chiapas

2018
2012

Chiapas
Mexico City

2018

Mexico City

2017
2015
2016
2017
2018
2018
2018

Coahuila
Colima
Colima
Mexico
Guanajuato
Jalisco
Jalisco

2007

Michoacán

2011
2015

Michoacán
Michoacán

2018
2018
2018
2018
2018
2018
2018
2018
Year
2016
2015

Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate

3.81
2.28
2.83
4.44
2.55
8.17

15.26
22.90
15.31
14.67
15.72
28.51

-11.45
-20.62
-12.48
-10.23
-13.17
-20.34

Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Senate
Election
Governor
Governor

7.12
9.04
5.45
6.42
2.41
3.26
10.21
8.30
PRI abroad
25.80
29.41

18.93
27.79
11.73
18.15
17.41
15.24
37.25
33.69
PRI total
40.89
35.21

-11.81
-18.75
-6.28
-11.73
-15.00
-11.98
-27.04
-25.39
Difference
-15.09
-5.8

Migrant
representative
Migrant
representative
Governor
Head of
government
Head of
government
Governor
Governor
Governor
Governor
Governor
Governor
Representatives
proportional
representation
Migrant
representative
Governor
Governor

0.00

NA

NA

0.00

NA

NA

5.17
10.70

16.96
14.99

-11.79
-4.29

10.82

12.83

-2.01

10.00
31.25
47.61111
7.07
4.93
6.06
5.53

33.44
35.04
43.23
30.80
12.86
16.58
14.33

-23.44
-3.79
4.38
-23.73
-7.93
-10.52
-8.80

6.87

NA

NA

19.99
19.53

33.58
24.50

-13.59
-4.97

111

Information for the election results for Colima were gathered from online newspapers article
https://elpais.com/internacional/2016/01/19/mexico/1453167693_004945.html;
https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/articulo/estados/2016/01/18/finaliza-prep-en-colima-peralta-tiene-4323-de-votospreciado-3953#imagen-1; https://www.milenio.com/estados/peralta-y-el-pri-retienen-colima
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2018
Morelos
Governor
3.03
6.07
-3.04
2016
Oaxaca
Governor
15.38
32.11
-16.73
2018
Puebla
Governor
5.55
18.37
-12.82
2019
Puebla
Governor
2.71
18.48
-15.77
2018
Yucatán
Governor
10.71
32.31
-21.6
*There is some discrepancy in data whether the numbers show party coalitions (when applicable)
or not.
Appendix H Table 2 Determinates of the Implementation of External Voting (Mexican
Subnational Units)
Variable
Coefficient
Standard error
Remittance pc
-.013445**
.006682
Remittance pc squared
.0000249**
.0000101
Emigrant/population
.7128861
2.915016
Levels of INSSG
.9556992
.6885584
Diffusion
.0370248
.0266457
PRI Government
-.7393256
.5548472
N-size 444
Log pseudolikelihood42.213508
Chi square 19.10***
**** p < .001; *** p < .01; ** p < .05 *p <0.10
Appendix H: Table 3 Descriptive Statistics (Mexican Subnational Units)
Variable
Mean
Standard
Minimum
Maximum
Deviation
Remittance pc
226.9133
135.3908
36.43133
740.0312
Remittance pc
69784.5
79831.04
1327.242
547646.2
squared
Emigrant/population .1630534
.1038982
.0300702
.5883923
Levels of INSSG
1.909278
.6485971
.9
3
Diffusion
7.031187
13.51839
0
60
PRI Government
.578125
.494245
0
1
Appendix H Table 4 Correlation Matrix of Cox Model (Mexican Subnational Units)

Remittance pc
Remittance pc
squared
Emigrant/population
Levels of INSSG
Diffusion

Remittance
pc

Remittance
pc squared

1.0000
-0.9776

1.0000

0.0835
-0.2685
-0.2256

-0.1276
0.2582
0.1605

Emigrant/population

1.0000
0.2081
-0.5099
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Levels
of
INSSG

1.0000
0.0491

Diffusion

1.0000

PRI
Government

PRI Government

0.1099

-0.0746

0.2487

0.2144

-0.6443

1.0000

Appendix H Table 5: Test of Proportional-hazards assumptions (Mexican Subnational
Units)
chi2
df
Prob>chi2
global test
6.60
6
0.3589
Appendix H Table 6: Test of Proportional-hazards assumptions (Mexican Subnational
Units)
rho
chi2
df
Prob>chi2
Remittance pc
0.33302
1.90
1
0.1684
Remittance pc
-0.34173
1.94
1
0.1642
squared
Emigrant/population
-0.05816
0.14
1
0.7116
Levels of INSSG
-0.17213
1.03
1
0.3104
Diffusion
-0.20007
1.58
1
0.2085
PRI Government
0.32346
3.19
1
0.0743
global test
6.60
6
0.3589
Appendix H Table 7 Remittances per capita at the Mexican Subnational Level in 2018
Subnational Unit
Remittance per capita
External Voting
Michoacán
740
Yes
Zacatecas
691
Yes
Guanajuato
520
Yes
Nayarit
461
Durango
459
Guerrero
457
San Luis Potosi
455
Colima
450
Oaxaca
436
Yes
Jalisco
419
Yes
Aguascalientes
357
Yes
Morelos
354
Yes
Queretaro
324
Hidalgo
315
Chihuahua
277
Puebla
275
Yes
Sinaloa
269
Baja California
266
Tamaulipas
230
Tlaxcala
200
169

Coahuila
Nuevo Leon
Sonora
Veracruz
Mexico City
Chiapas
State of Mexico
Quintana Roo
Baja California (South)
Yucatan
Campeche
Tabasco

198
185
184
170
158
156
118
110
109
98
88
86

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
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Appendix I: Acronyms
BNG: Galician nationalist party
CONAGO: National Conference of Governors--Conferencia Nacional de Gobernadores
GDP: Gross domestic product
FDI: Foreign direct investment
GATT: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
HTAs: Hometown associations
IDEA: International Institute for Democracy & Electoral Assistance
IIRIRA: Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
IRCA: Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
INE: National Electoral Institute--Instituto Nacional Electoral
INEGI: National Institute of Statistics, Geography and Information Technology-- Instituto
Nacional de Estadística y Geografía
ISI: Import-substitution industrialization
IMF: International Monetary Fund
LMICs: Lower-and-middle-income countries
NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement
MORENA: National Regeneration Movement-- Movimiento Regeneración Nacional
ODA: Official development assistance
PAN: National Action Party-- Partido Acción Nacional
PRD: Party of the Democratic Revolution-- Partido de la Revolución Democrática
PRI: Institutional Revolutionary Party--Partido Revolucionario Institucional
SNGs: Subnational Governments
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